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Abstract 
The dissertation builds upon the question of why Nixon, a Republican, implemented 
the frrst affrrmative action programs. It is divided into three parts. The first charts the 
liberal approach to race relations and the crisis that attended its collapse. As 
Habermas noted, a "legitimation crisis" affected private institutions necessitating a 
new round of government intervention. This section explores the idea that affirmative 
action was part of this legitimation crisis, an administrative replacement for the failure 
of the post-war hope that racism would disappear after the destruction of formal 
barriers to black equality. 
The second looks at the interventions of the Nixon administration. It argues that the 
Philadelphia Plan was less important in terms of later affrrmative action than is 
usually thought. Other programs (such as the OMBE) developed around the same 
time became more significant. 1970 became the year that programs aimed at 
reforming ghettos transformed into programs aimed at strengthening the black 
middle-class. Nixon, though often characterised as "aprincipled," had what Garry 
Wills termed "the right to earn" in mind when pushing through the Philadelphia Plan 
in Congress. All Americans - black and white - should have this right, he reasoned. 
The present-day sides of the argument had yet to be formed and in 1972 Nixon saw no 
fundamental contradiction in insisting that quotas not curtail the rights of white 
workers. 
The third section examines why the issue of affrrmative action seemed to follow the 
implementation of affrrmative action programs. Here, it is suggested that the changing 
intellectual climate surrounding the introduction of the first affrrmative action 
programs transformed piecemeal civil rights programs into a broad policy model and 
ensured that controversy followed. Early affIrmative action policies, this section 
demonstrates, caused little controversy before (at least) 1973. The sides of the debate 
had yet to be formed. John Rawls' work is examined as an expression of the need to 
replace liberal institutions - such as the allocation of resources on the basis of merit. 
The Club of Rome's The Limits to Growth similarly focussed attention onto the realm 
of distribution rather than that of production, moving from Kennedy's perspective-
"a rising tide lifts all boats" - to one of affIrmative action. Afftrmative action 
measures were both necessary as a mechanism of distribution and a constant focus of 
complaint as different groups argued over relative shares. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many, many volumes greet the scholar or interested observer who wishes 
to understand the affirmative action debate in the United States today. This is not entirely 
surprising for an issue that has remained either in or just behind the headlines for nearly 
thirty years. Most of the material takes sides in a debate about whether affIrmative action 
policies should continue to dictate how university admissions, government contracts or 
jo bs are distributed. As such, the literature is stunningly repetitive. I Despite the plethora 
of material available on affIrmative action, however, there is little agreement even about 
what exactly affrrmative action is. There is also remarkable ignorance about - and, not 
enough interest in - the history of the policy, how this little phrase included in Kennedy's 
Executive Order 10925 in 1961 came to engage Americans in a way unrivalled by 
virtually any other question of public policy. The most important contributions to the 
ascent of affrrmative action happened during the presidency of Richard Nixon, often, as 
we will see, with his direct involvement. Reconstructing this history and reconsidering 
exactly what affIrmative action is will be the broad remit of this thesis. 
The definition of affIrmative action as well as questions of who exactly it 
benefits and whether or not affIrmative action policies work remain open, but it is worth 
trying to establish exactly what is meant by this phrase today. In the past, affrrmative 
action meant efforts to include members of nonwhite minorities2 and (white) women in 
various institutions in American society. The aim of affrrmative action then and now -
upon which most Americans today probably agree - might be said to be a more 
proportional representation of all racial and ethnic groups and a reasonable gender 
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balance in American workplaces, colleges and business ownership. Officially, affirmative 
action denotes a set of policies designed to increase the proportion of women and 
minorities within several spheres of American life.3 On March 7, 1995, President Clinton 
directed that a review be conducted of the Federal government's affrrmative action 
programs. The report "analyzed federal programs that might be categorized as affrrmative 
action.,,4 They included everything from "outreach efforts that encourage grantmakers to 
seek out members of disadvantaged groups, to procurement regulations that set aside 
particular contracts for competitive bidding limited largely to minority-owned, 
economically disadvantaged small businesses.,,5 This definition is perhaps the broadest 
possible. It is the discussion of how these programs are implemented, of the means to 
achieve the agreed aim, that generates controversy today. When contained in a newspaper 
headline, the phrase affrrmative action implies "preferential treatment" for women and 
minorities. Opponents protest (and some defenders of affrrmative action admit) that, 
despite the legitimate aim of affrrmative action, its goals can only be achieved by 
"reverse discrimination," by making decisions about hiring or granting college places 
using race or gender considerations equal to if not more important than merit 
considerations. 
Historically, the phrase has constantly shifted in its meaning. The phrase 
referred to regulatory action in the early 1930s and made its first legislative appearance in 
the 193 5 Wagner Act. There, it asked that managers take "affrrmative action" to re-
employ laid off union members. It became associated with civil rights in the 1940s and 
1950s, appearing in a report by Truman's Committee on Contract Compliance. Later, the 
term appeared in John F. Kennedy's Executive Order 10925 and again in the 1964 Civil 
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Rights Act;6 but its meamng was still, like so many phrases, vague and open to 
interpretation. It appears in this context to have meant, in relation to d i s c r i m i n a t i o ~ ~ that 
something more than simply not discriminating was needed. During the Kennedy and 
Johnson presidencies the term implied voluntary efforts only and, as a concept, it 
remained vague throughout most of the 1960s. Edward Sylvester, in charge of the Office 
for Federal Contract Compliance during the Johnson administration, stated in 1968 that: 
"There is no fixed and fIrm defmition of affIrmative action. I would say in a general way 
that affirmative action is anything that you have to do to get results. But this does not 
necessarily include preferential treatment. The key word here is 'results.",7 In 1969. 
however, the term became associated with the Philadelphia plan, the fIrst enforced 
affirmative action plan that set "goals and targets" for minorities hired by construction 
contractors working on Federally funded contracts. Order No.4, issued by the 
Department of Labor in February 1970, made affirmative action programs mandatory for 
all government contractors with fIfty or more employees. Despite its more exacting 
policy meaning, the term was not controversial nor implicitly linked with "quotas" until 
1972 when a controversy broke out, mainly within academic circles, about affirmative 
action programs. 
Revised Order No.4, issued in December of 1971 included women for the 
frrst time as an "affected class," extending greatly the groups covered by affirmative 
action programs. The New Republic, discussing the quota issue in October 1972, stated 
that afIrrmative action was "administered in three large segments: one by the civil service 
over government jobs, one by HEW (the Department of Health Education and Welfare) 
over colleges that accept grants, and one by the Labor Department over federal 
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contractors." Yet, the magazine's editors admitted, the relationship between quotas and 
affirmative action was hazy.8 In 1973 affrrmative action programs were extended to the 
physically and mentally handicapped and for the purpose of bilingual education. Still. it 
is likely that most Americans frrst heard of affirmative action when Alan Bakke's suit 
against the University of California Board of Regents reached the Supreme Court in 1977 
(Bakke had sued because he had been denied entry to the medical school, despite being 
better qualified than some minority applicants who were accepted). In a parallel process, 
aff'rrmative action for minority-owned businesses became an issue long after programs 
effecting "set asides" were initiated. In 1969 the Nixon administration began aiding 
minority-owned businesses in a program co-ordinated by the Office of Minority Business 
Enterprise (OMBE), created by Nixon in his first months of office. The Small Business 
Administration (SBA) administered the "8(a)" preferential procurement program for 
minority business (see appendix). In 1977 Congress passed the Public Works 
Employment Act, which earmarked 1 0 percent of funds for businesses owned by 
minorities. 9 
Thus the mearung of affrrmative action became, in the 1970s, more 
inclusive and more exact. From a vague term that appeared more hopeful than realistic it 
grew to a regulatory mechanism deemed necessary to achieve civil rights to a controversy 
creating entrenched positions. Not only the meaning but the goals of aff'rrmative action 
policies have also shifted over time. When frrst implemented, affrrmative action had as its 
remit the expansion of job opportunities for African-Americans in the inner-cities. The 
stated goal at that time was to provide equal opportunities to those who had been denied 
them. Advocates also spoke of the goal of "remedying past discrimination" and this goal 
4 
of affrrmative action has been the primary justification for its existence. 10 In 1970, Nixon 
shifted the emphasis of affrrmative action programs toward creating a stable black 
middle-class. Implicit within this strategy was the "role model theory," whereby those 
categories of people that have been discriminated against in the past are put into 
prominent positions in order to encourage others to follow in their footsteps. However. 
the US Supreme Court rejected the "role model theory" as a justification for affirmative 
action in 1986. 11 
One of the problems with "past discrimination" as a justification for 
affrrmative action is that it makes affrrmative action a temporary program. It becomes 
difficult to justify the continuation of affrrmative action programs in terms of past 
discrimination thirty years after they were frrst implemented. The implication is that 
either past discrimination has been alleviated or the affrrmative action programs have 
simply not worked. In the 1980s, largely as a response to the promised attacks on 
affirmative action programs by the Reagan administration, a third goal of "enhancing 
diversity" emerged as a reason for retaining affrrmative action policies. 12 The idea, now 
widely cited as a reason for continuing affrrmative action admissions policies in 
Universities and affrrmative action within private business, is that ethnic, racial and 
gender diversity creates a healthy atmosphere for learning/working. Justice Lewis Powell, 
in the famous Bakke case, argued that colleges and universities have a compelling interest 
in having a diverse student body.13 Such large American frrms as Xerox have introduced 
"balanced workforce" plans on the basis that diversity improves the workplace. Writing 
in the Harvard Business Review in 1990, R. Roosevelt Thomas highlighted diversity as 
good business sense, noting that "(s)ooner or later, affirmative action will die a natural 
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death." He instead promoted "diversity management," which, as Erin Kelley and Frank 
Dobbin observed recently, is almost indistinguishable in practice from affirmative action 
programs. 14 
So-called "soft" affIrmative action programs remam relatively 
unproblematic. Even the most entrenched anti-affrrmative action commentators put 
forward few objections to "outreach," race- or gender-conscious methods to expand 
applicant pools for jobs or higher education facilities. William Bennett and Terry 
Eastland, conservative critics of affrrmative action, argued that "personal attributes such 
as one's having overcome poverty, parental abuse or racial discrimination ... can, and 
should be, taken into account" in considering university admissions. 15 "Hard" affirmative 
action refers to policies that set explicit targets for the percentage of minorities and/or 
women in a workplace, in college, or holding government contracts. It sets hiring or 
admissions goals, or sets aside government contracts based on racial or sexual categories. 
In other words, hard affrrmative action specifically discriminates - other qualifications 
being equal- in favour of non-whites and women. Most discussions of affrrmative action 
concentrate on policies affecting the workplace, on issues of hiring, promotion or fIring. 16 
However, contract "set-asides" continue to create discussion, as do preferential college 
admissions policies. 
Controversy also extends to the intended beneficiaries of affrrmative 
action po licies. The original justification, at least, was that African-Americans had 
historically been discriminated against. Thus, affrrmative action is a remedy for past 
discrimination, intended to restore blacks to the position that they would have achieved 
had there been no discrimination against them. Though the original intended beneficiaries 
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were African-Americans, the first affIrmative action policies targeted "minorities," listed 
in a government letter to the heads of all departments as "Negroes, Puerto Ricans, 
American Indians, Spanish Americans, Asians, Eskimos and Aleuts.,,17 By 1971, when 
Revised Order No.4 was issued by the Department of Labor (DOL), women were 
included as affrrmative action beneficiaries. The term "Spanish Americans" was later 
replaced by "Spanish-Speaking." The Small Business Administration's set-aside program 
8(a) was expanded in 1979 to include "Asian PacifIc Americans"; and, in the 1980s, 
Americans with Indian, Sri Lankan, Tongan, Indonesian, Nepalese and Bhutanese 
backgrounds all petitioned successfully to be included in the 8(a) program, whereas 
Hassidic Jews, women, disabled veterans, Iranians and Afghans all had their petitions 
rejected. I8 Many observers, both pro and anti-affrrmative action, object to what they see 
as the corruption of the original meaning of affrrmative action - to remedy past 
discrimination. They point out that many immigrants, such as Cubans who settled in 
Florida after the fall of the Batista regime, have not experienced historical discrimination 
within the United States.19 Many object to affirmative action because it emphasises racial 
differences; rather, they would like to see affrrmative action for all disadvantaged persons 
rather than racially defmed groups. A debate has also emerged over whether affrrmative 
action policies designed to help women have worked against African American men, the 
original intended beneficiaries. 20 
One controversy that muddies discussions about aff"rrmative action 
concerns the question of whether affrrmative action in the United States requires "quotas" 
of non-whites or women or whether these should be flexible "goals." Many, if not most, 
defenders of affrrmative action insist that quotas are wrong but goals and timetables are 
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good. Benjamin Hooks, former executive director of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) refers to "goals and timetables, which are 
disparagingly called quotas by critics and opponents." He insisted that the ''NAACP has 
never promoted the concept of so-called quotas.,,21 Bill Clinton foreswore quotas in his 
pre-election collaborative effort with Senator Albert Gore.22 Not surprisingly, his 
Presidential Commission found that "(q)uotas are intrinsically rigid, and intrinsically 
relegate qualifications and other factors to secondary status." They found that there were 
no quota programs in operation by the federal government. 23 In fact, this argument goes 
back to the original discussion about the legality or otherwise of the Philadelphia plan in 
1969. The Nixon administration defended the plan against charges of illegal quotas 
(made illegal by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act - see Appendix 1) by insisting 
that the affirmative action plans need only specify "goals and timetables." In 1972, when 
the administration faced criticism over quotas, Nixon aide Leonard Garment used the 
same defence against the charges. 24 
However, Barbara Bergmann, another resolute defender of affirmative 
action, admitted, asserts that such a difference is largely semantic: "Are numerical goals 
~ ~ ------
and timetables the same thing as quotas? It is not unreasonable to say so." Bergmann 
believes the debate is best served by defenders of affIrmative action if they "acknowledge 
that such programs do have quotalike aspects. ,,25 There is some support for this view to 
be found in Justice Powell's summation of the Bakke decision. In reply to the petitioner's 
claim that only "goals" and not quotas were being pursued, Powell stated: "This semantic 
distinction is beside the point: The special admissions program is undeniably a 
classification based on race and ethnic background.,,26 Logically, the insistence on goals 
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and timetables simply shifts the burden of setting the quota onto the individual employer. 
To reach a goal of fifteen black employees in a workforce of one hundred when only ten 
are employed, the employer must hire five more black employees or face increasing 
pressure by federal contract compliance officers and risk losing a valuable contract. 
Historically, even those within the Nixon administration used the term quotas when 
referring to programs that they insisted publicly were dealing only with goals and targets, 
confirming the fact that there was really little difference in practice between goals and 
quotas.27 
No doubt (and no wonder that) affirmative action is 0 ften misunderstood. 
In general, the two sides of the argument are seen to divide into left/right categories, with 
defenders of affirmative action normally considering themselves liberal or even left-wing 
while those opposing affrrmative action usually (but not always) have more conservative 
worldviews. A general point made in this thesis is that left/right categories obscure what 
affirmative action really is and how it developed. First, the polemical discussion misses 
the fact that affrrmative action is not simply a few Federal or state policies. As Nathan 
Glazer observed, affrrmative action has become "institutionalized" within American 
life.28 Thus, many supporters of California's Proposition 209 and, more recently, 
Washington's 1-200, hoped (and opponents of these measures feared) that affirmative 
action was on the way out when these measures banning racial or sexual preference in 
state employment, college admissions and procurement contracts were passed. The 
difficulties in dismantling the programs were immediately apparent. Even after 
Proposition 209 passed, California affrrmative action programs, because of an obscure 
provision in the state Constitution, could continue to operate unless ordered not to by a 
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judge. The City of San Francisco, amongst others, promised to continue its programs 
whatever the stipulations within 209. Private companies continue atrmnative action 
policies under the new rubric of "diversity management.,,29 In favour of209, California's 
Governor Pete Wilson was forced to file suit against his own state agencies to get a court 
opinion that would permanently close some of their programs. The agencies were 
represented by state attorneys who offered no defense of the programs. When he left 
office, his Democratic replacement Governor Gray Davis dropped the suit. On July 16 
1999, the Democratic-controlled California Legislature gave fmal approval to a bill by 
state Senator Richard Polanco (Democratic - Los Angeles) stating that outreach 
programs for minorities and women are permissible under Proposition 209. The measure 
now goes to Davis. Those who voted for the proposition hoping that a strict merit system 
would soon be back in operation were frustrated by an atrrrmative action bureaucracy 
that is still well-ensconced, even in California. 30 
To think that atrrrmative action can be simply banned misses the fact that 
affirmative action is something larger than a few policies. As Glazer observed, the 
Supreme Court "will pause before considering the uprooting of processes so well 
established, involving thousands of employees, affecting the expectations of millions.,,31 
"Diversity management," as affrrmative action is now called in some circles, is now sold 
as a way to maximise profits. 32 In other words, affrrmative action may have begun as a 
number of regulatory policies by the United States Federal government but it has been 
incorporated so fully within the private sphere that it would continue without government 
regulations. 33 As the Economist magazine observed: "The public sector's assorted 
affirmative action officials may fmd that the best way to save their pet schemes lies in 
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privatization. ,,34 Originally an idea to reform American institutions, it has become an 
institution itself. 
Concentrating narrowly on the state initiatives also misses the fact that 
affIrmative action has become internationalised - a point often missed in American 
discussions. A week after voters in Houston, Texas, rejected a law that would have ended 
the city's explicit preferences for awarding business contracts to women and minorities, 
the European Court of Justice gave encouragement to supporters of affirmative action 
across the European Union by upholding a German law that favours women in public-
sector promotions.35 In Britain, the announcement by Home Secretary Jack Straw that he 
would set quotas of ethnic policemen and women excited little controversy, indicating 
that, although affIrmative action remains prohibited by the 1976 Race Relations Act, de 
facto affIrmative action continues.36 Few institutions in Britain have escaped the 
compulsion to seek representation. Even the reformed House of Lords must now have six 
percent of its members from the ethnic minority community and two and a half percent 
disabled. Sunita Parikh notes the existence within India of affIrmative action laws 
(predating those in the US) designed to protect "untouchables" and "other backward 
castes," or OBCs.37 Affrrmative action, even if it is not called affIrmative action, is 
clearly the operational basis for much more than employment laws in California. No 
other civil rights initiative in the history of the United States has become such an all-
pervasive system. 
Historical mysteries surrounding affrrmative action also confound the 
left/right perspective on the issue. First, why, in the face of much evidence that 
voluntaristic policies were not working, did administrators in the 1950s and early 1960s 
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refuse to consider implementing quota-based affirmative action programs? Black 
Americans had picketed different concerns in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s in order to get 
black representation within the workforces of these concerns.38 One of the original 
demands of the Birmingham, Alabama bus boycott in 1955/6 was that black drivers be 
hired for routes with primarily black customers. 39 Whitney Young, the executive 
chairman of the National Urban League (NUL) published To Be Equal in 1964, asking 
for reparations and preferential treatment for African-Americans. But Young dropped his 
demand in order to lend support for the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights bill. When the 
issue was brought up in the ensuing debate over the bill, it was dismissed out of hand by 
all concerned (see chapter 1). Though it was an obvious way of enforcing 
nondiscrimination, few would consider it until later on in the 1960s. The biggest mystery, 
however, is why Nixon, a conservative president who attracted the votes of Southern 
segregationists by promising to slow down desegregation and by opposing bussing, was 
the President to bring in affrrmative action policies, so hated by later generations of 
Republicans. Though civil rights figures had previously lobbied for preferential 
treatment, none rose to the defence of the Philadelphia plan when it was threatened in late 
1969. In fact, the NAACP came out against the Philadelphia plan as "divisive.,,40 Nixon 
clearly worked hard to save the Philadelphia plan in 1969 from a congressional challenge 
and safeguarded affrrmative action in the congressional battle over the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. But in the run-up to the 1972 election, Nixon 
campaigned against the quotas he had fought so hard to preserve. Understanding the 
Nixon civil rights agenda has been, as Skrentny observed, "an exercise in futility for 
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scholars of the American Presidency - as well as for insiders in the Nixon White 
House.,,41 
A hidden yet important aspect of affrrmative action has been its role within 
an historical process whereby the American State has gained a remarkable amount of 
power over its citizens. It is interesting that little opposition to affIrmative action - hostile 
in general to government interference in the lives of American citizens - approve of the 
notion that private employers should be free to set quotas (or to discriminate) if they like. 
Neither side of the debate appears primarily concerned with the issue of freedom from 
government interference. In the fight between Sean Thornton (John Wayne) and Red Will 
Danaher in the movie classic, The Quiet Man, neither of the fighters accomplishes much 
but an awful lot of scenery goes by as they fight. Those who see recent American history 
in left-right terms, as an eternal battle between liberal progressives and conservatives, 
miss the incredible distances both have covered towards what Hugh Davis Graham has 
called a "vast but quiet revolution in the nature of the American State itsel£,,42 The 
American State has clearly progressed from its New Deal or perhaps post-war Keynesian 
role whereby it simply oiled the wheels of the capitalist engine. The State now regulates 
hiring, promotion and fIring processes for the majority of employed Americans. An 
estimated three-quarters of Americans belong to "affected classes" who warrant 
preference under affIrmative action plans.43 Because the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth amendment of the Constitution protects individuals from exclusion due to 
their race, the courts must constantly rule whether or not disputed programs serve a 
"compelling governmental interest" that justifies racial categories. In some ways, the 
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civil rights struggle has moved off the streets and into the courtroom. Real power has not 
so much been accrued by different interest groups as by the courts and the executive. 44 
The issue is also interesting in that the dominant pluralist vision of 
American political and policy history has foundered on affrrmative action. No national 
civil rights group or other "interests" that stood to gain implemented or even lobbied for 
the Philadelphia plan. It was, as Skrentny has remarked, completely the product of a 
white male policy elite45 ; there was little public pressure for affrrmative action from its 
beneficiaries nor anyone else. No political gains were made by the Nixon administration 
by implementing affrrmative action. In fact, as Nixon observed just a few days after 
saving the Philadelphia plan from a congressional attack on it in 1969, "we gained little 
on the play.,,46 There was no bargaining and no compromises were reached. One single 
group dominated in making decisions that would result in affrrmative action policies -
the white male (Republican) elite. One of the most influential policy decisions in 
American history has never really been subject to a democratic decision by the American 
people. In virtually every poll taken, white Americans overwhelmingly rejected the idea 
of preferences for blacks and a sizeable minority of black Americans also rejects 
preferences. 47 Affrrmative action programs have consistently either eluded or 
circumvented the democratic process. Instead of political gain, these policies offered a 
way to restore the legitimacy of government action on civil rights after the post-war 
appeals to white American conscience simply drew attention to the gap between the 
promise and the realisation of civil rights. Affirmative action policies regulated relations 
between the races that had previously been left within the private sphere. Nixon, though 
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his gut instinct went against further government intervention in the area of civil rights, 
understood that restoring legitimacy to government had to be prioritised. 
Another connected facet of affIrmative action is that it effectively 
depoliticised the issue of civil rights. The civil rights movement may have been a 
movement of "political rejuvenation or r e v i t a l i z a t i o ~ " " as Richard King points out, but its 
effects on the existing polity were profoundly destabilizing.48 By forcing the issue of civil 
rights, the expectations of black Americans were raised and, when they were not met, 
black insurgency and ghetto riots ensued. White reaction to the issue also resulted in a 
crisis 0 f authority for the status quo in the late 1960s. The Nixon administration spent 
much of its time devising ways to re-incorporate disparate strands of American society to 
ensure that they worked within the existing political structure. AffIrmative action brought 
the unruly issue of civil rights fIrmly within the system, blunting the widespread 
questioning of existing authority, reducing a potentially explosive political question to an 
argument about how much, reducing a qualitative question to a quantitative argument. 
Though affirmative action has generated its own consequences and, as a controversy, is 
anything but dead, there is a certain stability to these discussions. The United States could 
once again appear to its citizens to be a quasi-pluralist democracy, whereby different 
interests compete against each other and the State exists primarily as an arbiter rather 
than a perceived barrier to social progress. Black Americans and other groups who felt 
they were excluded were brought into the system through affIrmative action policies, 
while the white backlash was incorporated into Republican politics by (sometimes only 
apparent) opposition to them. Again, Glazer found that ''the stability we see is not only 
one of exhaustion and equally matched forces; it is also one of institutionalizing the 
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acceptance of affIrmative action as a legitimate norm by employers; even, grudgingly, by 
employees.,,49 The issue of race, so destructive to the fabric of American society in the 
past, has been contained within the issue of affIrmative action. Though controversy 
remains, no alternative leadership or counter elite has emerged nationally and, despite 
efforts, no mass campaign has emerged.50 Dye and Zeigler observed in 1970: "If 
American elites can help the blacks achieve economic equality, prevent further urban 
violence, and pacify the white masses, they will indeed have proved the viability of 
American democracy. ,,51 That two of three of these tasks has been accomplished 
concurrent with the development of affirmative action is surely significant. 
The points above - I hope - justify more analysis of this much talked-
about issue. In building on some excellent histories of affIrmative action as an evolving 
concept and set of policies, I hope to be able to contribute to an exciting and dynamic 
current that deserves further exploration. In that spirit, this study hopes to place the 
development of affIrmative action - not simply as a series of programs but in the larger 
sense of a "system" sketched above - in historical context by examining the emergence 
and development of affrrmative action largely within Nixon's first term, 1969-1972. It 
will examine the introduction and rapid expansion of affIrmative action programs in the 
context of the Nixon White House's need to assert control over both a Congress and a 
bureaucracy hostile to many of its policy innovations. 
In examining affIrmative action, this thesis will concentrate on elite 
policymaking and responses to civil rights issues. In doing so, it will suggest that the 
historical impetus for affIrmative action came more from the top than from pressure from 
civil rights groups. Undoubtedly, the civil rights movement created the civil rights 
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revolution in the 1960s that provoked a crisis of the elite. It is not the intention here to 
belittle the importance of the movement in influencing profoundly the history of the 
period and, in many ways, creating the need for affirmative action. The literature on the 
civil rights movement is voluminous and there is no need to repeat the story. But it must 
be stressed that affirmative action was an elite strategy to deal with civil rights and race 
relations problems. As Skrentny observed: "There was never any march on Washington 
for affirmative action, never any consistent pressing of politicians to acquiesce in a policy 
of racial hiring. . .. The policy is largely the construction of white male elites who 
traditionally have dominated government and business. ,,52 
One central question - why did Nixon, the conservative author of the 
"Southern strategy,,,53 a hyper-political operator whose feelings towards black Americans 
were ambivalent at best, implement a radical change affecting not only African-
Americans but also women? - is the basis for this dissertation. There are, of course, 
different facets to the question. One important method of understanding the origins of 
affirmative action the importance of which will be demonstrated throughout this 
dissertation, is as policy history, as a result of administrative logic as well as in relation to 
various political and social trends occurring around these unfolding policies. A simple 
truth concerning affIrmative action policies is that the Federal government could 
effectively enforce them at a local level by threatening contractors who failed to make 
sufficient progress toward specific goals and targets or by setting aside a segment of 
contracts to minority-owned fIrms. These goals and targets replaced the vagueness of 
many Great Society civil rights policies and civil rights policy no longer relied on 
voluntary activism on the part of companies, unions or the white population. It could be 
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enforced, unlike housing and education civil rights reform, fairly effectively at a local 
level. 
We are, however, left with many questions. For instance, why wasn't 
affIrmative action implemented earlier, given its effectiveness? And what precipitated its 
arrival at the end of the 1960s? As chapter 1 indicates, schemes very similar to 
affirmative action operated before WWII with few problems. Certainly, the broad 
strategy behind affIrmative action today was understood throughout the post-war period. 
Chapter 1 evaluates the importance of the Myrdalian model of race relations and shows 
why it could not broach affIrmative action in its modem sense. Chapter 2 details early 
government civil rights efforts, indicating that, although the affIrmative action strategy 
(and even the term "affirmative action") was familiar to Truman and Eisenhower 
officials, they drew back from enforced quotas. Chapters 3 and 4 look at what was at base 
a political crisis resulting in the decline of the authority of liberal institutions, including 
liberal hopes for reforming the attitudes of white Americans. I will show that the post-
war liberal attitude towards race - the basis of post-war government intervention in race 
relations - could only be maintained in an era characterised by a broad social and 
political consensus. In the last chapter of this section, I will discuss the crisis at another 
level, showing the relationship between these crises and the unfolding of affrrmative 
action in terms of social theorist Jiirgen Habermas's Legitimation Crisis. 54 
In the second section, I will examine the conscious responses by the Nixon 
administration to the various crises. Chapter 6 shows that the importance of the 
Philadelphia Plan was not for its programmatic or administrative precedent - for there is 
little indication that the Philadelphia Plan succeeded - but for the battle in Congress 
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surrounding it. Here Nixon's role in defending the Philadelphia Plan was crucial. Chapter 
7 indicates that other policies implemented by Nixon at about the same time as the 
Philadelphia Plan were more important in the programmatic development of affirmative 
action. Chapter 8 evaluates a shift of emphasis in civil rights policy 1970 effected by 
Nixon himself in terms of the direction meant that affrrmative action policy took away 
from the ghettoes and towards the creation of a more stable black middle-class, a 
different emphasis than Great Society policies. This was no retreat from affirmative 
action, however. Not only did Nixon refuse to disavow this affrrmative action plan, the 
White House defended affrrmative action programs for the second time against an 
attempt to make them illegal which was included in the Democratic-sponsored Equal 
Employment Opportunities Bill put forward in the fall of 1971. Finally, Chapter 9 deals 
with the seemingly impenetrable private Nixon's views on race and civil rights. 
Considered by many to be a racial liberal in the 1950s, Nixon was ambivalent when in 
the White House about whether blacks were capable of being equal. There is evidence 
that he doubted they were. Yet, he kept the door open. Nixon's views on race were not, 
however, atypical of his generation. Far from the moral cipher that many historians 
consider him to have been, he strongly believed in what Gary Wills referred to as the 
"right to earn,,,55 a version of the Weberian Protestant work ethic promoting rewards to 
anyone willing to work hard, and was anxious to extend this right to African-Americans. 
That he put this into practice in the form of the Philadelphia Plan indicates a certain 
commitment to this ideal. Nor, if we analyse Nixon's support for affrrmative action in 
this way, is there any clash with his attack on quotas in the run-up to the 1972 election. 
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In the fmal section, the last pieces of the puzzle are assembled. Here. I 
examine changes in the American economy, the rise of a popular consciousness of limits, 
and the influential philosophy of John Rawls. These trends ensured that affIrmative 
action policies were the policies of choice during the 1970s but also ensured that an 
obscure policy became a huge political issue. The key change was the rising importance 
of the realm of distribution as opposed to that of production. AffIrmative action became 
viable in an era where private companies grew increasingly reliant on government 
contracts. It became effective as an ethical method of distribution of social goods in the 
absence of the discipline of the market. It also became contentious when it became a 
zero-sum game - when, in the perceptions of white American males especially, fmite 
social goods were being divided unfairly. 
Chapter 10 deals with the gap that exists between the arrival of affrrmative 
action policies and the emergence of affIrmative action as an issue. There was virtually 
no opposition to affIrmative action until, on the pages of Commentary in late 1971 and 
1972, writers started attacking "quotas" because of the effect of "reverse discrimination." 
It is doubtful that very many Americans were made aware of this set of policies until the 
Supreme Court ruled on the Bakke case in 1978. Chapter 11 explores the shifts in the 
justifications for aff'rrmative action policies after the threat of riots receded and after the 
extension of categories of minorities and the addition of women as an affected class. John 
Rawls' A Theory of Justice and the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth are analysed in 
their contribution to a complex new set of justifications for affIrmative action in the 
1970s. 
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Section 1 
FROM MYRDAL TO THE KERNER COMMISSION: 
THE FALL OF THE LIBERAL HOUSE OF CARDS 
Time, events, or the unaided individual action of the mind will sometimes 
undermine or destroy an opinion, without any outward sign of the change. It has 
not been openly assailed, no conspiracy has been formed to make war upon it, but 
its followers one by one noiselessly secede, day by day a few of them abandon it, 
until at last it is only professed by a minority ... They are themselves caught 
unaware that a great revolution has actually been affected ... The majority has 
ceased to believe what they believed before, but they still effect to believe, and 
this empty phantom of public opinion is strong enough to chill innovators and 
keep them silent and at a respectful distance. (Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy 
in America). 
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Chapter 1 
THE MYRDALIAN PARADIGM 
In exploring this q u e s t i o ~ ~ it becomes apparent that a set of values -
existing in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s but no longer in existence by the early 
1970s - regarded government enforced quotas as taboo. It is answered indirectly for the 
most part by the existing scholarship. Policy historian Hugh Davis Graham identifies 
three "new and institutionally distinct" streams of thought as being responsible for the 
change in meaning and raised profile of affIrmative action occurring in the 1970s: 1., 
Bureaucratic logic of "clientele capture." 2., "(t)heoreticians of affIrmative action." and 
3., judicial logic following the courts' switch to demanding the "undoing of the effects of 
past discrimination."l Unfortunately, the ''theoreticians of affIrmative action" that 
Graham claims contributed to the acceptance of affIrmative action policy simply did not 
exist before the Nixon presidency. In a footnote he lists the Ford and Rockefeller 
foundations, the American Civil Liberties U n i o ~ ~ law schools and others but fails to 
specify which articles or books provided a ''theory of affIrmative action." The fIrst 
examination of affIrmative action as a comprehensive theory can be seen in a critical 
article by Daniel Bell reviewing the 1970 Civil Rights Commission (CRC) report, a year 
after the implementation of the Philadelphia plan. Even then, Bell simply pointed out that 
the definition of discrimination used by the CRC - failing to achieve results -
contradicted the earlier defmition whereby an individual consciously refused to employ 
minorities.2 Not until Nathan Glazer published Affirmative Discrimination in 1975 (made 
up of articles published earlier) was there a book-length critique of affirmative action, let 
26 
alone an extensive justificatory tract. 3 That such an important policy change should be 
implemented before any treatise describing it appeared calls into question Graham's 
formulation of affirmative action as a conscious, coherent policy. It is no doubt more 
accurate to say, as Nixon speechwriter William Safrre did, of affirmative action: 
"Strange, fitting a philosophy to the set of deeds, but sometimes that is what must be 
done.,,4 The "clientele capture" formulation is also problematic. That the clientele - the 
civil rights movement - became incorporated into the Federal bureaucracy need not be 
contested.5 What needs to be explained, however, is why, if affirmative action was the 
result of civil rights activists moving into the halls of government, very few calls for 
affrrmative action programs were heard prior to their "capture." Apart from a small 
discussion prior to the 1964 Civil Rights Act during which civil rights leaders made clear 
their opposition to quotas, very little was heard about the issue at al1.6 Moreover, as will 
be demonstrated later, key civil rights movement figures ignored or opposed the 
Philadelphia plan when it introduced an affrrmative action policy in the construction 
industry in 1969. 
Graham's contention that "judicial logic" moved towards demands for 
goals and timetables is undeniable. There is much to the idea that frustration with the 
inability to enforce aspects of the 1964 Civil Rights Act led to demands for demonstrable 
equal results. A convincing explanation of why piecemeal judicial decisions converged 
with Executive actions to create an entire system based on affrrmative action logic at the 
time that it did, however, is missing from Graham's analysis. Judicial demands for 
percentages of minorities hired within particular industries and organizations were hardly 
new, as will be demonstrated below. Why did a system of affrrmative action in which the 
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focus of civil rights and race relations not take place soon after the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
became law? In late 1965 at the White House Conference on Civil Rights the few 
demands upon which the fragmenting civil rights movement could agree focused on the 
lack of enforcement of existing laws.7 What barriers to a system of afftrmative action 
existed in 1965 that no longer existed ten years later? 
A useful insight appears in a comment in the conclusions of The Civil 
Rights Era. Graham notes the occurrence of a "shift of civil rights policy appears to have 
been the unwitting cutting edge of a vast but quiet revolution in the nature of the 
American State itself.,,8 Writing in the Journal of Policy History in 1998, Graham 
expands upon this thesis by including affirmative action as one of the "subsets" of a 
swathe of social regulation sextupling the pages of the Federal Register in the 1970s.9 
The idea of affirmative action as regulation undoubtedly captures an aspect of it that the 
left/right discussion misses. 
In terms of understanding the preVIOUS period of history, in which 
affirmative action was not even considered an option, something must have existed which 
precluded quota-based policies. Whatever it was, it was disappearing or at least in crisis 
by the time affirmative action policies came to dominate the policy environment. John 
David Skrentny devotes an entire section of his book, The Ironies of Affirmative Action, 
to this very question.1O He notes that in 1964 ''the interest of the mainstream civil rights 
groups and liberals were peculiarly limited. Presumably, racial preference was in their 
interest then, as it is presumably in their interest now. Why not demand it in 1964, go for 
all one can get, and compromise later if necessary?" His answer is simple: "Anything 
beyond color blindness had a strange, taboo like quality. Advocacy of racial preference 
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was one of those 'third rails' of American politics: Touch it and you die." II Skrentny's 
study concentrates on reconstructing the "historical and cultural context of policy elites." 
Three chapters address the problem of "Understanding Resistance to Affirmative 
Action." Skrentny shows the historical and ideological barriers to affirmative action and 
includes a discussion on what he calls "acceptable preference." Echoing complaints first 
heard from the National Urban League,12 Skrentny compares the preference shown to 
veterans after the World Wars with that of affIrmative action. The comparative structure 
is flimsy in that preferences for soldiers could be seen as rewards for service rather than 
preferential treatment. 13 As will be shown in this chapter, Paul D. Moreno makes the 
same point - that the preferences in affIrmative action were hardly unprecedented - more 
effectively by showing that employment preferences for African-Americans, let alone 
preferential treatment for veterans or mothers or children of alumni, had been instituted in 
the past. 
Skrentny's "color-blind" model of American society is more compelling, 
particularly in his explication of affIrmative action and color-blindness as systems of 
thought that dominated different periods of history. He sees affIrmative action not as a 
specific set of policies but as a model or "policy paradigm.,,14 He compares it with what 
he sees as the previous policy paradigm, the color-blind model. This usefully divides the 
piecemeal decisions from the arrival of affIrmative action as a system. However, in order 
to understand why affrrmative action could not be implemented before Nixon took the 
reigns of the presidency, the "color-blind" paradigm must be investigated. 
One point that has become clear (and will be discussed below) is that, 
before WWII, quota-based policies existed, implemented by the Federal Government and 
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private companies. This move to create quotas created very little comment at the time. 
Besides this, official quotas dictated the "racial" nature of immigration to the United 
States after 1924.15 Presumably the color-blind paradigm simply did not operate before 
WWII. When it did operate, how far did affect the United States? Color-blindness, 
though it was official policy for much of the post-war period, did not extend to all 
American communities at this stage, as Arnold Hirsch and Thomas Sugrue have pointed 
OUt.
16 Another possible problem with the "color-blind" model is that much of the color-
blind rhetoric still holds true during the "affirmative action era." Justice Harry Blackmun, 
dissenting in the Bakke case, stated that America was going through a regrettable but 
necessary phase of "transitional inequality" that would end ''within a decade at most. ,,17 
Many other supporters of affIrmative action today see their ultimate goal as a color-blind 
society but suppose that color-conscious policies are needed to achieve that goal. 18 
Though there is undoubtedly much insight to be gained by arguing that a "color-blind" 
society prevented affIrmative action from operating, we must look more closely at how 
this color-blind ethos operated. 19 
Skrentny is right to point to the importance of whatever prevented 
affirmative action - more effective, surely, than its policy predecessors - from becoming 
the general approach before Nixon implemented the Philadelphia Plan in 1969. This 
chapter will be, in part, an attempt to build upon Skrentny's paradigmatic approach to 
affirmative a c t i o ~ ~ to sketch some of the relevant aspects of the post-war liberal world-
view in order to understand why it remained resistant to initiating a quota-based system 
and to understand why a quota-based system was adopted less than a decade after it had 
been condemned all around. Regarding the fIrst part of the question, several elements of 
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post-war liberal ideology stand out as important in analysing why a quota-based system 
could not be considered. First, the problem began to be analysed after WWII as one of 
outdated and irrational prejudice in American whites. The so lution, it was felt, was to 
educate whites away from their prejudices and to show them that there was no economic 
rationale to racism. Quotas were not seen as helpful in achieving this aim as they might 
antagonise white workers. Second, consensus politics were the rule during this period. 
The issue threatened the New Deal coalition. Again, quotas might jeopardise the 
consensus needed to resolve the problem. The great hope of post-war liberalism was that 
American democratic institutions,20 including education, business, political parties, and 
trade unions, would oversee the eradication of racial discrimination. Through these 
institutions, the irrational mobs that were evident in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union 
might be made more rational, more democratic and less irrationally racist. Any race 
relations policy that undermined these institutions was, at a time of Cold War tension, not 
simply counterproductive but hostile to American democracy, unAmerican. Only when, 
at the end of the 1960s, these institutions were seen to be bankrupt could tentative moves 
towards quota-based solutions be considered. Last, post-war liberalism saw quotas as 
unnecessary in a period characterised by belief in constant economic growth and a trend 
toward greater economic equality. The class-based economic inequalities that had 
resulted in so much tension before WWII appeared to have been overcome successfully 
with economic expansion; surely, liberals reasoned, any irrational race-based divisions 
would soon be transcended as life for all Americans became materially better. There was 
simply no room in an expanding economy for irrational prejudices. 
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Recently, Thomas Sugrue has written about the history of affIrmative 
action: "The most influential arguments (both Left and Right) about affirmative action 
rest on two assumptions. First affrrmative action represented a radical departure from 
previous public policies to address racial inequality. Second, the policy of racial 
preferences destroyed a liberal consensus that dominated American politics since the 
New Deal." Both of these perspectives he calls "fundamentally ahistorical.,,21 Sugrue is 
half-right in his condemnation. First, as this chapter will show, quota-based affrrmative 
action policies were no new invention in 1969 when the Philadelphia plan was initiated. 
But the context within which this old and somewhat obvious policy idea was initiated 
was very different. Second, this chapter will show that, in fact, a liberal consensus was 
destroyed in the second half of the 1960s, though not by affrrmative action policies. 
Instead, this consensus self-destructed because of the destabilising effect of the issue of 
race within liberalism and the collapse of agreement on the desirability of racial progress 
within Democratic constituencies. Ironically, as we shall see, affIrmative action has been 
important in limiting the damage that the issue of race inflicts upon American stability. 22 
The Background to Post-war Liberalism in the US 
In order to understand why affrrmative action in its modern sense appeared 
when it did, it is necessary to analyse the post-war period. Only then can we understand 
what specifically precluded quota-based strategies for nearly a quarter of a century. In 
fact, the way race was understood was being revolutionised after the war. Racial 
divisions acceptable before the war were essentially redefmed as problematic. In light of 
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the Nazi experience, psychologists were enlisted to explain what appeared to leaders to 
be the bewildering motivations of men and women who became committed Nazis or 
Communists.23 
Gaetano Mosca observed that ruling classes vary in respect to the number 
and grade of social forces they control, tolerate, stimulate or create. The internal stability 
of a regime can be measured by the ratio between the number and strength of the social 
forces that it controls, conciliates or represents, and the number and strength of the social 
forces it fails to represent and oppose it. 24 In these terms, the ruling class in the United 
States in the post-war years enjoyed power almost unique in history. As Godfrey 
Hodgson observed, liberalism became not simply the property of liberals but a consensus 
formed when most conservatives accepted the Rooseveltian economic and domestic 
policies and liberals adopted conservative anti-communism. Liberal ideology was not 
restricted to intellectuals. Bankers, industrialists, clergymen, and even military men 
believed and actively propagated its principles. Only the extreme of left and right resisted 
these principles. The consensus built in the United States at this time was perhaps 
unprecedented in the history of any nation yet seen. 25 
The United States emerged from the war with an economy making up over 
40 percent of the world's Gross Domestic Product.26 The problems that American 
capitalism had experienced in the 1930s appeared to have been overcome during the war, 
which had created a full employment economy. Inadequate production was a problem of 
the past; inadequate consumption, after the war, appeared to be a more pressing problem. 
The New Deal left in place structures providing social security and to settle labor troubles 
that remained but, on the whole, the massive growth of the American economy seemed to 
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provide a solution to any residual labor problems.27 Optimism about the capacity of the 
United States to create further growth was high. 
However, American liberal rulers also had reason to be underconfident in 
their authority to rule. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., observed, liberalism combined a 
"certain operational optimism with a certain historical and philosophical pessimism. ,,28 
Too many previously-held assumptions had been exploded by depression and war to 
make liberals entirely comfortable with their own worldview. "Free society has failed," 
Schlesinger lamented. "Western man in the middle of the twentieth century is tense, 
uncertain, adrift. ,,29 Liberals like Schlesinger had to create a tentative path between 
unfettered capitalism, widely associated with war and depression, and the socialism of the 
Soviet Union. Whereas certain problems within American society such as class divisions, 
liberals felt, had been at least partially resolved, war had cast doubts on the human 
prospect. Reinhold Niebuhr, an influential thinker during this period, expressed this 
pessimism in 1944: "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible", Niebuhr 
concluded, "but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary." This 
democracy, he felt, had a certain tension between "essential freedom" - "the capacity for 
indeterminate transcendence over the processes and limitations of nature" and the 
..c: d· h .. ,,30 
"neceSSIty lor or er ill uman commumhes. 
Democracy - as defined by postwar liberals - did not necessarily entail 
giving power directly to the electorate. In terms of political style, these liberals followed 
the political advice of Edmund Burke: that a representative of the people is elected not to 
exercise their judgement but his judgement on the issues. The job of political leaders was 
to be elected but to manipulate local interests in the greater interest of the nation. Richard 
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Neustadt, who published an influential treatise entitled Presidential Power in 1961. 
advocated that a President should use every conceivable political technique to manipulate 
existing interests in achieving his political, social, and economic goals. A liberal 
President, he wrote, has to manipulate against the powers that be. Liberal hero John F. 
Kennedy translated Neustadt's somewhat subversive attitude toward the democratic 
process thus in 1962: "The fact of the matter is that most of the problems, or at least 
many of them that we now face, are technical problems, are administrative problems. 
They are very sophisticated judgements which do not lend themselves to the great work 
of 'passionate movements' which have stirred this country so often in the past. Now they 
deal with questions that are beyond the understanding of most men.,,31 
The question of race became central to liberal critiques of American 
democracy. Polls undertaken had showed that most Americans had no idea why they 
were fighting the war. "Among the most glaring examples of how depraved public 
opinion could actually be, and therefore how much in need of expert management, was 
'intergroup conflict. ",32 Instead of a political understanding of problems of race that had 
been prevalent before the war (which had been influenced by Communists and which 
they continued to push propagandistically after the war), the problem of racism was 
increasingly seen in psychological terms or moral terms.33 The significance for quota-
based policies is that they threatened to exacerbate "intergroup conflict." If the problems 
were psychological or moral, the answers would lie in these directions also, rather than in 
administrative measures. 
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Liberalism and quotas 
In response to the crisis of the depression, the New Deal set up various 
agencies to manage conflicts between labor and management that would later be inherited 
by those attempting to reduce racial conflict. Some of the legislation predated the New 
Deal but came to be associated with it, such as the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931 that 
regulated wages paid by federal contractors. When fIrst used in the 1930s, the phrase 
"affrrmative action" was connected with regulatory government action. C.B. Sudborough 
used the phrase in 1932 in a plea that motor vehicles were regulated, using the subtitle 
"Why the national welfare requires affrrmative action. ,,34 The phrase was also used in a 
sense much more similar to its meaning today in the 1935 National Labor Relations (or 
Wagner Act) required employers discriminating against union members to stop 
discriminating and to take "affirmative action" to place the victims where they would 
have been without the discrimination. 35 
Quotas, at least quotas of minority members within government 
employment schemes, also made their debut during the 1930s both in the private and 
public spheres. Yet the idea of quotas to overcome the prejudice that black Americans 
experienced dated back at least to Reconstruction. The Freedmen's Bureau established 
benign racial classifications in order to combat prejudice against blacks. 36 In 1871 the 
black leader Martin Delaney argued that the way to counter discrimination was to 
establish quotas for blacks.37 The Ford Motor Company had a policy in the early 1930s 
stating that ''Negroes should make up the same proportion of the workers as 
corresponded to their proportion in the population of Detroit. ,,38 Nor was the imposition 
of quotas by the Federal Government unprecedented. A quota program operated within 
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the Public Works Administration (PWA). Secretary of Labor Harold Ickes issued an 
order prohibiting discrimination based on race or religion in all PWA projects on 
September 1 1933. In 1934 Isador Lubin of the Bureau of Labor Statistics disclosed a 
confidential plan by which the Labor Department would negotiate for projects that would 
use 50 percent Negro labor. Clark Foreman, also of the Bureau of Labor, suggested 
basing the proportion of Negroes in each job category upon the occupational census of 
1930. The PWA put Foreman's plan into effect. No quotas were ever devised for other 
racial or religious groups. Ickes sent a message to the NAACP's 1935 annual conference 
explaining the program. The contract for the first federal housing project, in Atlanta, 
specified that 12 percent of the skilled labor payroll must go to Negro employees. 39 
Moreno sees this action partly as a response to the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931 which 
required paying "prevailing wage rates," thus reducing migrant non-union (often black) 
employment. In other words, they may have been quotas to prevent too much cheap black 
labor. If this is true, the NAACP raised no objections to the PWA quotas. In general, 
there was little objection in principle to the PWA experiments. They were successfully 
instituted in most cases, and met no legal challenge. 40 
These few instances of the imposition of quotas did not undermine New 
Deal liberalism, as Alan Brinkley, amongst others, has termed it.41 In response to a 
perceived racial crisis, the 1924 National Origins Act established national quotas along 
racial and ethnic lines, determining the (greatly reduced) influx of immigrants by the 
proportion of racial and ethnic groups present in the United States in 1890. The 10hnson-
Reed Act, as it was also known, explicitly used racial categories that remained on the 
statute books until the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 abolished all racial requirements for 
37 
citizenship.42 These racial divisions were regarded as unproblematic until just before 
WWII. Outside of a few anthropologists and social scientists, no one questioned them. 
With heightened awareness of the existence of racial and ethnic groups in the United 
States, few could justify opposition to policies that treated these groups as groups. At this 
stage, no one objected to quotas. 
Changes to liberal thought also occurred fairly abruptly as it became 
obvious that international events demanded an international role. Historian Elazar Barkan 
argues convincingly that official antipathy towards race categories emerged suddenly in 
1938 when it became obvious that the US would have to playa decisive role both in the 
coming war and in the post-war period.43 Gary Gerstle observed that Hitler's rise to 
power in one of the world's most technologically and culturally advanced societies 
"directly challenged two convictions that had sustained American liberalism since the 
early 1920s; first, that the taming of capitalism was the pre-eminent problem confronting 
industrial societies and, second, that issues of ethnic and racial discrimination were best 
left alone or addressed indirectly ... These problems were not secondary; they were 
themselves primary." 44 
Gunnar Myrdal and the American Creed 
Capturing the spirit of the new war-time racial liberalism, the Swedish 
sociologist Gunnar Myrdal defmed America's treatment of African-Americans as the 
primary aspect of the problem in the USA. He was called upon in 1938 by the Carnegie 
Corporation to conduct a comprehensive study of American race relations. Myrdal 
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assembled all those with experience in researching Negro problems for his vast project 
while staying very much in control of the end product. The study gained in stature after 
the war began and mobilisation against fascist ideology started in earnest. It was 
published in 1944 with some fanfare. Myrdal' s An American Dilemma appears in the 
bibliographies of many works considering racial problems and race relations.45 This 
massive two-volume tome remained the modus operandi for race relations for twenty 
years. It drew the nation's attention to the plight of African-Americans and called on all 
Americans to vigorously work towards a solution to the dilemma. 
Myrdal's work is remarkable not because of new formulations of the 
problem of race in the us. An American Dilemma was only one of a number of works 
attacking previously accepted racial dogmas46 but it was unique in its concentration on 
black Americans and in its assertion that the treatment of its most downtrodden minority 
represented a test for American democracy. What stands out about Myrdal's study is its 
sheer size and comprehensiveness but also its summation, or perhaps even defmition, of 
liberal attitudes towards race during the war. Myrdal displayed an insight into the rise to 
world leadership of the United States at this juncture of history. In the fmal chapter, he 
warned that the Soviet Union would attract the international rising tide of coloured 
people with egalitarian propaganda. The ability of the United States to counteract such 
propaganda, her international standing and security depended upon how the race problem 
was handled. 
Efforts to sum up the themes running throughout such a huge study, as 
contemporary reviewers complained, prove difficult because of the vast scope of the 
project. However, several themes emerged that would prove important for liberal 
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thinking on race in the post-war period. Perhaps the strongest theme to emerge in An 
American Dilemma was that of what Myrdal identified as the "American Creed." This 
was a set of values that Myrdal saw as continuous throughout American history 
stemming from the Enlightenment that militated towards racial equality, a tendency 
toward equality, justice and fairness that was fmally "realising itself:" "The American 
Creed is a humanistic liberalism developing out of the epoch of Enlightenment when 
America received its national consciousness and its political structure. ,,47 Myrdal held 
fIrmly to his belief that all Americans, even those most bigoted Southerners, subscribed 
to this peculiarly American belief in the essential equality of humanity. He dedicated 
large tracts of The American Dilemma to proving the existence of the Creed in the South 
as well as in the urban North, buried as it might be beneath justifying myths of racial 
superiority and inferiority. In Myrdal's view, the Creed's powers attained a near magical 
healing power: "When the American Creed is once detected", he enthused, "the 
cacophony becomes a melody. ,,48 
A second theme was that the American race problem was national, rather 
than regional, and existed on the white side of the equation. Whereas in the 1930s the 
problem of black oppression was generally analysed as one of many in a constellation of 
problems emanating from economic inequality, Myrdal redefmed it as a moral problem 
existing not just in the structures of American society but in the hearts of whites. Such an 
analysis gave Myrdal (and other liberals) great hope for eradicating the problem: "The 
deeper reason for the technical simplicity of the value aspect of the Negro problem is 
this: From the point of view of the American Creed the status accorded the Negro in 
America represents nothing more and nothing less than a century-long lag of public 
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morals.,,49 The contradiction between the Creed and the practical treatment of Negroes, 
he insisted, led to whites harbouring irrational fears and prejudices about blacks. From 
this, Myrdal implied that Blacks need not organise themselves in order to eradicate the 
racial divisions that held them down.50 
Institutions 
A third theme was that American democratic institutions were basically 
sound and provided the best vehicles with which to purge white Americans of their 
racism. During the 1930s these same institutions had become widely questioned and 
Myrdal sought to bolster them. American liberalism defined itself against the racism of 
Nazi Germany but, just as importantly, against the socialism of the Soviet Union, which 
had been using racial inequality in the United States as one of its key propagandistic 
points since the 1928 Communist International (Comintem). The American Creed 
expressed liberal optimism that equality of opportunity, the current embodiment of the 
American Dream, would create the best of all possible worlds. Though undoubtedly part 
of the problem, for Myrdal institutions remained the most hopeful solution to the 
prejudices within the hearts of white Americans, necessary to restrain the "undemocratic, 
unAmerican" tendencies within the masses. Democratic institutions must imbue the 
masses with "democratic values": 
The school, in every community, is likely to be a degree more broadminded than 
local opinion. So is the sermon in church. The national labor assembly is prone to 
decide slightly above the prejudice of the median member. Legislation will, on the 
whole, be more equitable than the legislators are themselves as private 
individuals. When the man on the street acts through his orderly collective bodies, 
he acts more as an American, as a Christian and as a humanitarian than if he were 
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acting independently ... 
Through these huge institutional structures, a constant pressure is brought to bear 
on race prejudice, counteracting the natural tendency for it to spread and become 
more intense. 51 
Myrdal, it is important to note, inveighed against proportionalism. He 
precluded the use of quotas as "unconstitutional" for the purpose of preserving 
individualism when he considered the question. "This norm (whereby blacks and whites 
share resources according to their proportions in the population) is in conflict with the 
Constitution, since it refers to the Negro group and does not guarantee individuals their 
right.,,52 
Myrdal put forward the case for social science to play a greater role. He 
lectured social scientists within the United States under the heading "Intellectual 
Defeatism." He railed against ''the 'do nothing' tendency.. . in present day social 
science. ,,53 He noted that an educational offensive against racial intolerance "has never 
seriously been attempted in America.,,54 However, he was optimistic that, if social 
science made a supreme effort, it would only be a matter of time before America would 
overcome its racial divide. He thought it possible that through enlightened intervention 
"institutions can be changed" and believed in ''the improvability of man and society." 
Myrdal was careful not to insist that these changes should emerge too fast; instead, 
"changes should, if possible, not be made by sudden upheavals but in gradual steps ... ,,55 
Myrdal's optimism about the ability of American society to socially 
engineer change resonated within liberal circles during the war. Liberals' contribution to 
new Deal policy-making and to war mobilization "proved their capacity for social 
engineering on the grandest scale. No problem was too great for them to handle.,,56 
Myrdal deliberately aimed his book at liberals; the dilemma was up to them to solve: 
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"But with few exceptions, only the liberals have gone down in history as national 
heroes.,,57 More importantly, Myrdal expressed the uneasy combination of pessimism and 
optimism that infected liberalism at that time: "The practical inference is that the social 
engineering required should have its basis in a deliberate and well-planned campaign of 
popular education. ,,58 This emphasis on education of whites became a hallowed principle 
for race relations officials for twenty years. 
The Influence of Myrdal 
Soon after its pUblication, An American Dilemma became the most cited 
authority on race relations, buoyed in its authority by the increased interest in racial 
equality surrounding the forming of the United Nations and the attention of figures such 
as Wendell Wilkie and Eleanor Roosevelt to the problem. David Southern notes that: 
"For twenty years, the Swede's authority was such that liberals simply cited him and 
confidently moved on. ,,59 Myrdal's influence amongst government and legal personnel, 
especially those involved in civil rights issues, seemed to know no bounds in the post-war 
period. The 1948 Truman initiative on civil rights, To Secure these Rights, capitalised the 
term "Creed" and quoted whole lines straight from Myrdal. One of the authors of the 
pamphlet, Robert Carr, told a house committee that the aim of the report was to "restate 
the American Creed or the American Dream.,,60 One of the first tasks that Truman 
accomplished on civil rights was to banish racial classification from federal government 
paperwork. Chief Justice Earl Warren voiced the unanimous decision in favour of the 
plaintiff in the famous Brown v. Board of Education decision, citing Myrdal in footnote 
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II: "And see generally M y r d a ~ ~ An American Dilemma (1944).,,61 Myrdal remained the 
basic text for civil rights professionals and other government authorities for many years. 
Harris Wofford, on joining the Civil Rights Commission set up by Eisenhower in 1958, 
remembered his preparation for the job: "For a while we benefited by the opportunity to 
read basic literature, collect available information for other sources, and discuss the major 
issues. The monumental study by Gunnar Myrdal, The American Dilemma, ... and the 
1947 report of President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights, 
were our initial texts.,,62 
However, the climate in which Myrdal's book was publiShed soon 
changed. Unlike the situation after World War I, the American economy regenerated 
shortly after the end of the war. Liberals, encouraged by what seemed like an automatic 
improvement of race relations by growing prosperity, discarded their attempts at social 
engineering in the hopes that further economic growth would erase racial lines in the 
same way it appeared to have eased ethnic divisions. Additionally, social engineering 
faced opposition as, in 1943-44, Congress reduced or eliminated many of the 
interventionist New Deal programs such as the Works Progress Administration (WP A), 
the Community Civilian Corps (CCC), the National Youth Administration and many 
others. The race problems during the war, demonstrated most violently in the Detroit riots 
of 1943 calmed in the aftermath of the war and the Fair Employment Practices , 
Committee (FEPC), the overseer of equal opportunity in defence contractors forced from 
the Roosevelt Administration by H. Phillip Randolph's threat of a march on Washington, 
was not renewed after the war. Labor tensions immediately after the war removed 
attention from race problems. The theory of ''totalitarianism'' associated State planning 
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with Nazism and communism. The wartime experience, lamented Reinhold Niebuhr, 
"has prompted the democratic world to view all collectivist answers to our social 
problems with increased apprehension.,,63 Instead of State solutions, other institutions 
such as the school and the church, became seen as the bulwark against racial attitudes. 
Though Myrdal's book was hardly ignored, the urgency with which he treated the 
problem, as well as his social engineering solutions, were increasingly played down. The 
book went out of print by 1948.64 
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Chapter 2 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE POST-WAR 
PERIOD 
Most observers point to Kennedy's Executive Order 10925 of 1961 as the 
fIrst mention of the phrase affirmative action in the context of black civil rights, emerging 
only after the civil rights movement had begun a concerted campaign for black civil 
rights. 1 However, "affIrmative action" in regard to race appeared years earlier both as a 
phrase and at least as a possible policy option. Five years after the demise of the Federal 
FEPC in 1946, President Truman issued a further executive order to ensure that federal 
contractors followed policies of nondiscrimination. Truman signed executive 10308 on 
December 3 1951, which provided that all government contracts and subcontracts have 
non-discrimination clauses. The order also set up the President's Committee on 
Government Contract Compliance to ensure compliance with the order. Staffed by 
members of the business community, labor representatives, social workers and federal 
employees, it had no powers of enforcement, however, and had to convince contracting 
agencies to weed out discriminating contractors. As such its impact was negligible. On 
January 16 1953, it published an obscure fmal report for what was apparently a very 
limited audience.2 The committee made such a small impact that its very existence was 
entirely overlooked by a similar report issued by a committee appointed by Eisenhower. 
What is indicated in this report and others published around the same time 
is that some sort of affIrmative action - rather than simply nondiscrimination measures -
remained an obvious but undesirable option for policy elites during the 1950s. The 
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inherent problems of "voluntaristic" policies were well-known even at this stage. Overt 
discrimination was not seen as the major problem; instead, the problem, as Vice President 
Nixon would state in 1955, was "like an iceberg, only part of is it visible.,,3 The report 
rehearses the idea that positive measures had to be taken to attack racial inequality. 
Suggestions included advertising specifically "among such groups as the physically-
handicapped, upper-age groups, women, minority groups. ,,4 Mirroring the concerns that 
resulted in the Philadelphia Plan nearly twenty years later, labor groups were attacked for 
discriminatory practices: "The Committee recommends that the Federal Committee on 
Apprenticeship promulgate policies which will exert maximum influence to eliminate 
discrimination and restrictive practices from all apprenticeship programs." Throughout 
these reports issued in the 1950s, phrases like "affirmative stand," "exert maximum 
effort," "a need for definite action," and "act positively and affrrmatively" can only 
indicate a perception that discrimination must not only be attacked in a negative sense -
by outlawing discrimination. Simply not discriminating was not enough. 5 
Even the term "affrrmative action" appeared in relation to race relations 
many years before EO 1 0925, contradicting the accounts cited above insisting that the 
term frrst appeared while Kennedy was president. It was heard during Fair Employment 
Practice Committee (FEPC) hearings in St. Louis in 1945.6 The fmal report of Truman's 
Committee on Government Contract Compliance called for "affrrmative action" against 
racial discrimination in its fmal report in 1953. After seeing encouraging signs of active 
non-discrimination in the Office of Education against recalcitrant states, the Committee 
recommended that: "The Bureau of Employment Security take more affIrmative action in 
a program to aid employers, Federal-state Employment Services, and other agencies in 
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the maximum placement of minority group workers ... ,,7 The published version of the 
report contained a use of the phrase with less voluntaristic implications: ''Nevertheless, 
the Office of Education should take more affirmative action to persuade states to conform 
to the enunciated policy of the Federal Government."s Nor was the phrase unknown 
outside obscure government reports; it occurs in a column heading as well as within the 
text of an optimistic piece, "What One Visitor Discovered in the South," by Otis W. Coan 
that appeared in the NAACP's periodical, The Crisis. 9 
After Eisenhower took over the presidency, a new commission replaced 
the earlier one. In its publications, it is possible to see some of the assumptions behind 
today's affirmative action. In answer to the question, "How can an agency determine 
whether there was discrimination in a particular action?" a pamphlet put out in 1955 
states: 
By obtaining information regarding the past practices of the particular supervisor 
involving members of the same minority group ... For example, if a supervisor is 
accused of racial discrimination because he failed to promote an Indian from a 
GS-3 to a GS-4 position and the records show that this supervisor had previously, 
on his own initiative, promoted or appointed other Indians to that or a similar GS-
4 position, the indication might be that his decision in the action complained of 
was not based on racial considerations. 
If no Indians had ever been appointed or promoted to a position such as that in 
question by that particular supervisor, further investigation would become 
10 
necessary ... 
When affrrmative action machinery was fmally installed in the 1970s, this 
process would become known as a "compliance review." The supervisor was assumed to 
discriminate (or at least to warrant further investigation) if he had appointed or promoted 
no Indians in the past. The implication for the employer was that if he appointed or 
promoted an unspecified quota of Indians, he would have fulfilled his obligation to equal 
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opportunity policy. Certainly, racial quotas had not been made illegal as an employment 
policy of a private employer - the Superior Court of California, dealing with a case where 
local blacks had picketed a store demanding that more blacks be hired, had declared in 
1950 that "it [California] need not forbid the employer to adopt such a quota system of 
his own free will." I I 
The one force in society that directly pushed for quotas was the 
Communist Party of the United States. Through its representative organisations, it 
sponsored black demands for African-Americans representation in employment within 
companies in black areas. In Lucky Stores v. Progressive Citizens of America, May 26 
1947, a case before the California Supreme Court, a "communist-dominated branch of the 
NAACP" in Richmond, CA, picketed Lucky Stores because of alleged brutality to a 
shoplifter and insisted that the store's workforce approximated the black proportion of 
Lucky's custom. The communist-front organisation, the Progressive Citizens 
Association, lost at the California Supreme Court but a notable dissent was made by 
Roger Traynor. In his opinion, minorities "may seek economic equality either by 
demanding that hiring be done without reference to race or color or by demanding a 
certain amount of jobs for members of their group.,,12 This is not to say that all requests 
for quotas of minority hiring emanated from the Communist Party. One of the original 
demands made by those boycotting the buses in Birmingham, Alabama in 1956 was that 
a number of black busdrivers to be hired. 13 
Progress in combating racial discrimination, despite the declared good 
intentions of both federal and state governments at the time, was slow if not non-existent. 
One trumpeted accomplishment was that, in 1960, "a Negro electrician was hired for the 
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frrst time in the District of Columbia by a contractor engaged in the construction of a 
Federal building.,,14 This took place only after threatened litigation. However, such small 
gains still looked good in percentage terms; a second Negro electrician would constitute a 
100 percent increase. For African-Americans living at the time, the lack of patience with 
such glacial progress exemplified by Martin Luther King's Why We Can't Wait must 
have been widespread. 15 For many others, too. As Moreno observes, "Clearly by the late 
1950s the executive antidiscrimination effort was clearly leaning towards the affirmative 
action requirements that are usually associated with the next administration.,,16 
The theory of "institutional racism" that forms the basis to affrrmative 
action policies, whereby unintentional racism, through systematic exclusion of African-
Americans from employment through what appear to be non-racist patterns and practices, 
presents the biggest barrier to equality, was certainly well-rehearsed in the 1950s. The 
New York Supreme Court, for example, in its summing up of Holland v. Edwards (1953) 
found against an employment agency that inquired into an applicant's change of name. 
To the agency's contention that the name change inquiry was not intentional 
discrimination, the court answered: "Discrimination in selection for employment based 
on considerations of race, creed, or color is quite apt to be a matter ofrefmed and elusive 
subtlety. Innocent components can add up to a sinister totality.,,17 In a report by 
Eisenhower's Committee on Government Contracts, of which Vice President Nixon was 
chairman, the observation was made that: "Overt discrimination, in the sense that an 
employer actually refuses to hire solely because of race, religion, color, or national origin 
is not as prevalent as is generally believed. To a greater degree, the indifference of 
employers to establishing a positive policy of nondiscrimination hinders qualified 
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applicants and employees from being hired and promoted on the basis of equality.,,18 The 
theory, or at least the reasoning behind it that effects and not intentions were harmfuL 
was familiar to policymakers in the 1950s. 
Theoretically, based on Truman's Executive Order in 1948 declaring that 
contractors must include a non-discrimination clause (Eisenhower renewed this clause 
upon taking office in 1953), the Federal Government had the power to cancel contracts 
and to debar contractors from further government contracts. Richard Nathan, in a report 
written for the Civil Rights Commission in 1969, claimed that several fIrms were 
debarred during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. 19 Though Kennedy 
undoubtedly made specific the penalties for discrimination in his Executive Order, there 
is no evidence to support Skrentny's contention that the fIrst agency with "real power" 
was Kennedy's President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO). 
The PCEEO as Skrentny states, "had the power to enforce penalties if it found 
discrimination by government contractors" but so did the heads of Federal Government 
agencies under Truman and Eisenhower.2o 
All the parts were in place; the analysis of the problem of institutional 
racism was at least vaguely understood in government circles, the necessity for some sort 
of proportional solution to the problem of employment discrimination had been grasped, 
the mechanism for enforcing it existed. Yet it was not used. The only effort at initiating 
affirmative action policies was to cajole and coax business to implement programs. As 
one official in Truman's contract compliance committee observed, "(i)t is not the desire 
of the Committee to win compliance with a club. The processes of education and appeals 
to human decency and basic American principles will be the prime weapons against 
55 
discrimination." To insist would have been to undermine faith in the ability of American 
business to accomplish the task itself, to admit that, far from being a rational force for 
progress, this American institution pushed the country away from its democratic goal of 
equal opportunity. Not only that, forcing Americans to accept quotas of minorities, it was 
thought, would not be successful: "It is a well known fact that the most effective means 
of obtaining compliance with any statute, regulation or order is by achieving acceptance 
on the part of the public. There is no budget large enough to force adherence to an 
unaccepted law, as witness prohibition.,,21 
The key to understanding why liberals seldom called for quota-based 
policies lies in the way they analysed the problem. If the problem did exist, as Myrdal 
insisted (and virtually no one had contradicted him), on the white side of the equation and 
if it was believed that reforming the "habits" of the white population was possible, quota-
based policies would provoke white anger and thus create a barrier to resolving the 
problem. Even when quotas might seem like a necessary short-term answer to a particular 
problem, they were resisted for that very reason. Logically, in order for quotas to be 
considered as a realistic option, the idea that whites could eventually be weaned away 
from prejudices and that this would result in blacks playing an equal role in all aspects of 
American life would have to be discarded. 
Contract compliance had to be "sold" to employers, the committee 
thought. Much of the efforts of the Truman Committee and its inheritor in the 
Eisenhower administration directed themselves towards explaining to employers that 
discrimination was bad business. For example, a pamphlet put out by the CGC warned 
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prejudiced company owners that "a discriminatory attitude on the part of employers or 
employees may result in: 
Cost to employers 
Wasted skills 
Destruction of competition 
Cost to community 
Destruction of employee incentives 
Cost to Nation 
Lowered purchasing power" 
With the benefit of considerable hindsight, we might speculate that a more 
positive response on the part of employers could have been forthcoming had "rioting" 
been added to the list. The same document asked in a question and answer section 
whether racial proportional ism might be utilised. The peremptory treatment given the 
question by the pamphlet indicates that such issues were beyond serious consideration: 
"Should the interviewer making referrals try to send out a certain percentage or "balance" 
of Negro and white workers? Ans. No. Referrals based on qualifications for a job avoid 
the proportion consideration. ,,22 
In its voluntary guise, and only implemented in specific circumstances, 
affirmative action did not necessarily contradict the framework of racial liberalism 
whereby racial inequality was best addressed by convincing individual whites that racial 
discrimination was irrational or morally wrong. The affIrmative action programs that the 
government employed were designed to be exemplary, aiming at cajoling and even 
threatening businessmen into hiring more African-Americans and thus integrating them, 
from the top down. As Truman's Contract Compliance Committee emphasised by 
capitalising the following sentence, "DEMOCRACY THRIVES ON VOLUNTARY 
ACTION BY MEN OF GOOD WILL. PREmDICE IN EMPLOYMENT CAN BE 
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DEFEATED MOST EASILY WHERE IT BREEDS - IN FACTORIES, UNIONS, AND 
COMMUNITIES.,,23 
Anti-Communism 
Within the reports issued by the Truman and Eisenhower Committees, the 
importance of equal opportunities for black Americans was continuously stressed in light 
of America's role as world leader in the fight against communism. Certainly, there was 
awareness that many emerging third-world countries found America's race relations 
deeply unattractive. The Soviet Union made the race situation in the United States one of 
its most important propagandistic points throughout the early post-war period. The 
Truman Committee warned that: 
There was a day when the prejudices which sap the moral and economic strength 
of our country were of little concern to other peoples of other nations. Not so in 
1952. This is no longer the problem of several states. The spotlight of world 
leadership in the fight against tyranny and oppression reveals shortcomings which 
our enemies are exploiting on every continent. 
Throughout the report, various mentions of the world role of the United 
States are repeated: "The summons to reaffirm the philosophy of equality is issued at a 
critical moment in history. The leadership of the United States is being tested throughout 
the world as a citadel of freedom and defender of individual rights for all men. We must 
fortify the claim to this leadership by deeds among our own people. ,,24 
Why, given the high priority allegedly given to combating racial prejudice, 
did the report issued by the Truman committee in 1953 receive so little attention? Voting 
rights and racial segregation of schools and facilities attracted some attention nationally 
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throughout the 1950s, especially after Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. The 
heightened awareness of the domestic "threat" of communism after Senator McCarthy 
made his widely-publicised charges made racial liberals wary of repeating or even being 
too sensitive too charges made by the Soviets. Labor issues might have been more 
sensitive than those of education, given the connection between many unions prominent 
in war industries and Moscow. But another answer is given in correspondence from 
Durward V. Sandifer, Acting Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs, to Robert 
Granville, chairman of the committee dated August 22, 1952. "One of the most persistent 
themes of the Communists is the alleged widespread racial discrimination practised in the 
United States. This theme is only infrequently stated in terms of discrimination in 
employment practices. Much greater emphasis is placed upon more general charges of 
the denial of human rights." Thus, the committee and its recommendations, minimal 
though they were, could be safely ignored by Truman and the incoming Eisenhower, 
world attention being fixed on human rights and not employment issues.25 
Intellectual Dissent Against the Myrdalian Paradigm 
Dissenters against Myrdal's "American Creed" analysis of race relations 
were lumped into two camps - those influenced by Communist Party literature on race 
relations and white Southerners. They were conveniently marginalised and Myrdal 
remained virtually unquestioned within the social science community at the time. 
Nothing either communists or Southerners had to say made much impact against the 
inexorable tide of opinion in favour of his study. Southern liberals' published criticisms 
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mildly chastised Myrdal for his insistence that the pace of change in the South should be 
forced but acknowledged the sometimes painful accuracy of his assessment of the racial 
situation in the South. The black intellectual Oliver C. Cox, in Caste, Class and Race, 
scored Myrdal's perception that racial beliefs were the most important aspect holding 
back blacks: "If beliefs, per se, could subjugate a people, the beliefs which Negroes hold 
about whites could be as effective as those which whites hold against Negroes.,,26 
Accurate as Cox's criticism might have been, his associations with the Communist Party 
ensured that they were marginalised. Herbert Aptheker attacked Myrdal' s study 
vociferously for ignoring black culture, foreshadowing criticisms heard more recently, as 
well as for Myrdal's insistence that economic structure had little to do with black 
oppression. However, Aptheker also towed the increasingly unpopular Communist Party 
line, assuring that his criticisms remained in obscurity until some years later?7 
Racial problems cooled considerably in the chill of the Cold War. Despite 
the growing preoccupation with the issue of civil rights towards the end of the 1950s, as 
the protests attracted more and more of the ire of the white South, no fundamental rethink 
of race relations took place within the realm of social science up until the 1960s. In fact, 
few analyses of the problem of race appeared at all in the 1950s. Most social scientists 
rejected the concept of race entirely, preferring more general concepts such as "group 
hostility," "value difference" or "intergroup relations." Oscar Handlin was able to ask in 
his 1957 book, Race and Nationality in American Life, "What ever happened to race?,,28 
A few years later, sociologist Talcott Parsons still attempted to provide a socio-
psychological model in which to place racial problems, demonstrating either the 
longevity of certain race relations concepts or the unwillingness of social science to 
60 
confront the proOblem in its own terms: "Where such a large reservoir of repressed 
aggression exists but cannot be directly expressed, it tends to become 'free-floating' and 
to be susceptible of mobilization against various kinds of scapegoats outside the 
immediate situation of its genesis. ,,29 
Most of Myrdal's assumptions about the nature of the problem remained 
unchallenged in literature. The fmal, concluding sentences of Abram Kardiner and Lionel 
Ovesy's influential 1951 work, The Mark of Oppression, read: 
Obviously, Negro self-esteem cannot be retrieved, nor Negro self-hatred 
destroyed, as long as the status is quo. What is needed by the Negro is not 
education, but re-integration. It is the white man who requires the education. 
There is only one way that the products of oppression can be dissolved, and that 
is to stop the oppression. 30 
Gordon Allport, whose book on prejudice was regarded as one of the most authoritative 
during the 1950s, introduced the "contact theory," based on the military research of 
Samuel Stouffer and the study on housing by Mary Evan Collins and Morton Deutsch. 
The idea, entirely in line with Myrdal' s assertion that the prejudice of white Americans 
constituted the large part of the problem of black American inequality, was that increased 
contact between blacks and whites would decrease prejudice.3} In the event, it is possible 
to understand Allport's optimism. The desegregation of the army, widely predicted to 
cause chaos, withstood the test of Korea, encouraging belief that a low profile effort to 
desegregate would provoke the least resistance. At most, government action to 
desegregate consisted of a series of court decisions eradicating the vestiges of federal 
complicity in segregation. 
Underlining the reliance of social theory on Myrdal' s insistence that 
racism was a ''white man's problem," the fear when black civil rights campaigns began in 
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the 1950s was of white resistance to change. The liberal line on civil rights expressed, 
above all else, the need to quell "totalitarian" tendencies that might, if unchecked, grow 
into mass movements. Black protest was beside the point at that stage. As Walter Jackson 
percipiently notes: 
If you had asked a white liberal in the 1950s about "mass movements" in 
conjunction with civil rights, he or she would probably have expressed fears that 
white resistance to desegregation in the South might lead to a right-wing extremist 
mass-movement that could become anti-Semitic or anti-Catholic, since prejudiced 
people could easily tum their hostility from one target group to another. Thus 
liberals tended to assume that maintaining law and order worked in the interest of 
racial justice. 32 
It is important to note at this stage that several streams of racial liberalism 
existed during the 1940s and 1950s, all influenced by the more liberal attitudes regarding 
race during and after the war. In this period the factors that united them were more 
important than the disagreements between them, although, in the 1960s the disagreements 
rose to the surface. The most committed to the cause of civil rights, of course, were black 
Americans themselves. Black civil rights activists prioritised achievement of equality 
above the stability of the liberal order, though most felt at the time that their best hope of 
achieving their aims was through lobbying and pressurising liberal leaders in power.33 On 
a political level, black Americans tended to be within the Democratic New Deal 
coalition. Left-wing (but still anti-communist) liberals tended to welcome the civil rights 
protests in the 1950s. Southern white radical liberals such as James Anderson 
Dombrowski, Virginia and Clifford Durr, Anne and Carl Braden and others had rallied to 
the cause of better treatment for blacks in the South as early as 1938 on the basis that 
continued segregation and devaluation of black Southerners held Southern development 
back. They maintained their commitment throughout the 1950s and 1960s. However, due 
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to the climate created by McCarthyism in the South, the central organisation of these 
liberals, the Southern Conference for Human Welfare and, later, the Southern Conference 
Education Fund, despite being roll-calls of prominent black and white liberal activists, 
were barely able to sustain themselves and made, by their own admission, little impact on 
Southern white attitudes.34 More mainstream liberals initially welcomed black protests 
but expressed nervousness about possible responses by Southern whites. The Nation 
blended optimism with concern about the effect on the Democratic Party of such protests. 
The New Republic took a surprisingly even-handed approach, publishing pieces such as 
"The NAACP's New Direction" by Paul Jacobs, which complained in 1956 of the 
growing militancy of the NAACP.35 It also featured debates between Southern 
"moderates" (defined as wishing to slow down but not entirely stop desegregation) such 
as Virginia state Senator Benjamin Muse and NAACP representatives such as Thurgood 
Marshall. 36 
The dominant liberal perspectives came from the liberal intelligentsia. To 
them, there was simply a technical problem in an otherwise working democracy. Racial 
equality would make democracy stronger, they reasoned, and thus it was worth 
supporting. Seymour Martin Lipset expressed what was no doubt the consensus amongst 
the intelligentsia when he wrote: "Democracy is not only or even primarily a means 
through which different groups can attain their ends or seek the good society: it is the 
good society itself." In other words, the goal of the liberal intelligentsia was the 
perfection of the democratic system rather than the alleviation of the conditions of black 
Americans. However, even those more critical of American democracy looked upon the 
civil rights struggle primarily as a means to an end rather than the end itself. As the left-
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wing pUblication Liberation magazine put it in 1964, when the cracks were beginning to 
appear, "In our opinion, civil rights, vitally necessary though they are, are not an end in 
themselves, but a beginning towards the really good society in which man will be really 
equal- economically and socially as well as politically.,,37 
The factor that united these disparate streams of liberalism was progress. 
Liberals of all hues were able to groups together under the banner of progress toward 
racial equality, whether they saw as the end the perfection of democracy, the creation of 
real democracy or simply black equality. As long as progress toward it appeared to be 
forthcoming and the enemy of it could be clearly identified, a broad consensus (outside of 
most southern whites) existed. Federal Government action against the Southern 
recalcitrants seemed the best possible method of achieving this goal to nearly everyone 
that considered themselves liberal. Loren Miller, writing in the early 1960s, stated that: 
Of course there are liberals and liberals, ranging from Left to Right: still there 
does exist a set of beliefs and attitudes, not easily defmed but readily identified, 
constituting the liberal outlook on the race question. Simply stated, it 
contemplates the ultimate elimination of all racial distinctions in every phase of 
American life through an orderly, step-by-step process adjusted to resistance and 
. d . h' 38 anne at overcommg suc reSIstance. 
When civil rights movement activists began to take direct action, more 
moderate liberals became uneasy. While the commitment of the civil rights movement to 
achieving patriotic American values made liberals sympathetic, the social activism -
despite its religious and non-vio lent nature - made many mainstream liberals worry that 
instability caused by direct action might be more harmful to American democracy than 
the good of achieving racial equality faster. The liberal Texan Johnson aide Harry 
McPherson remembered Martin Luther King's bus boycott as ''vaguely disturbing" 
because of the ''Negroes' assertiveness, the use of the active voice on their own behalf.,,39 
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However most liberals welcomed the emergence of the question, confirming, as it did, 
their theories on the need to control irrational mobs, personified in Southern whites. They 
called not for mass support of the civil rights movement but for firm government action. 
After Brown, Southern resistance began getting organised. While civil 
rights groups also began organising, their existence inspired little comment, let alone 
revision of the Myrdalian model. As Jackson shows, only The New Republic contained 
any coverage of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, "an event that was greatly overshadowed 
in the national press by Massive Resistance." Throughout the 1950s race relations were 
considered legally and politically tricky but not yet intellectually problematic. Most 
mainstream liberal Americans felt they understood black anger but equally felt that 
protests and demonstrations hurt the cause by provoking white anger.40 
The Kennedy Era 
By the end of the 1950s, issues involving race no longer could be avoided. 
The liberal response to this challenge to the existing institutions, however, was to regard 
it simply as a challenge and to redouble existing efforts. Conservatives confidently 
asserted that the best approach was still to do nothing, since American institutions would 
eventually right themselves. Economist Milton Friedman, writing after the 1957 events in 
Little Rock, predicted in a characteristically ebullient passage that the South's problems 
were anachronistic and would soon disappear: 
No one who buys bread knows whether the wheat from which it was made was 
grown by a communist or a Republican, by a constitutionalist or a fascist, or, for 
that matter, by a Negro or a white. This illustrates how an impersonal market 
separates economic activities from political views and protects men from being 
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discriminated against in their economic activities for reasons that are irrelevant to 
their productivity - whether these reasons are associated with their views or with 
their COIOr."41 
By the end of the decade, however, confidence in these sorts of assertions 
began to wane. Kennedy was elected in 1960 to "do something" about America's 
problems and he had contrasted himself with the complacency of the Eisenhower years. 
Civil rights was among the problems identified by the Kennedy team where it was felt 
that executive action might be needed. Kennedy's Executive Order 10925, issued in 1961 
and containing the term "affrrmative action," created a new agency, the President's 
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, and provided for more stringent and 
explicit requirements on government contractors. Despite the new emphasis on 
enforcement, it created no new standards for proving discrimination. Without specific 
provable discrimination, little could be done against employers suspected of 
discriminating. The most visible aspect of the Order was the Plans for Progress program, 
designed to induce prominent government contractors to devise their own plans for 
increasing minority group hiring and employment mobility. The National Urban 
League's Whitney Young praised Plans for Progress in 1963 for its preferential hiring 
policies. However, the NAACP's Herbert Hill and Martin Luther King were more 
critical. 42 
The issue of "racial preference" arose while Kennedy was president, 
causing him to react by stating that he would not countenance quotas, " ... not hard and fast 
quotas. We are too mixed, this society of ours, to begin to divide on the basis of race and 
color. ,,43 Many already realised the dangerous implications of such concepts as 
"compensatory education." Traditional liberalism and a majority of the civil rights 
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movement rejected the notion as the Myrdalian analysis of the problem, particularly the 
optimistic view that white Americans would eventually be reformed away from their 
prejudices that had kept black Americans down through the centuries, remained largely 
intact. 
Throughout the early 1960s, faced with the rising tempo of civil rights 
protest, some began to question whether the existing provisions, based on the fair 
employment approach of the FEPCs initiated by Roosevelt, were adequate. Minnesota 
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey introduced a bill on August 1 1963, S.1937, which sought 
to "establish a broader and more comprehensive obligation of providing equal 
employment opportunities." Humphrey's bill "proceeded from the assumption that the 
fair employment approach of the state FEPCs had proved inadequate. ,,44 
What was becoming apparent to all Americans shortly before the 1964 
Civil Rights Act passed was that previous efforts had not yet been effective. The civil 
rights activism of the early 1960s, with its well of support and legions of volunteers, had 
proved both that existing civil rights efforts were inadequate and that doing nothing 
would simply aggravate the problem. The bill ran into opposition from Southerners who 
pointed out that the legislation would simply nationalise post-war Fair Employment 
Practices Committee (FEPC) acts passed by 25 states shortly after the war. Southern 
racial conservatives like John Stennis were able to point out that the pressure for a federal 
act came from the failure of these other approaches. He asked "Why should we 
compound and enlarge the error by expanding such a law to all States?,,45 However, due 
precisely to the objections of Southern Democrats, the Act failed to go any further than 
had the state FEPC laws, except in the sense that it prohibited discrimination on the basis 
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of sex in addition to race, color, national origin, and religion (ironically, this one addition 
came because of a failed spoiling tactic on the part of Representative Howard Smith of 
Virginia). 
Title VII of the Act, dealing with employment, called for "affIrmative 
action" by employers to ensure non-discrimination in hiring, firing and promotion. These 
requirements covered employers with one hundred or more employees a year after the 
law came into effect a year after its signing. It extended the regulations to those with 
twenty-five or more after July 2 1967. In the proceedings leading up to the bill's passage, 
Southern Democrats objected to the potential for forcing firms to hire quotas of African-
Americans thus negating union seniority rights. The leadership of the AFL-CIO denied 
that this would be the result of the Act. The Act did not require abrogation of seniority 
rights in order to create black employment, they insisted, nor could the Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC), the main body responsible for 
overseeing the implementation of the Act, derive such a requirement from the language 
of the Act. However, to blunt the Southern opposition, three provisos were included 
within the Act. 703(h) allowed employers to continue with a "bona fide seniority or merit 
system" and 706(g), by disallowing the court from requiring hiring, reinstatement, 
advancement, etc. of employees for reasons "other than discrimination on account of 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin," implied that reasons of racial balance would 
not be legitimate. 7030) was the most clear in its intentions, inveighing against 
"preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance 
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which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin employed.,,46 
It is clear from the debate surrounding the passage of the 1964 Act that the 
use of quotas, while a possibility, had no sponsors amongst even the most liberal 
congressmen and women. Hubert Humphrey insisted that "nothing in it [the Act, at that 
stage a Bill] will give any power to the Commission or to any court to require hiring, 
frring or promotion of employees to meet a racial quota, or to achieve a certain racial 
balance.,,47 Senator Joseph Clark, one of the floor managers of the bill, assured his 
colleagues that "nothing in this bill will interfere with merit hiring or merit promotion.,,48 
Perhaps the most sympathetic views of quotas at the time came from a conservative, and 
one who would later attack quotas as an abrogation of the 1964 Act. Alexander Bickel, 
considering the "benevolent quota," admitted in 1962 that: "If it wishes to go beyond 
ineffectual removal of legal bars to integration, the State or the Federal government may 
have to legislate some degree of controlled segregation. ,,49 Mainstream liberals, at this 
time, did not consider the use of quotas as legitimate in any circumstance. When Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt, Jr., the Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission (EEOC), also created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was asked in January 
1966 about the possibility of quotas, he replied: "It is wrong even to talk about quota 
systems. ,,50 
The thinking behind the 1964 Act was that it should be more exemplary 
and symbolic than strictly legislative. The objections made by Southern Democrats - that 
under the provisions of the Act, no precise defmition of what constituted employment 
discrimination existed - were brushed aside rather than tackled head on. Liberals hoped 
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that the mere appearance of civil rights legislation would induce employers to hire blacks 
and that the process would snowball until African-Americans were represented at the 
same level in employment as they were in the American population. The provisos 
demanded by Southerners and some Republicans caused little consternation amongst the 
liberal sponsors of the bill except in that they were barriers to its passage. The AFL-CIO 
never seriously worried that it might be adversely affected by the legislation and argued 
against the need for the provisos. The 1964 Civil Rights Act, though it raised the profile 
of affirmative action, did not change its defmition. 
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Chapter 3 
THE END OF THE MYRDALIAN PARADIGM 
As protests in the 1960s came to be more and more insistent, the liberal 
consensus on race showed signs of coming apart. In particular, blacks faced with the 
reality of lack of changes in their immediate environments, North and South, became 
disenchanted with liberal promises. James Baldwin stated in 1962 that Negroes ''twenty 
years younger than I don't believe in liberals at all."! Loren Miller observed the 
differences between blacks and liberals in approach: "The liberal sees 'both sides' of the 
issue: the force of the Negro's constitutional argument and the existence of customs, 
sometimes gelled into law, that justify the gradualist approach. He is impatient with 
'extremists on both sides. '" However, "every civil rights victory adds to the Negro's 
intransigence." Miller concluded sombrely that "(t)he middle ground on which the 
traditional liberal has taken his stand is being cut from beneath him. ,,2 
Soon after the protests began, intellectuals began questioning some of the 
Myrdalian precepts. In the early 1960s in the journal Social Forces, several 
correspondents tested key Myrdal concepts like the "rank order of discrimination," 
whereby Myrdal ranked the social importance to both white and blacks of various aspects 
of discrimination and by suggesting that the problem of discrimination may be more 
multifaceted than simply a "moral" issue. (The order was listed by Myrdal as 1. 
Intermarriage and sexual intercourse, 2. Personal relations - drinking, dancing, etc., 3. 
schools, churches, 4. political disenfranchisement, 5. courts police, etc., 6. land, credit, 
jobs.)3 
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One of the greatest challenges to Myrdal's rosy picture of the future of 
black-white relations in the United States came from the pen of journalist Charles E. 
Silberman in 1964. Crisis in Black and White declared that "what we are discovering, in 
short, is that the United States - all of it, North as well as South, West as well as East - is 
a racist society in a sense and to a degree that we have refused so far to admit, much less 
face.,,4 In other words, Myrdal had concentrated on the South as the source of the 
problem but in the North, too, pervasive racism had been found to exist. Silberman felt 
that Myrdal's optimism that American whites simply had to divest themselves of 
outmoded beliefs in the inferiority of blacks could not still be countenanced. The timing 
was, of course, important. By 1964 the racial crisis appeared much more serious than it 
had in 1962 or, for that matter, at any time since the Detroit race riot of 1943. 
Silberman had already written a provocative article in Fortune magazine 
that appeared in September 1963. In it he suggested, in alarmist tones, that African-
Americans were becoming "increasingly intolerant of 'moderation,' and the poor, in 
particular, are contemptuous of the doctrine of nonviolence that has dominated the 
struggle so far." He noted that within a single week, Martin Luther King was pelted with 
eggs in Harlem, and Alabama activist James Meredith was publicly rebuked for being a 
"moderate." He then suggested that businessmen adopt "positive discrimination," 
implying that the cost for business would be less than the "cost to the community of 
racial violence." "Executives can be expected to be attacked from both sides," he warned. 
"(T)hey will need all the political art they can muster to persuade white employees that 
'reverse discrimination' is socially necessary and for the greater good." These arguments, 
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though they stopped short of calling for government-enforced affirmative action, 
connected the issue of affrrmative action with the threat of racial violence. 5 
Intellectuals, struck by the pressing need of the situation, were caught 
between advocating racial preferences and defending the existing liberal institutions. 
They essentially ran into the same problems that professionals in the Committee on 
Government Contract Compliance and Eisenhower's Contract Compliance committee 
had some ten years earlier. At the frrst of two Daedalus conferences on the Negro in 
America in April 1964, "(t)he participants all agreed that the situation of Negro 
Americans required preferential treatment, but they were very unclear as to how this 
could be rationalised in traditional political rhetoric.,,6 Emphasising equality and in 
particular the formulation of "equality of results," Moynihan hoped to make preferential 
treatment a less bitter pill to swallow. Citing Bayard Rustin, he warned: "The principal 
challenge of the next phase of the Negro revolution is to make certain that equality of 
results will now follow. Ifwe do not, there will be no social peace in the United States for 
generations." 7 
The overall belief that American society was headed almost inexorably 
towards racial equality, though perhaps weakened by this stage, still remained. So did the 
idea that lack of racial progress was entirely a problem affecting individual whites. Faith 
and hope, however, had replaced certainty in the minds of many both within and outside 
the policy elite. Liberal authorities, at this point, sought to prop up the institutions rather 
than to achieve results for African-Americans. None of the assumptions of the postwar 
era could be dropped for fear that the entire basis of liberal legitimacy might be eroded.
8 
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The Myrdalian Paradigm Reaffirmed 
In 1964 nearly all liberals believed in the basic tenets of Myrdal - that a 
century long lag in morals within white America was ultimately responsible for racial 
inequality and that concerted action through liberal institutions was the best chance of 
alleviating the situation. Increasingly, however, they were tom between espousing a 
clearly moral cause that articulated liberal values and fear of instability. The call for 
government action became louder and louder. Liberals took the lead in urging the 
government to act decisively in favour of civil rights both to correct the moral lag and to 
decrease the possibilities of instability stemming from increasingly strident civil rights 
movement which, it was felt, was forcing the pace. 
In many ways, rather than being forgotten or contradicted in the light of 
black unrest, Myrdal's analysis seemed to be vindicated. Throughout the 1950s, 
Americans had set aside the question of race, ignoring Myrdal's advice. Now, the 
American dilemma received the attention Myrdal thought it deserved. The crisis tipped 
the scales against the more laissez-faire attitude expressed by free-marketeers such as 
Friedman. The mass of extreme sentiments expressed over the civil rights issue 
frightened those that cleaved unto the "vital center," as did the civil rights movement's 
implicit rejection of the government as the sole locus for political action. No more would 
faith in the inexorable levelling powers of capitalism substitute for some government-led 
sort of action to create equality for black Americans. As Daniel C. Thompson wrote in 
January 1965, "(t)he Negro protest is, itself, a clear endorsement of the "American 
Creed" and a reaffirmation of the faith Negroes have in the democratic process.,,9 
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Martin Luther King and other civil rights leaders skilfully used the 
rhetorical language of the Creed to further their cause. They became an alternative moral 
leadership in the country, forcing the federal government to come decisively down on the 
side of integration. As King said in an address to the national Press Club in 1962: "We 
feel that we are the conscience of America - we are its troubled soul- we will continue to 
insist that right be done because both God's will and the heritage of our nation speak 
through our echoing demands."l0 In King's 1963 publication, Why We Can 'f Wait, King 
continued this theme yet also begins to ask that black problems be addressed in more 
immediate terms. In the end section of the book he discussed the issue of preferential 
treatment: "Whenever this issue of compensatory or preferential treatment for the Negro 
is raised, some of our friends recoil in horror. The Negro should be granted equality, they 
agree; but he should ask for nothing more." King then raised the issue of the quota-based 
system in India, whereby those from the untouchable caste received preferential treatment 
in college places, approvingly. He noted that "In facing the new American dilemma, the 
relevant question is not: 'What more does the Negro want?' but rather: 'How can we 
make the freedom real and substantial for our Negro citizens?''' King, however, was 
careful not to insist on quotas or any sort of preferential treatment. In line with most 
liberal thinking at the time, he simply wished to emphasise the urgency of the task and 
the effort needed to overcome black inequality. 11 
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Liberalism and Race: The Commentary Article 
In an extraordinary roundtable discussion held by the liberal journal 
Commentary in 1964, Sidney Hook, Nathan Glazer, Gunnar Myrdal and James Baldwin 
debated the implications of the ''Negro revolution" on liberal thought, showing how the 
question of civil rights exposed certain home truths about the post-war political 
establishment. Nathan Glazer effectively introduced the discussion with a precis of the 
problem: 
The formal equality that prevails in this country has always been accompanied by 
a great order of inequality that doesn't apply only to Negroes, though Negroes are 
its worst victims. Traditionally, there have always been ways of dealing with this 
problem, and these ways have worked well enough to prevent ethnic and race 
wars from breaking out. One of them has been the provision of formal equality 
itself: formally we take no cognizance of differences among groups. Informally, 
however, cognizance has always been taken of these differences. We set up 
'balanced' tickets, we make sure that different groups are represented on boards, 
commissions, and so on.. . In my opinion, this is a reasonable procedure. 
American democracy has always been a hazardous thing ... The problem for 
Negroes is not that they have been outside the pattern but that they have been very 
badly off within it. And this too poses a challenge - a challenge of another sort - to 
liberalism. 
The discussion quickly polarised between James Baldwin and the others. 
Baldwin, while not denying the efficacy of the Creed, insisted that a reconstitution of 
American democracy was necessary in order that African-Americans take their rightful 
p lace within it: 
I might be perfectly willing to be one of the first Negroes accepted here or there; I 
might even be perfectly willing to wait ten years or a generation to be fitted into 
American civilization, or American society, if I really felt that I could be fitted 
into it as it now is, as its now constituted. But to my mind, you see, before one can 
really talk about the Negro problem in this country, one has got to talk about the 
white people's problem. 
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Though this point had been made by Myrdal in 1944, the context had 
changed enough to make the others nervous and defensive. The argument went back and 
forth between Baldwin's assertion that something fundamental was missing from the 
values of American society and the others' insistence that the treatment of blacks was an 
anomaly in an otherwise basically healthy system of values held by Americans. Sidney 
Hook insisted that things were basically going along the right track in terms of racial 
justice and that the "ethical principles" so vital to the Creed and to liberals' belief in their 
own legitimacy still represented the best hope of further progress: 
And, if we examine the development of American society, we certainly can say 
we made some progress - not enough progress, to be sure, but progress 
nevertheless - by virtue of the extension of our ethical principles to institutional 
life. Ifwe want to explain the progress that has been made in the last twenty years 
by minority groups in this country - not only the Negroes, but other groups as well 
- I believe we have to take into account the effect of our commitment to 
democracy, imperfect as it may be. 
Myrdal insisted, as he had twenty years previously, that liberal institutions 
contained the solution within themselves but that they must be pressured in order to draw 
out the inherent equalising tendencies: "So what the Negroes have to rely upon in the end 
is that America is its institutions, and that the highest of these institutions will act when 
they come under pressure. And when they act, they will act according to certain 
principles, which, like Professor Hook, I call ethical." A point made by Glazer provides 
an interesting insight into the way liberals still viewed the issue of race, primarily as a 
contest between the enlightened few and the venial many: "Down below hardly anyone 
wants equality or is in favour of civil liberties. But up above they remember the 
American Creed. And the system works because there's enough power at the top to keep 
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it going. Is that progress? I don't know. But I think that's the way things work in 
America." 12 
Perhaps better than any other contemporary source, the roundtable 
discussion conveys the onset of crisis that the issue of race created within liberal circles. 
At once, liberals became anxious about the implications of race for liberal institutions and 
more optimistic about the possibility of a solution because of the call to action provoked 
by the civil rights movement. The overall goals and perceptions of the problem did not 
change but the stakes were higher. Tilman C. Cothran wrote in 1965 that "(p )ossibly the 
most obvious consequence emerging from the demonstrations is the validation of 
Myrdal's hypothesis that the race problem in America - the contradiction between the 
American Creed and practice - is a problem in the minds of white people,,)3 Until events 
proved otherwise, many analysts simply saw the race crisis as a clarion call for a more 
action to make the paradigm work. Few would give up on the ability of liberal institutions 
to resolve the issue of race until the late 1960s. 
It is important to see the extent to which liberal intellectuals were taken by 
surprise by events in the early 1960s. Neither left nor right predicted the Freedom bus 
rides initiated by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) or the lunch-counter sit-ins 
begun in Greensboro, North Carolina. C. L. R. James, the West Indian Marxist, predicted 
in 1947 that US blacks would rise up simply because of their desperate plight in the 
South. Many other left-wingers, taking their cue from Soviet propaganda, predicted the 
same. 14 Liberal observers felt that progress was being made, obviating the need for 
protest. While national attention fIxed upon events in the South, the issue had yet to 
metamorphasize into a national problem - few connections were drawn between the 
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problems faced in the South and those faced by coloured migrants in Northern cities. 
There was little comment about racial problems in the North; what there was normally 
assigned any difficulties to the unfamiliarity of recent Southern migrants to cities. When 
comments were made about the situation in the North, the problem was normally seen as 
a function of the speed with which southern blacks entered northern cities. William H. 
Whyte was entirely unabashed about urban blacks in a 1957 article and doubtless would 
have been upset at any comparison between his views and those of white Southerners: 
But there is no denying that the proportion of Negroes in a neighborhood is a 
critical factor. Once the percentage of Negroes gets over a certain point - it seems 
to range between 10 and 20% - whites will generally move out. .. Negro leaders 
themselves are leaning towards the idea of quotas [i.e. restricting the numbers of 
Negroes] Quotas used to be a fighting word with them, but, privately at least, 
many see some form of quota as the only way the Negro middle-class can achieve 
integration. 15 
When the term "quotas" was used in the 1950s, it meant restricting the number of African 
Americans in a particular area to avoid "white flight!" 
The Onset of Crisis 
In understanding the installation of quota-based policies, the overriding 
necessity for some sort of replacements for institutions originating during the New Deal 
and World War II becomes evident in the latter half of the 1960s. The crisis of the late 
1960s indicates that nothing less than panic occurred amongst the authorities when many 
social groups, including African-Americans, Wallace supporters, and the youth of the 
nation, moved outside of the influence of the existing institutions. The issue of race 
created a crisis of authority or legitimation that extended beyond the black community. 
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At the same time that the fIrst affirmative action programs had been initiated, government 
at various levels began to intervene directly in the lives of Americans in order to replace 
the influence of lost institutions, in order to regain influence and control. The advent of 
affIrmative action as a system may be seen, as Graham noted, as ''the unwitting cutting 
edge of a vast but quiet revolution in the nature of the American state itself' that 
increasingly regulated the lives of Americans. 16 This chapter will review the process of 
destruction of the Myrdalian paradigm, showing that the perspective outlined in the last 
chapter had to be significantly weakened before affIrmative action measures could be 
implemented. 
Johnson raises the stakes 
The stakes for Lyndon Johnson, who, more than anyone else, bore the 
responsibility for making democracy work for all Americans, were extremely high. In 
many ways, he personified the liberal belief that through enlightened liberal leadership 
and political will, any problem could be solved. Johnson aide Harry McPherson, who 
admits his former leader was "aggressive, scheming, vehement," also noted that, 
"(i)ngenious and practical as he was, he was also ethically sentient; he wished to be 
thought a good man as well as a clever one.,,17 Johnson's philosophy, perfectly in tune 
with the time, could (and has) been summed up by one word - "consensus". Eric 
Goldman, another Johnson aide, indicated how Johnson's political philosophy worked: 
"He was sure that the United States in the post-World War II period had wasted 
enormous energy and talent in essentially unnecessary clashes between labor and 
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management, urban interests and the rural regions, blacks and whites. He intended to find 
the formulas to smooth over these conflictS.,,18 He was fond of quoting the bible to 
emphasise the higher authority behind his negotiations: "Come, let us reason together."I 9 
As racial problems intensified, so did Johnson's efforts to find common 
ground. According to Goldman, who was hired by Johnson in 1965, Johnson spoke more 
and more of his desire to create, in his own words, "a broad national consensus which can 
end obstruction and paralysis and can liberate the energies of the nation.,,20 He had some 
reason to be optimistic in the summer of 1965 - the 1964 Act and the 1965 Civil Rights 
Bill, which would ensure that no one would be denied the right to vote on the basis of 
colour, had also been great political unifiers, both inside the Democratic Party and in the 
nation as a whole. He was lauded by all the civil rights leaders of the time, to the extent 
that Martin Luther King initiated a march at the White House to thank Johnson for his 
support of voting rights for the residents of Washington, D.C. 
On the other hand, as Johnson observed, his support was "like a Western 
river, broad but not deep.,,21 Even amongst the most loyal Democratic constituencies -
civil rights leaders, trade unionists, church leaders and liberal intellectuals - signs of 
rising anxiety were apparent. He knew that both his own and his party's fortunes rested 
upon the promise to a solution to the civil rights problem. Besides his losses in the South, 
Wallace had collected 34% of the votes cast in the Democratic primaries in April, 1964 
including one third of the Wisconsin vote, 30 percent in Indiana and 43 percent in 
Maryland. In some steel districts in Indiana Wallace took 70 percent of the vote in the 
primary, indicating that, although he had the support of Labor leaders, his support 
amongst the "hardhats" was by no means safe.22 Whereas the widely predicted "white 
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backlash" had not materialised in the election, a Harris survey published in May, 1965 
showed " ... apparent uneasiness of the American people over the current pace of civil 
rights progress. Six months ago, the public tended to feel that steady and sound progress 
was being registered. After recent events, the number who feel things are moving -too 
fast' has risen rather sharply.,,23 Yet the civil rights movement continued to demand faster 
progress. 
Johnson took a chance by speeding up civil rights reforms in an attempt to 
pre-empt the civil rights movement. In doing so, he altered the usual way that the 
government did business with interest groups by taking the initiative himself. John D. 
Pomfret, writing in the New York Times, noted the unusual manner that the initiatives 
contained in a then-obscure report entitled "The Negro Family: The Case for National 
Action" (later known as the Moynihan Report) took place: 
The process by which the administration's proposals to aid the Negro community 
are being evolved is not the usual one. Ordinarily, legislative proposals are put 
forward by pressure groups and the government acts as a sort of broker working 
out a politically feasible compromise between these groups. 
In the present situation, the initiative so far has come largely from the 
administration, which is convinced that the problem and the need for fast action 
are so great that it must take the lead.24 
Plans for Progress expressed the pragmatic hope that solutions might be 
found through rather than outside of the existing American institutions. By 1966 it 
included 317 of the country's largest businesses, employing some 8.6 million employees. 
Historically, it is interesting in that it embodied the still-popular sentiment that business 
should lead efforts to create racial equality. Its purpose was to "provide leadership in 
bringing more Americans into fuller participation in the economy." Franklin Roosevelt, 
Jr. told delegates to a Plans for Progress Conference in 1966 that "it is time that you get 
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into the school system, you participate in working up the curriculum, you participate in 
the remedial educational programs of the city school system... Whatever your obstacles 
[to affirmative action], you are in a better position to overcome them than Uncle Sam 
is. ,,25 
Hobart Taylor, speaking at the same conference, encapsulated the 
perception of many in early 1966 that, whatever recent difficulties, "the institutions 
created by our forefathers have proved their viability and the ability to adapt to new 
conditions." He said that the period since Plans for Progress had been created had been 
"an exceptional period morally and socially - one in which the American people picked 
up the American Dream, brushed it off, and put it to work for the whole country." 
Implicit within Taylor's prose is the conviction that American institutions might yet 
overcome the severe difficulties in which the heightened awareness of the issue of race 
had placed them. The writing was on the wall, however. At the same conference the 
rather-less sanguine speech of Dr. Samuel Proctor, the North East director of the Office 
of Economic Opportunities (OEO) told delegates that "Watts today is not a place 
anymore - it's a state of mind, it's a condition, it's a mental milieux." He characterised 
the young black mind of the time as thinking "you don't have to touch this crumbling, 
decadent white society ... " The boosters, by this stage, were clearly on the defensive. 26 
In May 1965, speaking at Howard University, Lyndon B. Johnson gave a 
speech that many credit with changing forever the defmition of affIrmative action:27 
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate 
him, bringing him to the starting line of a race and then say, "you are free to 
compete with all the others," and still justly believe you have been completely 
fair. .. We seek not just freedom but opportunity ... not just equality as a right and 
a theory but equality as a fact and as a result.28 
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It is debatable whether "equality as a fact" and as a result represented any 
real step towards quota-based affIrmative action. As Steven Steinberg suggests, this 
speech may have been a case of "semantic infiltration," an example of selling relatively 
conservative measures with radical labels.29 Furthermore, Johnson's speech hardly went 
beyond Nixon's threatening of businessmen in the 1950s.3o However, it was surely 
significant that radical suggestions by civil rights activists, rejected out of hand by nearly 
all concerned two years earlier, were echoed by the most powerful man in the world, the 
personification of American democracy and the voice of the American people. The stakes 
for the government had been upped dramatically. However, the Howard speech may 
fairly be viewed as another cajoling effort by the Johnson administration aimed at 
convincing businessmen and other Americans that they must be committed to equal 
opportunities and must indicate their commitment with results. Realistically, no new 
defmition of affIrmative action emerged because of the distinction between equality as a 
right and equality as a fact. Johnson was simply announcing that affIrmative action (at its 
most basic meaning of "positive action") must augment the Civil Rights Act, expressing a 
sentiment that had been heard many times before, if not, perhaps, with the same urgency. 
But it is undeniable that the issue was now given a huge prominence that the civil rights 
leaders who fITst suggested some sort of preferential treatment should take place. The 
implication of the speech was also that the government would have to take positive action 
itself. 
Skrentny points out that a moment of at least equal importance, less 
noticed, was when, in March 1966, EEO-1 forms were sent out to every employer 
contracted with the federal government requiring employers to keep track of the race of 
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every employee. This, however, marked the extent of Johnson's willingness to enforce 
the afftrmative action he had called for at Howard University. Instead, Johnson pushed 
voluntaristic affIrmative action programs such as the Plans for Progress harder. He 
gambled that American employers and employees, like many Southerners, could be 
cajoled and bullied into accepting black employees without any real force being applied. 
The EEO-l forms would be yet another application of pressure to hire blacks.31 
Watts and the beginning of a period of policy stasis 
On a hot August night, the Watts area of Los Angeles erupted into the 
worst racial violence since the 1943 Detroit race riot. It continued for six days, with over 
$40m in property destroyed, over 1,000 injuries, 4,000 arrests made and 34 persons 
killed. Its biggest effect, however, was to sound the death-knell for the Myrdalian 
conception of race relations. 
The racial crisis heralded by Watts brought the liberal paradigm crashing 
down. Liberals had succeeded in raising expectations for the American Creed and 
American institutions so high that they toppled from a great height. The institutions that 
Myrdal insisted were to lead Americans from their individualised prejudices now 
appeared to be riddled with racism. Johnson had inadvertently exacerbated the crisis by 
attempting to match the activism of the civil rights movement with executive action on 
civil rights. He had little choice. The civil rights movement managed to show how little 
the institution of law meant to Southern segregationists. The response of the Kennedy 
administration, fulftlled by Johnson, was to pass the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Acts 
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preventing any agency from administering unequal treatment on the basis of race, creed, 
colour or sex. Now Americans believed that the law and justice might fmally be done for 
the Negro. Johnson believed that a process towards racial equality, now that the formal 
apparatus of oppression had been dismantled, had been initiated and would spread from 
the South into the ghettoes in northern cities where many blacks watched the events in 
the South eagerly. 
Watts shattered the beliefs held by most Americans that prejudice 
emanated from the treatment of blacks in the South alone. American institutions were 
sound, they had reasoned, but some outdated practices in the South, influencing some in 
the North, hampered the progress of the black race towards equality. The outlawing of 
these practices by the civil rights laws in the 1960s, most people hoped, would begin a 
process whereby racism in the United States would gradually disappear. Though some 
observers, including quite a few within the civil rights movement itself, began to suspect 
that racism might be embedded deeper within American society, at the time of the Watts 
riots most Americans thought that progress would soon be seen. 
The White House Conference on Civil Rights 
The White House Conference on Civil Rights, planned before the riot but 
held as a "planning conference" with 250 delegates in November 1965 (the full 
conference, far less interesting than the planning conference, was held in May 1966), is 
interesting in its exposition of the problems of race relations at a time when one paradigm 
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was breaking up but before any new paradigm had been developed. Not surprisingly, 
rancour and confusion ruled. 
Johnson had hoped that the conference would strengthen his liberal 
constituencies and re-establish presidential leadership over the civil rights movement. 
Those invited to the conference reflected the attempt to reconstruct "the coalition which 
staged the March on Washington, passed the Civil Rights Act, and laid the basis for the 
Johnson landslide - Negroes, trade unionists, liberals, and religious groups.,,32 In other 
words, Johnson wanted to use the conference to create the political consensus with which 
he had won the election. The consideration, therefore, was not so much to "solve" the 
problem, but to line up the political forces which could deliver a mandate to solve the 
problem. Watts, however, created splits in the civil rights movement, beset as it was by 
confusion and increasing hostility toward liberal politics, and within the liberal camp 
itself before Vietnam became a divisive political issue. 
The conference is interesting fIrst in that it gathered civil rights interests 
all under one roof for perhaps the fIrst and last time. Martin Luther King, James Bevel, 
Andrew Young and Septima Clarke of the SCLC, John Lewis, Jesse Jackson and a young 
Marion Berry from SNCC, Herbert Hill, John Morsell and Stanley Branch of the 
NAACP, Whitney Young from the NUL, Floyd McKissick from CORE, poverty activist 
Saul Alinsky, writers Michael Harrington and Charles Silberman, sociologists Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan, Nathan Glazer, economist Leon Keyserling, future mayor of Los 
Angeles Tom Bradley, not to mention church, trade union and government leaders - all 
discussed race issues in the aftermath ofWatts.33 
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Second, the structure of the conference gives a useful indication of what 
ways policymakers thought that racial problems could be resolved in the early 1960s. The 
fall conference was divided into seven panels - voting, education, "housing and 
neighborhood", the family, employment, health and welfare, and administration of 
justice. Myrdalian perspectives dominated the agenda and the incoming reports to the 
conference. The First Report Of The Task Force On Education dated 25 March 1965 
concluded that ''the obstacle of attitude" was the major obstacle to black equality. The 
report indicated that there was "a need for a program of "corrective" education, designed 
with special reference to racial, ethnic and cultural stereotypes which reflect the distorted 
cultural images." At the conference, delegates spoke of the need for equal education in 
order to get equality generally in society, voicing the principles behind the 1954 Brown v. 
Board of Education decision. 34 
The overall impression of the conference transcripts is of traffic running in 
all directions. Splits occurred between liberals and the civil rights movement but within 
both camps as well. Vivian W. Henderson, who was forced to sum up the session on jobs, 
admitted in a memorandum to Carl Holman in December 1965: "Virtually no 
recommendations came out of the panel on jobs to get at the problem of race relations in 
employment ... (This is) in spite of the fact that considerable discussion was devoted to 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.,,35 Even the subgroups of the conference became 
increasingly divided. Very few issues created a united front.36 Within the NAACP, for 
example, Dr. Morsell in Panel VII argued strenuously for "racially-conscious" statistics -
in other words, statistics based on race - whereas, when the same question was brought 
up in Panel IV, Clarence Laws, the NAACP representative, objected that " ... this is the 
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very thing we have been fighting against.,,37 Herbert Hill, the NAACP labor spokesman, 
stated bluntly that "We are opposed to the keeping of such records.,,38 
Perhaps the most important aspect of this obscure conference, however, 
was the concern shown for the future of institutions in the aftermath of Watts. The 
implications for the whole post-war pattern of politics seemed serious to many at the 
conference. The preliminary report to Panel I-A suggests that ''the old basis for such 
(political) organisation - the ward clubhouse and the organisation of job-holders - is 
decaying or eliminated." and called for a discussion on the psychological dimensions of 
citizenship.39 Above all, discussion in the panel addressed the problem of black political 
participation. Another preliminary report warned that " ... the concentration of Negroes in 
overcrowded areas decreases their political representation in city councils. This, in turn, 
reduces patronage posts and the exclusion from a fair share of the 'spoils system' 
discourages participation in ward organisation." The same report went on to suggest that 
besides the danger of riot is the danger that non-participation of blacks in the electoral 
process will "deal a serious blow to effective government in the urban North.,,40 Another 
panel expressed the anxiety of liberals faced with segregated schools: "Public education -
the public schools and colleges - are (sic) the basic social institutions designed to make 
real, vitalize and strengthen American democracy ... Racially segregated schools ... 
contribute to social instability and community pathology. They weaken the foundations 
of the American system of government.,,41 
Two Reports Undermine Myrda/ 
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Two reports initiated by the Federal Government emphasised that the 
existing analysis of the problem of black inequality was simply wrong and that a rethink 
of existing assumptions was needed. In 1966, the Coleman Report pulled the rug out from 
the under the theory that, with desegregated schools, blacks could achieve equality. 
Kennedy came to power promising "to help equalize educational opportunity throughout 
the country.,,42 Education had been highlighted both as a means to bring African-
Americans into the mainstream by better preparing them for job opportunities and also by 
lessening prejudice in whites through what Gordon Allport termed "contact theory" - the 
idea that white prejudice would dissipate if the races came into contact more often. 
The Coleman Report had been called for by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. It 
addressed itself to four major questions: 1. How segregated are schoolchildren? 2. Do 
different schools offer equal educational opportunity? 3. How much do different children 
learn as measured by their performance on standardized achievement tests? 4. What are 
the possible relationships between students' achievement and the kind of schools they 
attend? First, the report found that ''when measured by that yardstick [1954 decision], 
American public education remains largely unequal in most regions of the country." 
Twelve years after the Brown decision, there had been no change. Much more disturbing, 
however, was the finding that the success of children was determined before they 
attended school and was related to socio-economic background rather. This implied that 
efforts to desegregate schools, while desirable for many reasons, would not improve the 
life-chances for African-American children and would thus have little effect on black 
inequality, even in the long-term.43 
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On a practical level, too, school desegregation efforts ran into problems. 
Formal segregation could be outlawed but little progress had occurred in actually 
desegregating schools since the Brown decision. At the end of the decade Leon Panetta, a 
liberal California Republican appointed by HEW Secretary Robert Finch to head up the 
department's Office of Civil Rights, recalled a White House staff discussion about school 
desegregation soon after the Nixon team took over. A White House report they inherited 
concluded that " ... after the most searching, intensive examination of the system we 
inherited for untying those knots [the knotty problems of school desegregation], we have 
concluded that it simply does not work. It has proven both ineffective and unfair. In short, 
it has failed.,,44 The problem was exacerbated by the new focus on Northern school 
districts where de facto segregation seemed to create an even deeper division between 
blacks and whites than existed in the South. 
Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of the failure of all previous 
efforts by the Johnson administration to alleviate black inequality came in the riots in the 
summer of 1967. Black riots had occurred in 1966 in San Francisco, New York, Chicago, 
Cleveland, Atlanta and Grenada, Mississippi. In 1967 the two most damaging and 
destructive riots of the decade came in Newark, New Jersey and, a week later, in Detroit, 
where 43 people were killed and millions of dollars worth of damage was caused. 
Johnson told the International Association of Police Chiefs in Kansas City, Missouri in 
September of 1967 that "(m)uch can explain - but nothing can justify - the riots of 
1967." He blamed the rioters for damaging "the respect and the accommodation among 
men on which a civilized society ultimately depends, and without which there can be no 
progress toward social justice." Johnson and many others at the time believed the riots 
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were provoked by "wretched, vulgar men, these poisonous propagandists" and set up a 
commission to investigate the causes of the riots. One of its briefs was to investigate the 
possibility that communist infiltrators were responsible. 
The Kerner Commission Reports 
The resulting report of the riot commission was perhaps most important 
document for sealing the fate of the racial liberalism of Gunnar Myrdal. The Report of the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, or Kerner Report, as it is more 
commonly known, appeared in 1968 with great fanfare. The commission, governed 
ostensibly by trusted Johnson deputy, Otto Kerner, but in reality manipulated by Mayor 
John Lindsay of New York, was published in March, 1968 with a print run of30,000 but 
was sold out in three days.45 It sold another 1.6m between March and June 1968.46 The 
report turned out very differently than Johnson had imagined. Its impact was immediate. 
It rejected the idea that there had been any conspiracy involved. Its keynote theme was 
that "white racism is essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which has been 
accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II." To appreciate the impact upon 
the hopes of racial liberalism, one only has to compare the oft-cited line at the beginning 
of the report, "our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white - separate 
and unequal," to Pravda's assessment of the American race riots of the 1960s. It 
observed in the riots ''two Americas which are at war with each other - that of the rich 
and strong and that of the poor and humiliated, of whom the majority are Negroes. ,,47 In 
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essence, American liberalism had admitted to all the accusations made by Soviet 
propaganda on racial issues heard since the beginning of the Cold War. 
The most important conclusion of the report was that the Federal 
Government could not "continue its present failing efforts towards an integrated 
society.,,48 The institutions that had been championed by Myrdal and other liberals 
through to Lyndon Johnson were indicted: " ... white society is deeply implicated in the 
ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society 
condones it.,,49 In other words, instead of institutions correcting the sometimes-irrational 
proclivities of white citizens, the (white) institutions created a system whereby racism, 
latent or otherwise, within (white) individuals came to the surface. Though the report, in 
some ways, pure Myrdal in its assessment that the problems of black Americans lay on 
the white side of the equation, it came as an indictment of the democratic institutions, of 
the American Creed itself. 
However, as well as its radical way of framing the question, aspects of the 
report are also fairly conservative by today's terms. It expressed in its recommendations 
the divisions between members of the commission over how to overcome the problems of 
black riots. It compromised, for instance, between attempts to destroy the ghettoes and 
integrate black Americans within white suburbs, and those directed at enriching life in the 
ghettoes, reflecting the concerns that had emerged at the White House Conference on 
Civil Rights planning session two years earlier. Many of its recommendations show that 
contentious issues were avoided; it was easier to recommend that the Federal 
Government create two million jobs over the next three years than to get agreement on 
job quotas for minorities. The report continually emphasised that the programmatic 
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suggestions would benefit poor whites as well as blacks, perhaps an indication that the 
Commission still saw the need to get white Americans behind civil rights efforts. 
The report stepped back from an entirely pessimistic prognosis of the 
problem; such an analysis would, of course, obviate its existence. In bringing the tragic 
events to light, it was hoped that the problem might still be resolved. Also, a key 
continuum since An American Dilemma was published was that all whites, rather than 
just the authorities, were implicated. Despite superficial similarities of the Report's 
analysis with Pravda, there was no return to blaming the inequities of capitalism for the 
continuing oppression of the nation's black citizens. "This report is addressed to the 
institutions of government and to the conscience of the nation, but even more urgently, to 
the minds and hearts of each citizen. The responsibility for decisive action, never more 
clearly demanded in the history of the nation, rests on all ofus.,,50 Effectively, blame for 
the problem was shared out equally amongst all whites, from the chiefs of corporations to 
street-sweepers, from Washington bureaucrats to Montana ranchers. Michael Lipsky, co-
author of a book about riot commissions published several years after the Kerner 
Commission, concluded that its research effort had allowed the Kerner Commission ''to 
demand changes and advocate radical reforms without calling names ... The problem is 
identified and the solutions are proposed. But no one is responsible, and no one is 
blamed, or urged to act, as an individual, any differently.,,51 The Kerner Report continued 
Myrdal's theme that racial injustice was a moral problem in the hearts of white men even 
while it contradicted Myrdal's hope that liberal institutions would eventually lead 
Americans away from their racism. Such a continuum would prove vital to the ascension 
of the affirmative action paradigm later. 
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Institutional Racism 
Around the same time as the report, the theory of "institutional racism" 
was elucidated. Skrentny says of the importance of institutionalised racism that that "its 
most powerful role was as a legitimizing influence" for affirmative action52 • However, as 
Steinberg has noted (and as has been noted earlier in this dissertation), the notion that 
American institutions were riddled with racism was not really new. Myrdal had 
documented how white institutions contributed to black oppression. What was new was 
the conception that all of white society was hopelessly racist. There was no question of 
progress; there was simply a blanket condemnation of white society. The same "white 
institutions" condemned in the Kerner report were condemned by Stokely Carmichael, 
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) leader who leapt to fame with 
the cry of "black power" at a demonstration in 1966, and Charles Hamilton, a black 
political scientist in their 1967 publication, Black Power: 
Racism is both overt and covert. It takes two, closely related forms: individual 
whites acting against individual blacks, and acts by the total white community 
against the black community. We call these individualized racism and 
institutional racism... The second type is less overt, far more subtle, less 
identifiable in terms of specific individuals committing the acts. But it is no less 
destructive of human life. The second type originates in the operation of 
established and respected forms in the society, and thus receives far less public 
condemnation than the fITst type. 53 
This book by Carmichael, already a controversial figure, and Hamilton 
quickly became a best seller. The theory of institutional racism now became discussed 
openly and rapidly became accepted amongst the liberal intelligentsia. The key difference 
between previous theories and the same themes that Nixon had highlighted in 1958 was 
in the hopelessness with which Carmichael and Hamilton viewed the problem. Whereas 
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those reports of the 1950s identified the propensity of institutions to, by habits and 
patterns rather than by conscious prejudice, discriminate against blacks, they hoped to 
alleviate the problem. Carmichael and Hamilton argued that blacks could never rely upon 
white institutions but had to organise themselves. This new conception clearly struck at 
the heart of the American Creed. Myrdal had enthused that "Americans believe in their 
own ability and in progress. They are at bottom moral optimistS.,,54 The acceptance of 
institutional racism, if it did not completely contradict this belief, set back the prospects 
for its achievement and suggested that other ways of achieving this fmal goal must be 
contemplated. 
On the one hand, the implication of failure was really aimed at American 
democratic institutions, despite the blanket condemnation of all of white society. Harking 
back to Myrdal, it had been up to these institutions to bring to bear "constant pressure on 
race prejudice, counteracting the natural tendency for it to spread and become more 
intense." They had patently failed. In fact, the riots and the reaction by white Americans 
gave an indication that racial problems within the United States could not be resolved 
within the existing democratic framework. The prevalence of the theory of institutional 
racism in the late 1960s, in this sense, marked the end of an era when people imagined 
that black Americans could be incorporated into the American mainstream through 
government acting as an "educative force," through democratic leadership. 55 On the other 
hand, however, the identification of the problem of black inequality as a white problem, 
rather than that of a particular social system, and the democratic insistence that the blame 
be laid equally throughout white society as a moral issue within the heart of each 
American, remained within Carmichael and Hamilton's thesis. Certainly, the critique of 
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American race relations did not take the direction it had done in the 1930s when it was 
infused with anti-capitalism. Myrdal was at once contradicted and reaffirmed. 
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Chapter 4 
THE STASIS OF GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS EFFORTS IN THE 
LATE 1960S 
While historians concentrate on the pioneers who first propagated theories 
of institutional racism, it is possible to miss the confusion besetting administrators and 
policymakers during this period. Most continued along lines handed down to them until 
instructed otherwise. The most important precept contained in An American Dilemma -
that white Americans might be persuaded to reform their attitudes towards blacks and 
thus alleviate the problem - survived in the minds of administrators until the late 1960s. I 
Some civil rights professionals analysed the problem in northern cities as essentially a 
transplanted Southern problem. They reasoned that black immigrants to the cities created 
overcrowding and thus unrest in the ghettoes, leading to rioting. Such an analysis must 
have proved attractive for officials desperate to get a handle on the problem. A "Miss 
Bennet," who listed herself as a federal government employee at the White House 
Conference on Civil Rights, told the conference: "You have in Watts, now, 1000 newly 
arriving illiterates from the rural South every month adding to that. I think we ought to 
take a little bit of time to talk about these people in the rural areas because they are going 
to prevent solutions to the problems.,,2 Miss Bennet's solution was a massive plan to 
pastoralize the South in order to provide more adequate livings for rural blacks and thus 
keep them out of the cities where they created trouble. Such solutions, while appearing 
strange now, appeared as credible programs at the height of the racial crisis.3 
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As Alfred Blumrosen complained, the wheels of bureaucracy turned 
slowly, though, keeping in mind the implications of Miss Bennet's plan, one can be 
slightly more charitable towards bureaucrats when judging their hesitancy at 
implementing new plans. Many administrators were loath to give up the Myrdalian 
precept of "education, not enforcement" when it came to discrimination in employment: 
This formula immobilized the agencies. The idea was that the law should not be 
enforced because it dealt with basic human motivations and attitudes. These 
attitudes could be corrected only by "education." But education was then defined 
to exclude enforcement of the law, despite a long history which has justified much 
law on the grounds of its deterrence or educational function. 4 
Blumrosen was indeed accurate regarding the immobilization of the agencies. In school 
desegregation cases, it was found that private sector actions in real-estate and home 
lending led to residential segregation that made school integration impossible. Busing 
between school districts became the favoured remedy of the courts but created a very 
messy and costly solution. Additionally, it ran up against concerted opposition from 
parents who, for racial motives or otherwise, objected to busing. 
The so-called "open housing" programs fared no better. In July 1967 
Housing and Urban Development (RUD) revised its tenant selection policy, eliminated 
ineffective free choice plans and substituted a plan based on "fITst come, fITst served" In 
summarizing its experience under the free choice system, HUD said: "for various 
reasons, such as the mores of the community, fear of reprisals, types of neighborhoods, 
inducement by Local Authority staff -- whether by subtle suggestion, manipulation, 
persuasion, or otherwise ... such freedom of choice plans did not provide applicants with 
actual freedom of access to, or full availability of, housing in all projects and locations.'" 5 
The enforcement mechanisms provided for ffiJD - generally complaint processing 
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through formal investigation and litigation initiated by individuals, according to the CRC 
report, "provide weak leverage because of their time-consuming and individualistic 
nature,,6 
Neither had other efforts been successful in lessening the gap between 
black and white Americans. The efforts at strengthening black communities through 
Community Action Projects and other experimental projects in the ghettoes had also 
failed to make any ground. The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission could not 
be counted as a success. The number of cases successfully prosecuted emerged like the 
smallest of a set of Russian dolls from the other relevant statistics. From an initial 44 
thousand charges reported to EEOC, 27 thousand were recommended for investigation, 
reasonable cause found for 1 7 thousand, conciliation was successful in less than eight 
thousand and, of the nine thousand cases remaining, only 900 were even brought to court! 
As EEOC chairman William H. Brown complained: 
It can readily be seen that the existing law is seriously deficient ... All that an 
intransigent respondent has to fear is the unlikely possibility that whomever he 
has discriminated against will take him to court. This has happened in less than 10 
per cent of the cases where we found reasonable cause and attempts at 
conciliation were unsuccessful. 7 
When it came to contract compliance, officials still balked at the idea of 
forcing companies to comply with the conditions of the contract, not least because a 
useful working defmition of "discrimination" that all contractors had foresworn remained 
elusive. Somewhat typical was the Allen-Bradley case. For the payroll period ending 
March 7 1968, the company had 6,869 employees, 32 of whom were black. There was an 
official, written company policy giving preference to relatives and friends of employees. 
Between April 1964 and October 1968, there were four meetings and three letters 
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exchanged between the government and Allen-Bradley. Neither the issues nor the attitude 
of the company changed. Nevertheless, four years passed before the company was 
formally notified in May 1968 that it was in noncompliance. After hearings, the Secretary 
of Labor ordered the company to "proceed immediately to attempt to agree on an 
appropriate program of affirmative action." No affirmative action plan had yet been 
agreed by June 1969.8 
A survey appearing at the time was damning of the government's record in 
persuading companies that they needed to hire more African-Americans. Of the fifty 
states, 24 (47 percent) showed increases in black employment of 1 percent or less in the 
five year period (1962-67). Of these, 22 had no increase or decreased - including Florida, 
Texas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, West Virginia. Nearly one fifth of all 
black federal employees in 1967 worked in Washington DC (where only 11 percent of all 
federal employees worked). Most humiliating to Johnson, perhaps, was the spectacular 
failure of the high profile Plans for Progress program. A survey carried out by the 
President's Council on Equal Opportunity (PCEO) indicated that by 1968 companies in 
the program had worse records of hiring African-Americans than the government 
contractors who were not in this preferred status and who had been lectured at by those in 
the program.9 Edward C. Sylvester, the head of Johnson's Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs (OFCC) complained in March 1967 of the government's equal 
. d h f k,,10 employment programs, "there IS too much carrot an not enoug s lC . 
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Nixon's Holding Pattern 
There is no question that when Nixon took office the crisis in authority had 
deepened considerably. In 1968 those who were still trying to downplay the nation's 
distress in the hope that it would go away could no longer ignore black rage or the 
undertow of Vietnam. On January 30 1968 the Viet Cong launched the Tet offensive, a 
surprise attack that, despite the fact that the Viet Cong suffered heavy losses, convinced 
many Americans that the Vietnam War could not be won. American casualties climbed 
throughout the year, equalling in the fIrst six months the total for the whole of 1967. As 
many Americans began questioning the correctness of the assumptions with which they 
had grown up, the authority of Johnson and his administration suffered. Many began to 
link the Vietnam War with the racial crisis, seeing the war as the annihilation of a people 
because of their difference from the mainstream. On March 31, Johnson appeared on the 
nation's television screens to announce the scaling-down of the bombing of North 
Vietnam, adding to a surprised national audience that he would not be a candidate for re-
election. When Dr. Martin Luther King was assassinated less than a week later, blacks 
rioted in 168 cities and towns. Thirty-four blacks and five whites died in the violence. 
Robert Kennedy was shot in June as he campaigned to be Democratic presidential 
candidate. Violence erupted again in August at the Democratic national convention in 
Chicago. However, it was protest about the Vietnam War that became the biggest worry 
for Nixon when he took office. This war, as Godfrey Hodgson observed, "became the 
organizing principle around which all the doubts and disillusionments of the years of 
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crisis since 1963, and all the deeper discontents hidden under the glossy surface of the 
confident years, coalesced into one great rebellion." I I 
The crisis, relatively small from the perspective of today, meant, at the 
time, that the deepest fears of liberals appeared to be realised. As Doug McAdam 
observed, "(i)t would not seem an overstatement to argue that the level of open defiance 
of the established economic and political order was as great during this period as during 
any other in this country's history, save the Civil War.,,12 
The more long-lasting effects of the crisis, though, were less physical than 
spiritual or moral. A pervasive self-doubt affected liberals at various different levels. The 
sense of moral failure occasionally developed into breastbeating and even (metaphoric) 
self-flagellation. Thus Ramparts magazine, a contemporary liberal publication, quoted 
James Baldwin: '" White people cannot in the generality be taken as models of how to 
live. Rather the white man himself is in sore need of new standards '" then added: "We 
agree.,,13 The Democratic Party, hitherto the political gathering point for civil rights 
liberals, appeared on the verge of collapse after the Chicago convention. A delegate told 
the audience in Chicago: 
To an extent not matched since the turn of the century, events in 1968 have called 
into question the integrity of the convention system for nominating presidential 
candidates. Recent developments have put the future of the two-party system into 
serious jeopardy... The crisis of the Democratic Party is a genuine crisis for 
democracy in America and especially of the two-party system. Racial minorities, 
the poor, the young, members of the upper-middle class, and much of the lower-
middle and working classes as well - all are seriously considering transferring 
. h f h . . 14 their allegiance away from eit er 0 t e two major partIes ... 
Nor was it simply Democrats who saw a crisis emergmg. Elliot 
Richardson, who would replace Bob Finch as Nixon's Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare, pontificated in 1967 about " ... a new and potentially disastrous development 
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threatens us: the growing loss, by millions of Americans of their sense of purpose and 
identity." He blamed the present administration for the debacle, not entirely surprising, 
given that he spoke to the Republican Ripon society. State Senator Jerris Leonard of 
Wisconsin, who took charge of the Civil Rights Division in the Justice Department of the 
Nixon administration, spoke of the crisis to the National, State, and Local Relations 
Subcommittee, National Republican Platform, on July 31 1968, pointing out its critical 
nature: 
.. .I submit to you that it is really only been in the last dozen or twenty years that 
the individual citizen has become despondent over his inability to get a handhold 
on his government. . .. While paying lip service to federalism and local 
government, we have established a mono lithic centralism before which the 
individual feels powerless. His alternatives are membership in mass protest 
groups, or introverted withdrawal -- neither of which serve well the cause of 
democracy. 15 
Leonard indicated that the implications for government were severe: 
To lift the urban crisis from our land will require profound adjustments 
throughout our social system, involving individual attitudes and commitments, the 
roles of public and private institutions, the assignment of priorities and resources, 
and, above all, national leadership that goes beyond the "politics as usual" of the 
past four years. 16 
Though both Richardson and Leonard could be counted as relatively 
liberal on many social issues, more mainstream Republican comment indicated that 
beneath the headline-grabbing condemnations of the Johnson administration's alleged 
softness on crime and disorder, genuine worries about the future of political system 
pervaded both parties. According to one of the official publications for the 1968 
Republican Convention, the crisis was seen in broad terms: 
These factors indicate that the urban crisis is far more than civil disorders and 
unmet social needs; it is a crisis of confidence, of leadership and of human 
relationships that amounts to a depression of the national spirit. For just as the old 
indicators of progress are no longer valid, so also the customary responses, 
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whether they be the establishment of one or more Federal program [sic], the 
appointment of another blue-ribbon study Commission, or an after-the-riot plea 
for law and order, are woefully inadequate.17 
Veteran newspaperman Walter Lippmann, who has been called the 
quintessential Washington insider, wrote in the Washington Post in 1968, just after the 
release of the Kerner Commission Report, that: "The dominant fact is the crumbling of 
that binding confidence in the Nation's purposes and its future, which in normal times 
may be taken for granted. There is a disintegration of that hope, which is the inner genius 
of the American spirit, that men can solve their problems and that evils can be 
overcome.,,18 The National Committee for an Effective Congress, a bipartisan affair, 
noted in a report cited in the New York Times on December 26 1967, asserting that 
'''malaise,' 'frustration,' 'alienation,' 'identity' are now becoming part of the professional 
political vocabulary." It summed up the period by stating that "America has experienced 
two internal crises in her history: the Civil War and the economic depression of the 
1930's. The country may now be on the brink of a third trauma, a depression in the 
national spirit." On the extent of the crisis, if not on the causes or cures, there was broad 
agreement at the end of the 1960s. 19 
It is evident that, between 1944, when An American Dilemma was 
published, and 1969, when the Philadelphia plan came into effect, attitudes to issues of 
race had changed dramatically. The white side of the equation had been eclipsed by 
problems on the black side. The American democratic system, heralded by a large section 
of the intelligentsia after the war as a system that was easily perfectible if not already 
perfected, had been indicted for its inability to incorporate twenty million of its citizens 
by 1969. Racial progress by slow but sure changes in the attitudes of white Americans 
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towards their black fellow citizens - as prescribed by Myrdal- was no longer a realistic 
scenario. In many ways, white racism was now assumed to a permanent fact. This change 
of perspective affected policy decisions, especially in the area of civil rights. As political 
scientist Theodore Lowi termed it, federal policy now "became a matter of indemnifying 
damages rather than righting wrongs. ,,20 
The role of the State in the question of racism changed entirely. In an 
article in the Michigan Law Journal in 1969, Norman Vieira noted that preferential 
treatment implied that the government no longer sought to reform white attitudes to 
blacks: "Blacks as well as whites may instinctively attribute the preferential treatment of 
a minority race to a low assessment of its capabilities. Racially predicated government 
action may thereby appear to confIrm the folklore of racism ... ,,21 Government now 
became an arbiter between groups in a racially divided society rather than a leader in a 
society striving towards racial equality. In this way, the power elite, while they could not 
lead the country on the issue, created a new basis for their authority. Few challenged their 
position as arbiters in the relations between the races. 
The process of destruction of the Myrdalian paradigm, while occasionally 
dramatic, took place over a number of years and in different ways. Because of its 
existence as a higher ideal, race relations professionals who dealt with a particular area 
found their experiences contradicted Myrdal' s perspectives but imagined that they were 
the exceptions to a still-valid general rule. It would be possible to illustrate aspects of 
continuity between the Myrdalian paradigm and the way race is understood today. 
Indeed, as many have pointed out, generations of African-Americans have grown up in 
ghettoes that saw few changes despite the furore taking place on the pages of scholarly 
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journals and at academic conferences. Black earnings compared to those of whites have 
not changed dramatically since the late 1950s. However, the deleterious effect on other 
aspects of liberalism happened quicker. 
The times called for a President who was not closely associated with the 
liberal programs and institutions of the 1960s. Only such a leader had the freedom to 
experiment with different programs. Nixon had the job of slowly extricating the issue of 
race from the democratic arena altogether. However, Nixon did not at first seriously 
consider overhauling race relations; his only remit was to "lower our voices," to calm an 
inflamed situation. Initially, Nixon followed the civil rights efforts of the Johnson 
administration, hoping to effectively enforce the existing legislation in order to promote 
order and faith in the law. His initial choice for Secretary of HEW, Bob Finch, explained 
that "We didn't need some new theory in the field of civil rights enforcement. .. the 
question became 'How are we going to rationalise it?",22 
After four consecutive summers of serious rioting, there seemed little 
reason to think that the rioting would end. In 1969 it moved to the campuses. At Cornell, 
one hundred black students armed with rifles and shotguns occupied the student union. In 
October three hundred Weathermen (a revolutionary splinter group) raced through 
Chicago smashing windows and attacking police officers in an attempt to incite armed 
class struggle.23 Between the beginning of the year and April 15, there were 8000 
bombings and threats of bombings. In the 1969-70 academic year, 7200 young people 
arrested for violent acts on campus, double that during 1968-69. As Melvin Small 
observed, "(w)hatever legislative program the administration fmally developed, the chief 
problem it faced in 1969 was the perception that the United States was coming apart at 
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the seams. The nation was awash in unprecedented political and racial violence and a 
perceived rise in criminality that made many Americans insecure, even in middle-class 
neighborhoods and homes. ,,24 
A solidly establishment figure like Irwin Miller, Chief Executive Officer 
of Cummins Engine Company, member of the steering committee of the Urban coalition, 
President of the National Council of Churches, amongst other things, predicted ensuing 
social chaos and summed up the feelings of many: "Because of our new dependence on 
electric power, communications, and transportation arteries, a small dedicated group of 
men in each city could paralyze us. Alongside the opportunity there exist men and 
women who might easily be motivated to seize it. These are the men and women for 
whom this country does not work. ,,25 Such alarmist sentiments were widespread in 1969. 
A Political Crisis 
Conservatives galvanised their constituents by spreading panic about the 
perceived (and often very real) lack of law and order in American society. "Crime and 
violence, disregard of law and disrespect for authority, immorality and irresponsibility 
are on the rise," one report exclaimed brightly at the Miami party conference in 1968.26 
"Rising crime rates and a series of major riots and civil disorders have left a trail of 
victims, both Negro and white, and have created an atmosphere of fear, alarm, mistrust 
and apprehension all across the country," chimed in another. Nixon, not to be outdone by 
his Republican colleagues, topped the hyperbole stakes in speeches around the country. 
"The violence being threatened for this summer is more in the nature of a war than a riot. 
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A riot, by defmition, is a spontaneous outburst. A war is subject to advance planning. ,,27 
Later, he warmed to the ''war'' descriptor for domestic vio lence. "The war in Asia is a 
limited one with limited means and limited goals. The war at home is a war for survival 
of a free society.,,28 
The Republicans had every reason to hype up the disorder, standing to 
benefit as they did from the fear and dissatisfaction existing in the population as a whole 
at the time. Their own party had been in crisis for some time. An interesting report 
entitled Where the Votes Are published in 1966 indicated the extent of the rot. In 1940 38 
percent of American voters considered themselves regularly affiliated with the GOP. By 
1950, 33 percent of the American population still affiliated themselves itself with the 
GOP. In 1960 the number dropped to 30 percent, in 1962, 28 percent and by 1964 only 
25 percent of the population called themselves Republicans. Meanwhile, Democratic 
Party affiliations rose to over 50 percent and those who called themselves independents 
remained between 20 and 24 percent between 1940 and 1966. Party affiliation was at its 
weakest among voters in their early and middle twenties. Despite the report's suggestion 
that its implications were of a "enormous opportunity," the statistics were clearly gloomy 
reading for Republican officials.29 
Nixon proposed compromises. On CBS Radio on June 27 1968, Nixon 
departed from the "law and order" theme with which he was attracting panicking white 
Americans: 
Faced with epidemic disorder, one part of the answer is both to strengthen and to 
use the forces of law. But this by itself is not enough. If we are to restore domestic 
peace, we sooner or later must bring those who threaten it back within the system. 
What we need is not one leader, but many leaders; not one center of power, but 
many centers of power. 
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Every idea has its time. And the time is now for the idea of an expanded 
democracy, of moving government closer to the people, of breaking massive 
problems into manageable pieces. This is the way people can participate, they can 
be involved, their voices can be heard and heeded. 
One of the first tasks of the next President should be to set in motion a searching 
fundamental appraisal of our whole structure of government - not only of our 
federal departments and agencies, but also of state and local government, and its 
relation to the Federal structure . 
. . .1 do think that as we make government more responsive, as we re-kindle trust 
and reestablish a sense of community, we can bring many back within the 
system. 30 
Several aspects of this speech stand out. First, some sort of measures to 
include the alienated within the system would be necessary that would accomplish the 
task of "breaking massive problems into manageable pieces." No longer were the 
problems referred to (this speech, delivered in the month after the rioting following 
Martin Luther King's assassination, obviously referred to rioting when it mentioned 
"epidemic disorder") to be resolved, they were simply to be made more manageable. 
This allowed housing to be approached separately from education and employment to be 
addressed separately from voting rights. The whole emphasis on decentralization backed 
away from the idea that all these could be accomplished at once the idea that black 
Americans should be brought into the mainstream and opened the door to localised 
solutions like affIrmative action quotas as the best way to proceed. 
There is other evidence that Nixon had some grasp that the nature of the 
crisis and that more than immediate measures were needed. As Lowi observed in 1969, 
"(t)he crisis of the 1960's is at bottom a political crisis, a crisis of political authority," a 
crisis, Lowi later stated, that was "more serious than any other in the twentieth century:3] 
"The institutions of the state have become implicated. There is serious doubt about 
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efficacy and justice m the agencIes of government, the process of policy-making, 
leadership selection, and the implementation of decisions... The modus operandi of 
power must be called into question.,,32 As Dan Carter reminded readers, that more than 
13 percent of the electorate that ultimately supported George Wallace indicated that 
alienation from the American political system extended far beyond the ghettoes. The 
destruction of the New Deal alliances formed in the 1930s threw many political and 
social assumptions into question. Once in office, Nixon could no longer simply criticise 
the record of the Democrats. He would have to deal with the situation himself 
In the White House, Nixon acted to restore public order and stability had 
to be regained. In White House speechwriter Ray Price's attempt at a poetic phrase, 
Nixon wished to "lay a hand on the nation's fevered brow.,,33 Outside the administration, 
the pundits agreed. Political pundits Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg referred in a 
book published in 1970 to ''Nixon's go-slow, antifrenetic style of government.,,34 Left-
wing editor of Dissent Irving Howe told the National Black Economic Development 
Conference held at the end of April 1969 that: "The main goal of the Nixon 
Administration is the restoration of social order - social peace - in the United States. How 
this is to be achieved - by blunt oppression, meliorist legislation, or both - the Nixon 
people don't yet know. ,,35 
Nixon carried the battle to the campuses of the nation m 1969. An 
historical curiosity, given the apolitical nature of US campuses today, is the extent to 
which Nixon and members of his administration worried about campus unrest. But the 
question for the Nixon team in 1969 "in its simplest form, was whether rule by mob 
would supplant rule by the democratic system.,,36 Throughout 1969, a constant theme was 
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the spectre of disorder and chaos. In a statement on campus disorders issued on March 22 
1969, Nixon warned in stark terms of the danger: "The process is altogether too familiar 
to those who would survey the wreckage of history: assault and counterassault, one 
extreme leading the opposite extreme, the voices of reason and calm discredited. As 
Yeats foresaw: 'Things fall apart; the center cannot hold ... ' None of us has the right to 
suppose it cannot happen here.,,37 Even at remarks given at an Annual Meeting of the 
Chamber of Commerce, Nixon's theme was campus disturbances.38 Perhaps his most 
prominent attack on campus disorders, however, was at the dedication of a library at 
General Beadle State College in South Dakota. Here he linked the issue of campus 
disorder with other ills affecting the country: "We live in a deeply troubled and 
profoundly unsettling time. Drugs and crime, campus revolt, racial discord, draft 
resistance - on every hand we find old standards violated, old values discarded, old 
precepts ignored... As a result of all this, our institutions in America today are 
undergoing what may be the severest challenge of our history. But the challenge I speak 
of today is deeper - the challenge to our values and to the moral base of authority that 
sustains those values.,,39 The "New Mobe" - the Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam 
_ threatened a massive march in Washington on November 15 1969. It would be made up 
largely of students around the country who would descend upon the city. Within the 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman White House records, many intelligence reports were filed, 
indicating that, despite Nixon's apparent disinterest (he let it be know that he would be 
watching a football game at the time was due to be held), the administration was actually 
deeply worried about the event. 40 
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In a record of a meeting with the President in 1969 (the exact date is 
unclear but the document is contained in a file marked 1969), Ehrlichman noted the 
priorities of the administration as 1. Vietnam, 2. Inflation, 3. Youth disaffection, 4. 
Politics (which included a. Attack on military [including ABM fight] b. School issue, c. 
Other), indicating the importance the President put on ''youth disaffection. ,,41 Nixon also 
ordered investigations into whether student leaders were trained and fmanced by 
communists.42 
Especially in the area of civil rights, the Nixon administration continued 
many of the policies begun under the Johnson administration, despite Nixon's apparent 
promises to Southerners that school desegregation would be slowed. There is evidence in 
the files of a fair amount of confusion over civil rights strategies of the new 
administration. Panetta spelled out his objections: "The trouble was that no one really 
understood what Nixon had said or promised during the campaign, and his statements 
were shrouded in ambiguity and controversy.,,43 Upon taking office, Finch was left with 
some problems by his predecessor, Wilbur Cohen. Cohen had ruled that five school 
districts - two in Strom Thurmond's South Carolina - had to lose federal school funds for 
failure to submit desegregation plans meeting HEW's guidelines. On January 24 Finch 
told Under-Secretary (and liberal California Republican) John Veneman that he had 
"lost" on the fund-cutoff. Finch said that the President wanted the fund cutoff stayed for 
60 days. The alternative plan was that the five districts would be cut off from their 
Federal funds effective January 29, but if they came up with acceptable plans within 60 
days, they could recover all the funds (and two districts did so). Finch wrote to Chief 
Judge John R. Brown on August 19 asking for a stay until December 1. On October 29, 
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despite a contrary ruling by the circuit court, the Supreme Court decided that "'the 
obligations of every school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to 
operate now and hereafter only unitary schools.,,44 Nixon, however, distanced himself 
from the machinations between HEW and Justice. At a press conference on September 
26, Nixon made his famous formulation that "there are those who want instant integration 
and those who want segregation forever. I believe that we need to have a middle course 
between those two extremes. ,,45 
To liberals, Nixon appeared to be backing away from civil rights 
commitments of the previous administration. In April Nixon requested Congress to 
reduce the enforcement program for fair housing by $4m. In June, the Justice Department 
came out against extending the Voting Rights Act of 1965, offering a substitute that 
would end the special sanctions against the South. However, the President stayed above 
the fray. At the ground level, HEW continued insisting that Southern schools 
desegregate. Many within the Nixon administration, at least at the lower levels, approved 
of more strident action by the agency to desegregate schools, buoyed in their opinions by 
court decisions like Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, which ruled that 
so-called freedom of choice plans, where schools simply opened their doors to children of 
any race, were not adequate if they did not result in integrated schools. The Baltimore 
Sun's headline summed up the difficulties that ensued as Nixon's balancing strategy and 
his attempt to find a non-existent middle ground on this issue lead to each side vying for 
the President's favour with ever-increasing energy and desperation. On July 1 1969 the 
paper warned: "INTEGRATION WAR LOOMS INSIDE GOp.,,46 By this time, however, 
speechwriter William Safrre records that Nixon thought he was "in mortal danger of 
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being perceived as a liberal. Worse, he felt this false perception could lead to a 
weakening of America's national will."47 Nixon began to distance himself from the 
liberal camp. However, he still made no hard and fast decisions that might indicate the 
direction in which he felt his administration should proceed on civil rights. Panetta 
recorded the disputes that occurred. The extent of revolt in HEW was evident when 1800 
employees signed a petition asking Finch to explain the Administration's civil rights 
policy. Panetta faced calls for his resignation from right-wingers in the Nixon team like 
Harry Dent (the former Strom Thurmond aide and self-proclaimed architect of the 
"southern strategy"), congressional liason Bryce Harlow and Patrick Buchanan and 
actually submitted his resignation in early October of that year. Panetta, who displayed a 
crusading and perhaps naive belief in the rightness of immediate and comprehensive 
school desegregation efforts, did not have his resignation accepted until Feb 17, 1970 - a 
testament to the fact that the Nixon administration's position on school desegregation 
remained fluid in 1969. 
Other key figures in the administration about the Nixon civil rights agenda 
in 1969 agreed that no new strategy was employed in 1969. Moynihan remarked that 
"The decision not to repudiate the social goals [of previous administrations] was 
signalled, but never quite articulated ... Whatever the case, comparatively clear decisions 
were made. There was not to be a restoration. There was to be continuity. ,,48 
Conservatives within the cabinet agreed. Harry Dent complained to Spiro Agnew that the 
"Southern Strategy" was not really being employed at ground level: "1 don't need to tell 
you that I have been extremely concerned about the apparently schizophrenic posture of 
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this Administration, brought about mainly by the vacuous and ultra-liberal utterances 
from HEW.,,49 
A copy of a Columbia magazine editorial from August 11 1969 held in the 
Nixon files noted the careful attempt of the President to calm the waters on domestic 
issues: "Listening to President Nixon's "New Federalism" address on domestic m a t t e r s ~ ~
one marvelled at how carefully he steered between the extreme positions of liberalism 
and conservatism. ,,50 Virtually the only guidance on policy issues by Nixon left things 
very vague. Nixon instructed his aides about domestic policy in a meeting in July that 
''just 'cause it's new doesn't mean it's right - but if it's old, it's wrong." At another 
meeting Nixon "emphasized p.r. will be important - but don't want to do anything we 
can't deliver on - present case as exciting way as we can but fIrst must be sure we can 
produce.,,51 Despite Nixon's seeming sympathy towards the plight of the white South, 
there was little action in this direction. John Mitchell's famous admonition to black 
leaders, "instead of listening to what we say... watch what we do, ,,52 reflected a certain 
truth about the operations of the administration in 1969. And the record in tenns of 
school desegregation indicates that this strategy bore at least some fruit. Nixon, mirroring 
his foreign policy strategy of playing opposing forces off against each other, leaving 
maximum room to manoeuvre, was clearly present here. 
Other aspects of the crisis 
The crisis in 1969 was immediate and numerous experimental programs 
were tried in the hope that they might lessen the pressure of instability. In 1970 and 
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beyond, however, the deeper (though less immediate) nature of the crisis began to be 
apparent. After the riots and student unrest ended there was no return to the days of 
consensus. As Finch told the press in 1972 (in a passage underlined by Nixon), there 
existed at the time a "general syndrome of distrust about all our institutions -- the Church, 
corporate life, labor unions and higher education.,,53 Yet these were precisely the 
institutions celebrated by Gunnar Myrdal that had linked Americans with their 
government and within which they had realised a common purpose lay in tatters. Large 
sections of American society had become alienated from their government as the 
programs and policies appeared to fail. In a letter to the President, Moynihan indicated 
how he thought the rot had started. He informed Nixon that the "many businessmen" he 
had spoken to since leaving the administration all seem to hate the Administration. 
I have been astonished -- that is the word -- at their hostility to the 
administration ... As best I can tell, they mostly get this belief from their children 
who absorb it in the atmosphere of the elite universities. But they believe their 
children, and in consequence detest the administration. . .. (Y)ou will recall I came 
down to Washington to work for you deeply concerned about the stability of the 
nation. I remain concerned. Vast changes have been made for the better. But in an 
odd way, appearances are worse. 54 
More disturbing, perhaps, was the fact that none of the programs or 
policies initiated by Nixon alleviated any of the ill feeling. Gary Wills emphasised the 
inexorable nature of the crisis: "What is hard, and essential, to convey is the interaction 
of resentments. The bitterness moved in crossing tides, an acid weave of right and left, 
old and young. Each shock deepened a fear, unsettled a hope.,,55 Lowi expressed the 
same problem in a different way: "It is as though each new program or program 
expansion were an admission of prior governmental inadequacy or failure without 
'b . d d 11 b' ,,56 necessarily being a contn utIon to or er an we - emg. 
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Chapter 5 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS LEGITIMATION CRISIS 
The political nature of the crisis pushed the Johnson administration and, 
later, Nixon towards instituting affirmative action programs. These objective conditions 
form at least part of the reason why affirmative action was fmally implemented in the 
form of the Philadelphia Plan. Whoever was elected in 1968 (discounting the extremely 
remote chance that it was George Wallace), very good reasons for moving in this 
direction existed already. The immediate task for the newly elected administration faced 
- besides calming the storm of protest - was to put into place mechanisms designed to 
restore the authority of government and the status quo. In other words, the incoming 
administration had to restore government's ability to govern. Bureaucracy, as discussed 
above, had no particular direction after the discrediting of many of the Great Society 
programs. As Nathan noted, discussions of "delivery problems" and "performance gaps" 
were in vogue in the late 1960s.1 It became obvious to all in the run-up to the 1968 
election that some sort of restructuring and decentralization of Federal programs would 
have to be instituted. Robert Kennedy, for instance, told a college audience in Utah 
during the race for the 1968 Democratic nomination that "We must return control to the 
people themselves.,,2 
Most of the political mechanisms in place since the New Deal to integrate 
various different groups within American society were failing to do so, in the eyes of the 
political and economic elite, by the late 1960s. At the preliminary meeting of the 1966 
White House Conference on Civil Rights, delegates called for a discussion on the 
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"psychological dimensions of citizenship" and complained that "the old basis for such 
(political) organisations - the ward clubhouse and the organisation of job-holders - is 
decaying or eliminated.,,3 Another preliminary report at that conference warned that ''the 
concentration of Negroes in overcrowded areas decreases their political representation in 
city councils. This, in turn, reduces patronage posts and the exclusion from a fair share of 
the 'spoils system' discourages participation in ward organisation." The same report went 
on to suggest that besides the danger of riot is the danger that non-participation of blacks 
in the electoral process will "deal a serious blow to effective government in the urban 
North.',4 
Jerris Leonard produced a thoughtful piece on federalism and revenue 
sharing, later to be a key program within the Nixon domestic agenda. While federalism 
had long been a programmatic unifier within the Republican Party (opposing the 
centralism of the New Deal), Leonard related it to the problem of alienation and the 
relationship between the citizen and government in the United States. Federalism thus 
became more than simply a political glue for the Republicans - it emerged as a possible 
solution to the "depression of the national spirit.,,5 
I realize that the great expansion of federal power began long before I became a 
legislator. But I submit to you that it is really only been in the last dozen or twenty 
years that the individual citizen has become despondent over his inability to get a 
handhold on his government. . .. While paying lip service to federalism and local 
government, we have established a monolithic centralism before which the 
individual feels powerless. His alternatives are membership in mass protest 
groups, or introverted withdrawal -- neither of which serve well the cause of 
democracy. 6 
The most dramatic effect of this problem could be seen in the consecutive 
summers of rioting. The task of extending links into the black community thus became 
paramount. At a series of meetings in Boston occurring in July 1967 after disturbances in 
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the area, the lack of any sort of organisation within which black demands might be 
channelled was repeated: "A recurring theme during the four days of meetings was the 
powerlessness of the Negro community.,,7 An analysis of disturbances in Plainfield, New 
Jersey also noted that "lack of coherent political organization" played a key role in the 
riot.8 However, as the planning meeting of the White House Conference on Civil Rights 
(as well as the 1965 Voting Rights Act) indicated, efforts at creating participation within 
the black community existed before the most serious rioting. A report to the National 
Governors Conference dated May 10 1967 (and thus predating much of the rioting that 
year) by the "Advisory Committee on Federal-State-Local Relations" was entitled "Full 
Participation by All People in the Process of Government." In its second section were the 
steps for creating participation: 
Provide for participation by all citizens in the election process ... 
Foster dialogue between citizens and government: create and support human 
relations agencies or commissions at local and state levels; encourage dialogue 
between majority and minority groups ... 
Encourage community improvement groups ... 
Assure representation of all citizens ... 9 
The Kerner Commission Report focussed much of its attention on this 
problem once the initial fear that the riots had somehow been orchestrated by Moscow no 
longer looked feasible. A letter from David Ginsburg, the Executive Director of the 
commission, stated at the outset that: "The basic theme of our work is that we must 
recognize and deal with the fact of deep political alienation in the ghetto."l0 The concern 
was that none of the institutions through which most Americans related to their 
government appeared to work - or even to exist - for black Americans. The authority of 
the police in ghetto areas hardly existed. Ginsburg continued: "What kinds of instruments 
(other than the police) are available for easing community tensions? For example, we are 
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looking preliminarily at the role of Human Relations Commissions, the possibility of 
establishing new grievance machinery (perhaps modelled after labor mediation services); 
and the ombudsman idea." 11 In order to maintain some sort of control over ghetto areas, 
the Commission toyed with the fairly ludicrous idea of community policing roles for 
street gangs such as the "White Hats" in Tampa, FL, the "Rebels with a Cause" ill 
Washington, DC, and the "Blackstone Rangers" in Chicago! 12 
Not surprisingly, many of the solutions to these problems dealt with the 
lack of jobs within the ghettoes. Some of the recommendations discussed by the Kerner 
Commission included in a section entitled "To expand and Improve Employment 
Opportunities" : 
Increase job opportunities: recruit, train and hire slum area residents for public 
employment; provide tax incentives for industry and business to locate in blighted 
areas, provide neighborhood counselling to small business in urban areas; 
encourage industry and labor to expand job opportunities through across-the-
board hiring of disadvantaged persons; promote and enforce equal employment 
practices in both public and private employment; use career fairs to publicize 
availability of jobs; utilize mobile employment units to bring employment 
information to the unemployed. 13 
Though these suggestions fall short of the kind of affirmative action contained in the 
Philadelphia Plan or in "set-asides" as per Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act (see 
Appendix III), they at least point the government in the direction of new policies aimed at 
increasing employment in the ghettoes, the riots themselves having demonstrated 
graphically the inadequacy of existing policies. Clearly, new policies too radical to be 
considered in previous years would have to be examined in the light of seemingly 
continuous rioting. 
Just as senous was the destruction of ideals that had given the vast 
bureaucratic structures of US society some ethical and moral coherence mentioned 
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earlier. An entire generation of young men and women joined the government at various 
levels inspired, perhaps, by Kennedy's public-service ethos. Committed to the cause of 
civil rights, this group was hostile to perceived attempts by the Nixon administration to 
slow down civil rights progress. Representation of Republicans at the senior career level 
of the bureaucracy, Bert Rockman and Joel Aberbach show, was quite low. Nearly twice 
as many senior bureaucrats in the social services agencies (for example, Health, 
Education and Welfare [HEW] and Housing and Urban Development[HUD]) were 
affiliated with the Democrats than with the Republicans - 24 percent were Republican, 
30 percent independent, 46 percent were Democrats. I4 However, had Hubert Humphrey 
won the election on his centrist, union-based plurality, rifts between these "old-style" 
Democrats and younger, more civil rights-oriented activists might have caused similar 
problems. Certainly, these rifts were apparent during the 1968 and 1972 Democratic 
National Conventions. 15 The administration that took power in 1969 would have to reach 
out not only to the black community but also to this large and powerful section of the 
bureaucracy. 
Nixon used affirmative action clauses to provide some sort of coherence 
and continuity between past programs and new initiatives. Specifically, they ensured that 
the reforms initiated by Nixon under the rubric of "New Federalism," designed to 
decentralise government and redistribute power in favour of local and state governments, 
would be justified in the eyes of liberals. Affirmative action served to allay fears barely 
dissipated since the height of the civil rights struggle that local and state governments 
might not be as progressive as liberals might wish. Additionally, affirmative action 
ensured that central government actually extended - rather than diffused - its power 
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while localising the controversy that civil rights measures often attracted. Under New 
Federalism projects earmarked for decentralisation included primarily services provided 
in the community - education, social services for the poor, manpower training, hospitals, 
urban and rural community development, and law enforcement. Instead, these programs 
were to be administered by state and local governments. However, indicative of the dual 
nature of Nixon's decentralisation programs, Nixon made affrrmative action clauses a 
contingency for continued funding, indirectly controlling many of the departments with 
which he struggled. In the civil service, affirmative action measures initiated with EO 
11478 were specifically used to provide some sort of mechanism to indicate the 
performance of one agency or another. As a Civil Service Commission report sternly 
noted, "Agencies have submitted EEO plans; we have reviewed them; and these plans are 
now being used to measure agency performance.,,16 Thus, the initiation of affrrmative 
action policies had as at least part of their purpose creating an ethical framework against 
which the performance of government agencies might be judged. 
In fact, New Federalism, rather than destroying the Great Society 
programs of direct aid to the poor and minorities, might be viewed as formalising their 
structures, of incorporating them into the permanent structure of government. Certainly, 
this was Nathan's opinion. He noted that: 
The New Federalism also opposed reliance on the kinds of quasi-governmental 
antipoverty agencies that had been established in the Great S o c i ~ t y y perio? ~ n d e r r
the Johnson Administration. Nixon spokesmen often took a hard line on this lSsue. 
However, a more positive way of looking at this subject is to a c k n o w l ~ d g e e that 
these community-action and model cities agencies, in fact, have had an unportant 
positive impact as a catalyst and a political training ground for minority groups 
and the poor, but that they do not represent appropriate long-term governmental 
arrangements. Rather than sponsoring these 'side games.' for the poor ~ ~ ~ the 
minorities, the New Federalism can be portrayed as seekmg to draw. all CItIzens 
into the main arena of local politics, which increasingly is a fertlle area for 
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minorities as their relative numbers in the central cities increase. 17 
The same might be said of affIrmative action programs. In many ways they formalised 
the informal structures developed by the Johnson administration aimed at giving African-
Americans and other minorities more employment opportunities within the American 
economy. 
The factor of recession 
The economic conditions for affIrmative action were better in the late 
1960s than at any time since World War II. In the first place, affIrmative action policies 
became more viable as contractors became more plentiful and contracts more scarce. As 
such, they were far better suited for conditions of recession than other civil rights 
policies. Paul Moreno suggests that contractors, who had disadvantages in government 
dealings during the thirties, held the upper hand with massive defence spending in the 
late 1940s and 1950s.I8 But at the end of the 1960s contractors faced a bear market. The 
economy went into recession in late 1969. Thus, the construction and many other blue-
collar industries floundered at the time and many of the military and space program 
contracts dried up in the early 1970s as the Vietnam war effort and the space programs 
were cut back. A viable affIrmative action plan became an asset in the battle to secure a 
valuable contract. In a memo to the President from Secretary of Labor George P. Shultz, 
he reminded his boss that "actions deemed desirable by the Blacks leave many whites 
unhappy, and vice versa. The giving of economic help to the Blacks does not carry the 
same disadvantage." Shultz pointed out that a "program like minority enterprise, with a 
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relatively small amount of money compared to those for jobs, health or education, can 
have greater visibility and impact, as new stores, shops and plants benefit from it and 
provide minority employment. ,,19 
Because more US workers in the 1970s than at any other time in history 
depended, directly or indirectly, upon the Federal government for their wages, 
"rulemaking to bind recipients to federal dollars," in Graham's words, became an 
option.20 Affirmative action in its new guise would now be brought to bear on a large 
percentage of the US workforce. As well as an estimated one-third of the US workforce 
working for government contractors, 15.2 percent of the civilian labor force worked for 
the government at either the federal, the state or the local levels. 21 The changing 
economic structure was tilting towards more government control (rather than less, even 
during the reigns of Republican presidents who wished to roll back government). The 
post-war period saw large growth in government purchases of goods and services, 
averaging 4.24 percent per year between 1948 and 1973. Government purchases made up 
21.5 percent of the Gross National Product in 1970. This figure was close to 40 percent 
higher than the total gross private domestic investment. All government payro 11 increased 
by an average annual rate of 3.62 percent per year in the same period. Wages and salaries 
make up, on average, 75 percent of the US GNP but government wages and salaries are 
one-fifth of this total. Economists John F. Walker and Harold G. Vatter note: "Labor 
d· xt t ,,22 Wh income is thus directly controlled by the government to an extraor mary e en. en 
direct control is added to indirect control exercised through contracts, it is hardly 
surprising that economists at the White House held out great hope for at least the 
possibility of effective enforcement of affirmative action. 
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Second, there was also a mergmg of the public and private spheres 
occurrmg m economic terms, as private industry began to rely more heavily on 
government patronage, having the effect of breaking down barriers to government 
interference long held within private industry. Walker and Vatter also note that the extent 
of government involvement in the economy went further than the statistical evidence 
might have suggested: " ... we can add to the government's spending growth the element 
of pervasive public involvement in much, if not most, of the economy's activities" 
[emphasis in original]. They argue that the public/private distinction within the economy 
has become increasingly meaningless with a "contemporary fusion of the public with the 
private" spheres extending beyond strictly economic terms ""by virtue of the vast 
extension of government's nonpecuniary interventions in economic affairs.,,23 
Shared fears over the dislocation and chaos that appeared to grip the nation 
at the turn of the decade contributed to the new cooperative nature of government and 
private industry. Business had abandoned its antipathy to government interference in 
hiring and promotion decisions. The aforementioned Irwin Miller argued that business 
had to let down its guard against government interference in this time of crisis. He called 
for what he termed "a war effort." Miller summoned his business colleagues to think and 
act anew and to consider affirmative action policies: "Up to now business has reacted to 
the impact of race on the communities in which it is located. We know now in business 
how important it is to act rather than react. Is it unthinkable that we should plan the total 
racial integration of each of our businesses, even to the point of importing members of 
minority groups ... ?" A survey of executives of the Fortune's 750 largest companies 
revealed that 78 percent of forth and fifth level executives agreed with "lowering the 
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company's employment qualifications to hire more from disadvantaged groups," though 
their lower level colleagues disagreed.24 The elite shared a common interest in keeping 
society together. The crises that existed at the time gave them a common purpose that 
allowed them, despite their commitment to democracy, to consider policies that most 
Americans opposed in an effort to keep the peace. 
Considerable resources came from company coffers for research on 
minority problems. General Electric (GE) published a report entitled "Our future business 
environment" in 1968.25 It claimed that the urban minority problem was "the dominant 
one of the domestic social, political, and economic scene for the next ten years." In 
January 1970 GE published another report called "A Decade of Tensions and Decisions: 
The Minority Environment in the Seventies." In the survey of opinions it used, it found 
that, though large-scale rioting would probably not occur again, "more calculated and 
selective attacks" might target, amongst other things, "businesses ... that discriminate 
against minorities." "The likelihood of such attacks is seen to be in direct proportion to 
the lack of minority progress and the strength of white 'backlash.'" The report went on to 
urge preferential treatment. 26 The recession, therefore, both made affirmative action a 
cheap and eminently possible option at the same time as heightening the general feeling 
of crisis that united the elite around previously unthinkable solutions. 
Even if large government contractors had not wished the government to 
take some measures to ensure stability, they might not have had the power to resist a 
detennined administration. By the time Nixon took office, the time when government 
contractors had dictated the terms was over. Comparing the period 1961-68 with that of 
1969-83, the annual compound rate of growth of all government purchases of goods and 
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services slowed from an average of five percent to 0.6 percent.27 With the winding dO\\,TI 
of the Vietnam War and the attempts by the Nixon administration to cut the federal 
deficit, contractors were left in a weaker position. Competition became fierceL leaving 
the government in a far stronger bargaining position. The unions, also, were forced on the 
defensive by the slowdown. 
Affirmative action and legitimation crisis 
At another level, the United States government was pushed in the direction 
of more intervention into civil rights in areas that had formerly been private matters, 
despite the intentions of the Nixon administration. The most compelling system-wide 
reasons for the proliferation of affmnative action policies under the ostensibly 
conservative Nixon administration have been suggested by the German social theorist 
Jiirgen Habermas in Legitimation Crisis. Habermas described a process whereby the State 
extends its activities into realms previously organised spontaneously and on a local 
informal, and private basis. The process is triggered by fears within the establishment that 
the legitimising political system does not succeed in maintaining the requisite level of 
mass loyalty (and thus its own authority). This threatens the informal arrangement within 
advanced capitalist democracies whereby, as Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba put 
it, the democratic citizen is "active, yet passive; involved, yet not too i n v o l v e d ~ ~
influentiaL yet deferential. ,,28 A legitimacy deficit, Habermas explained, "must be based 
on a motivation crisis - that is, a discrepancy between the need for motives declared by 
the State, the educational system on the one hand, and the motivation supplied by the 
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socio-cultural system on the other.,,29 In other words, a philosophical confusion about the 
motivations and meanings of society emerges concomitantly with a legitimation crisis. 
This sort of a crisis, Habermas insisted, was not a constant phenomenon 
within advanced capitalist societies where a legitimation deficit might occur as the State 
assumed aspects that had formerly been dealt with by the market. Instead: 
... only when members of a society experience structural alterations as critical for 
continued existence and feel their social identity threatened can we speak of 
crises. Disturbances of system integration endanger continued existence only to 
the extent that social integration is at stake, that is, when the consensual 
foundations of normative structures are so much impaired that the society 
becomes anomic. Crisis states assume the form of a disintegration of social 
institutions. 30 
The crisis that Nixon faced in the aftermath of the turmoil of the 1960s 
might fairly be represented as a legitimation crisis. The consensus that had broadly 
characterised post-war American society no longer existed. Existing sources of authority 
- the institutions celebrated by Myrdal - disintegrated. A rejection - especially by young 
Americans - of existing modes of authorities took place not only within "hippie" 
communities but also within those Americans who supported Wallace. This latter group 
rejected the traditional political system like many who espoused a left-wing critique of 
American politics. It was commonly observed at the time that America was disintegrating 
into differentiated groups and factions. Nixon had taken power simply by personifying a 
negative assessment of the situation in the late 1960s, by avoiding extremes but without 
any coherent program. There existed a crisis far more generalised and less tangible than 
the direct threat to authority demonstrated in the rioting in the ghettoes. 
If we view the issue of civil rights within the context of a legitimation 
crisis, Nixon's actions become easier to understand. Before the late 1950s and 1960s, the 
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Federal Government studiously avoided becoming involved in local race relations issues. 
as we have seen in Chapter 1. State and local government had adapted to local cultural 
patterns. There was little attempt - despite the rhetoric - by government at any level to 
reform racial attitudes. As much of the material in the fITst chapter indicates, though the 
new international role of the United States put pressure on it to reform racial practices 
and attitudes, it hoped to do so by example. Direct involvement in civil rights issues was 
avoided as much as possible. The civil rights movement, though, was able to pressure the 
Federal Government into involving itself fITst with education issues and later with more 
comprehensive interventions into matters that had in the past been considered local 
matter of customs. This intervention created the need for further intervention when focus 
shifted to Northern attitudes and patterns. Nixon, despite his conservative instincts on the 
subject, was forced to implement a further round of intervention. 
As Habermas argued, however, the intervention into previously private 
spheres has the unfortunate effect of undermining the institutions that had reified society. 
Advanced capitalist societies necessarily encroach upon previously privatised economic 
spheres and socio-political spheres in order to shore up weaknesses created by destructive 
tendencies inherent within capitalism. For example, the State may have to take over 
unprofitable industries (like railways) that are essential to capitalism as a whole and, 
historically, has had to pass laws preventing children from dangerous or debilitating work 
to counter the destructive effect of factory work on families. As Habermas notes, 
however, the effect of government involvement in a sphere that was previously governed 
by informal local traditions has the effect of undermining those traditions: "It ... results 
from the fact that the fulfilment of governmental planning tasks places in question the 
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structure of the depoliticized public realm and, thereby, the formally democratic securing 
of private autonomous disposition of the means of production.,,31 Legislating to protect 
children, for example, has the effect of undermining the institution that had traditionally 
assumed that role - the family.32 
Habermas's theory - if we understand it to be an analysis of a specific 
historical set of circumstances occurring from the late 1960s - provides the most 
convincing reason for Nixon's rhetorical opposition to the expansion of government 
while he oversaw a massive encroachment of the State into the lives of Americans. He 
was forced into actions he does not wish to take, actions that in many ways ran counter to 
his political and gut instincts. He had to expand programs he did not particularly believe 
in that threatened his political constituency. Though Graham is right to point to the role 
of "aggressive men" pursuing their own agendas as a force behind affirmative action,33 it 
must be located within this process of the inexorable expansion of State apparatus 
pointed out by Habermas. 
The legitimation crisis comes as the expansion of State activity creates a 
disproportionate need for legitimation, both because of the need to justify additional 
spheres of State activity and because the boundaries between the cultural system and the 
political system shift in favour of the latter. Cultural affairs that were formerly taken for 
granted must now fall into the administrative planning area. Areas of human activity that 
were once regulated and legitimated informally and locally are now subject to State 
regulation. But State action replacing this informal regulation cannot be solely 
mechanistic - the purposes for acquiring these new realms must be justified. Why should 
the State be active here, to what end, and by what guiding philosophies?34 Thus, Nixon 
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and his administration struggled to justify ideologically the actions taken and often did 
not succeed. 
Unfortunately for the administration, the process is unrelenting as the 
problems thrown up are insoluble. As the validity of past norms, traditions and 
institutions is undermined, so government must step in to try to replace those functions 
that were formerly processed informally within the cultural sphere. 35 Once the 
unquestionable character of traditions is destroyed, more areas within the private sphere 
come under scrutiny. The destruction of the traditions and informal regulations sets off a 
panicked reaction by the authorities as there appears to be a lack of controls and rules 
governing the whole sphere. Habermas warned that the entire private sphere was in 
danger of being destroyed through this process.36 Alan Wolfe expressed the problem in a 
slightly different fashion, showing that options close with the enactment of the whole 
process: 
The activity of the state has increased to the point where it has become a major 
producer and certainly the major consumer, but often forgotten is that the growth 
in potential power of the state is matched by a decline in the options that the state 
has at its command. For this reason, the increased activity of the state reflects, not 
an expansion of alternatives, but an exhaustion of them. 37 
Johnson's civil rights actions aimed to, as Habermas put it, "ward off 
system crisis" by focusing "all forces of social integration at the point of the structurally 
most probable conflict [civil rights] - in order all the more effectively to keep it latent.,,38 
Affirmative action measures differed, however, from previous civil rights initiatives in 
that they no longer simply exhorted American citizens at all levels to adjust their 
behaviour in order to include African-Americans within the economic and social life of 
the country. The crisis that created the need for affirmative action sprang from the 
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examination in light of the racial crisis of the 1960s of the (generally private) institutions 
that ostensibly created the basis of equal opportunity. They were found wanting. Existing 
mechanisms that should have created the basis of equal opportunity in both public and 
private employment, higher education and traditional contracting arrangements simply 
did not work for blacks. AffIrmative action broke new ground in that it attempted to 
replace these traditional structures that had proved inadequate to the inclusion of black 
Americans within American life with a specific regulatory structure. It responded to a 
legitimation crisis initially within the African-American community that, by the time 
Nixon took power, extended way beyond. 
However, the incursion of the State into this sphere of formerly quasi-
privatised labor relations,39 the civil service, contract arrangements (whereby the lowest 
bidder is awarded the contract), school and higher education allocations, and local and 
state government systems undermined many of the traditional motivations underlying 
these systems. As Habermas might have put it, there existed a discrepancy between the 
need for (racially liberal) imperatives declared by the State, the educational system and 
the occupational system on the one hand and the motivations supplied by the socio-
cultural system, such as individualism, the tradition of merit in both employment and 
higher education places, traditional managerial prerogative to hire and fire as managers 
saw fit, and even the law, which specifically forbade quota-based systems. In many ways, 
the motivations behind affIrmative action had to replace the assumption behind 
traditional socio-cultural structures, changing themselves in the process. 
Also interesting in light of Habermas' s theory is the way that affIrmative 
action programs, once initiated, multiplied and extended into more and more spheres as 
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the aforementioned traditional systems eroded. The inexorable nature of the growth of 
affirmative action structures mirrors, as we have seen, the description that Habermas used 
to illustrate the fact that legitimacy crises cannot be solved. The extension of affirmative 
action into some spheres undermined traditional modes of hiring and accepting students 
in others, resulting in the adoption of affIrmative action criteria within these new spheres. 
Yet one other aspect related to Habermas's model stands out. A lack of 
philosophical justification or coherence to early affIrmative action measures reflected a 
general turmoil about the legitimacy of socio-cultural traditions and the legitimacy of the 
motivations behind new administrative procedures. Early affIrmative action measures 
were not (and could not be) defended confidently, especially after the initial justifications 
- the need to extend civil rights and the threat of rioting - lost resonance, despite the 
destruction of socio-cultural traditions that stood in the way of affIrmative action 
measures. Instead some new basis of authority had to be created that would provide the 
basis for the widespread adoption of these measures. Here was a motivation crisis, 
created by the need for motivation by the State and the educational system, and the 
motivation behind the existing socio-political system. 
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Section II 
THE NIXON REFORMS 
Nixon was not a natural reformer. Recoiling at the prospect of having to 
sign the constitutional amendment giving 18-20 year-olds the right to vote, he posed a 
number of alternative solutions to the crisis affecting youth. He gave a rather tall order to 
his speechwriter Pat Buchanan who was put in charge of creating "a new conservative 
youth movement." Nixon commanded Buchanan to "Make it 'out' to wear long hair, 
smoke pot and go on the needle. Make it 'in' to indulge in the lesser vices, smoking 
( cigars, preferably - non-Castro!) and alcoho I in reasonable quantities on the right 
occasions."} How much success Buchanan had in leading the youth of America away 
from its vices is not indicated in the files. After observing the popularity of Woodstock 
and other rock music festivals, plans were afoot to organise a concert that would no doubt 
have attracted, well, scores of youth. A White House "salute to youth" planned to have as 
its main attractions the "Mike Curb Congregation," and the Partridge Family! 2 
Relinquishing these strategies, attractive as they were, the presidential Nixon decided -
sensibly - to sign the constitutional amendment. 
The incorrigibly political Nixon is also well known. Always on the 
lookout for new constituencies or new ways of relating to voters, a memo contained in 
files marked "President's Handwriting" gives some indication of just how far Nixon 
would go. One of Nixon's aides, Henry C. Cashen, wrote a memorandum regarding a 
meeting with the winners of the Seventh World International Bowling Federation 
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Tournament. Cashen noted that there were then 52 million American bowlers, according 
to the latest poll. Nixon circled the figure and wrote, "H- note." At least three letters 
followed instructing senior staff to note there was 52 million bowlers in the US. Nixon 
duly had a pUblicity shot of himself bowling passed to the press. Unfortunately, the White 
House was flooded with letters from bowlers pointing out that the President was cheating 
- he had his foot over the fault line! A promising political constituency had to be 
abandoned. 3 
Nixon was, of course, forced to compromise his conservative and political 
sensibilities on many occasions. In foreign policy, the anti-communism with which 
Nixon had sustained his career and in which he continued to believe into the 1990s had to 
be put aside. As he put it in a meeting recorded by the assiduous taken down by Charles 
Colson, the up-and-coming White House aide who became famous after the Watergate 
revelations: "Balance of Power Politics - keep balancing power centers acc. to self 
interest and [their?] self interest - Pragmatic, cold, calculating - only way now with rising 
power of Japan economically, China militarily - only way now to maintain peace - before 
it was possible with policy of containment - no longer a practical possibility.,,4 The same 
thing occurred in domestic policy. When one of Ehrlichman's underlings wrote to him 
complaining that "at least as far as domestic legislation is concerned, I believe that an 
image has been created that the President doesn't really believe in some of the things he 
has propose ... ," Ehrlichman noted, presumably only to himself, that "Problem here is -
he doesn't."s Even regarding school desegregation, where it appears obvious that Nixon 
played to the hostility of his Southern white constituents, contradictory impulses were in 
evidence. In a meeting with Ehrlichman regarding school desegregation, Nixon worried 
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that "(i)t may not work. Wallace and others may stir it up - Don't tell me there may be 
good politics in this." His responsibility, he said, was "not to let the country come apart -
it won't on this Goddamn issue or this silly decision." He added, "Don't be the aggressor 
with the South in an agonizing experience - the racist dogs will be in full cry & will effect 
the decent people.,,6 
There are few areas within the Nixon administration more contradictory 
and confusing than civil rights. The Nixon administration boosted nonmilitary racial and 
ethnic minorities among federal workers to 19.5 percent; more than doubled aid to black 
colleges and increased minority business aid by 152 percent. The percentage of black 
children in all black schools decreased from 40 percent in 1969 to 12 percent in 1972, 
effectively desegregating more children than had all previous administrations since the 
1954 Brown decision combined.7 Topping Clinton's attempt to gather a cabinet that 
"looked like America," Nixon offered Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to the 
head of the Urban League, Whitney Young, and the US ambassadorship to the United 
Nations to black Republican Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts. While Young and 
Brooke declined the offer, James Farmer, one-time executive director of the Congress on 
Racial Equality (CORE) accepted a job as undersecretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare (HEW) in 1969. Nixon also appointed Walter Washington as the fIrst black 
Mayor of Washington.8 Nixon enthusiastically backed the creation of a ''Negro history 
week.,,9 Yet, when asked to establish a holiday in honour of Martin Luther King, he 
wrote ''No, Never."l0 He referred to "these little Negro bastards on the welfare rolls at 
$2,400 a family," hardly the language of a sympathiser. ll He also maintained that blacks 
were genetically inferior to whites, could never hope to achieve parity and that there had 
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never been an adequate black nation. 12 He depended on segregationists like Strom 
Thurmond for support, used the coded language of "law and order" to play on racial 
fears, attacked busing to achieve racial balance in schools and even voiced opposition to 
"quotas" in the run-up to 1972. 
Perhaps the most enduring program of Nixon's civil rights legacy is his initiation 
of not just one but many affirmative action programs. Several points will be made below. 
Chapters six and seven show that Nixon's implementation of the Philadelphia Plan was 
only one of many contributions made by his administration to the development of 
affirmative action. The Philadelphia Plan itself was not particularly successful and its 
contribution to the institutionalisation of affirmative action has been overstated. Many 
other policies more closely related to modem affirmative action policies have been 
neglected by historians. Taken together, these policies represented a strategy 
implemented by Nixon and his administration for making civil rights practical by using 
the growing fmancial muscle of the federal government to force those dependent on 
government contracts and aid to hire a proportion of minorities (and later women) in their 
workforces. Viewed in this way, policies other than the Philadelphia Plan proved more 
important for providing models for future affIrmative action programs. 
Chapter seven demonstrates the effect Nixon had on newly emergmg 
affirmative action policies by changing the direction of civil rights policy in 1970. 
Chapter eight explores the evidence available on Nixon's personal convictions and 
feelings on racial issues. Though Nixon is often viewed as a moral cipher in light of 
Watergate, his consistent espousal of something resembling the Protestant Work Ethic 
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allowed him to put energy and conviction into the battle to save the Philadelphia Plan and 
to oversee the rapid expansion of many affrrmative action programs. 
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Chapter 6 
THE PHILADELPHIA PLAN, ORDER NO.4 AND THE ORIGINS OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Most texts dealing with affirmative action assume the 1969 Philadelphia 
Plan, which required all contractors working on large federally funded projects to adopt 
"numerical goals and timetables" to assure the desegregation of their workforces, was the 
forerunner of the affrrmative action programs still in place today. Jill Quadagno, author 
of The Color of Welfare, argued that "the Philadelphia Plan worked" in creating black 
employment and in instituting successfully affrrmative programs. 1 Hugh Davis Graham, 
whose texts on the history of civil rights policy appear in the footnotes of every text 
dealing with the issue since The Civil Rights Era was published in 1990, notes that, after 
Nixon's effective defence of the Philadelphia Plan in December 1969, "(t)he tide of 
affirmative action thereby turned sharply towards minority preferences." However, 
Graham cites the obscure bureaucratic Order No.4, the order issued by the Labor 
Department on January 23 1970 that extended the requirements of the Philadelphia Plan 
to nearly all government contractors, as being that which universalised affirmative action 
in the United States.2 
Although Graham is right to mark Order No.4 as an important historical 
precedent, it is possible that the Philadelphia Plan and Order No.4 acquired much of their 
importance in hindsight. This chapter will argue that the significance of the Philadelphia 
Plan and Order No.4 has been overstated. First, neither the Philadelphia Plan nor the 
"hometown solutions," voluntary plans modelled on the Philadelphia Plan agreed in other 
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urban areas, can be regarded as successes. Progress, when it existed, was painfully slow. 
Most of the original "hometown plans" were tom up and rewritten within a year of being 
implemented. Progress for blacks employed in the construction industry took place in 
tens rather than in thousands of jobs. The impact of the Philadelphia and hometown plans 
upon black employment in the inner-cities at a time when the construction industry 
suffered under the recession of the early 1970s was, not surprisingly, negligible. There is 
no evidence that Order No.4, despite its near universal coverage, was implemented as 
anything more than an attempt to placate the construction industry by extending its 
strictures to other industries. As far as the records show, Nixon never mentioned Order 
No. 4 and seldom mentioned the Philadelphia Plan after the battle in Congress in 
December 1969 to have it rescinded. Up until September 1971 (at least) not one contract 
had been cancelled nor had any contractor been debarred under the Philadelphia Plan or 
Order No.4 despite many calls from such organisations as the Congressional Black 
Caucus for stricter implementation3 and the fact that, as the Civil Rights Commission 
observed, "violation of the Philadelphia Plan has been widespread.,,4 
Second, the Philadelphia Plan, designed to combat black unemployment in 
the ghettoes, was effectively shelved by the Nixon administration almost as soon as it 
was implemented. Nixon's rethink of civil rights strategies in 1970, to be discussed later, 
shifted policies away from the ghettoes and towards those that could "help themselves" -
the black middle class. Nixon really only mentioned the Philadelphia Plan when his 
administration's civil rights record was being attacked. Few others thought that the 
Philadelphia Plan was significant at the time. It was less contentious than open housing 
and certainly less contentious than busing to achieve racial balance - the issue of the day 
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during Nixon's fIrst term. Even within the issue of equal employment, a more prominent 
issue was whether the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) would 
have "cease and desist" powers or just the power to bring cases to the courts. The Plan 
was insignificant to the Democratic Party at the time, so much so that they were willing 
to outlaw preferential hiring and, therefore, scrap the Philadelphia Plan, in return for 
cease and desist powers for EEOC in 1972 (to be discussed later). Had they succeeded in 
their attempt, a much different history would now be being written. (This anomaly 
between the arrival of such a significant piece of legislation and the deafening silence 
from those who would later praise or decry affIrmative action will be explored in the final 
chapter that looks at affIrmative action as an issue, separate from its existence as a 
policy). We may also observe that the idea of racial preference contained within the 
Philadelphia Plan was in no way new. As has been discussed previously, the concept of 
racial preferences had existed for some time and a quota-system was in the process of 
being implemented in the Democratic Party when the Philadelphia Plan was being 
readied for implementation. 5 
The real significance of the Philadelphia Plan was in the Congressional 
battle against it. Here, it is possible to see that the majority of the political and business 
elite (or, to use C. Wright Mills' term, the "power elite,,6) had now been won over to the 
need for a new race relations strategy. The nearly unanimous insistence in 1964 that 
quotas were unnecessary and undesirable, that American business, unions, schools, 
colleges and political parties were inherently fair institutions that would naturally reform 
themselves (as discussed in Chapter 4), could not be maintained in the post-riot race 
relations climate. The idea of merit - so important for defences of American institutions 
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against charges of unfairness - was losing its predominance within the American culture. 
Even American business began to ask the government to intervene in business and social 
practices that now appeared outdated. The battle in Congress showed this to be so. 
What was the Philadelphia Plan? 
Originating in 1967, the Philadelphia Plan hoped to break the grip of lily-
white unions on the construction trades in Philadelphia. These highly-paid skilled crafts 
included sheet-metal workers, plumbers, roofers, structural ironworkers, steamfitters, and 
elevator constructors and had a combined membership of between 8500 and 9000, 
including 700 apprentices. Altogether, these locals made up only about four percent of 
the area's union members and just over a tenth of Philadelphia's unionised construction 
workers. A survey done at the time revealed that most local construction unions had 
"sizable minority memberships." However, these few offending locals remained defiantly 
lily-white, highly paid and highly visible.7 By minorities, the Philadelphia Plan meant a 
group of individuals ''who, by virtue of past discrimination, continue to suffer the present 
effects of that discrimination .... ,,8 The question of who constituted a minority was not 
made clear in the original documents regarding the Philadelphia Plan. However, 
contained within a memo dated December 15 1969 is an indication of which groups 
might be called minorities: Negroes, Puerto Ricans, American Indians, Spanish 
Americans, Asians, Eskimos and Aleuts. However, the memo stated that "( t ) his 
classification serves as a guide primarily for record-keeping purposes and any 
disadvantaged person would be eligible.,,9 There is no reason to think that the 
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Philadelphia Plan used any different criteria. At this stage, those charged with drawing up 
affirmative action programs drew back from the implication that the inclusive terms of 
the Great Society might be narrowed. 
The goal was to force integration on six offending locals in Philadelphia 
by concentrating irresistible economic leverage on the region's builders. The method was 
to set no fIrm target numbers (this would suggest illegal quotas10) but to hold up contracts 
until bidders submitted detailed manning tables that listed specific numbers of minority 
members they promised to hire. Contractors who submitted the lowest bid after all 
contractors received the same pre-bid specifications were termed "apparent low bidders" 
while their manning tables were examined, after which the contract could be signed. II 
Sanctions, provided in Johnson's 1965 executive order, 11246, included 
cancellation of existing contracts and debarment from any further contracts with the 
Federal government. 12 Despite the Plan being forced upon the city of Philadelphia, the 
Nixon team would rationalise it as voluntary, economic arm-twisting rather than a quota 
system. First, it insisted on specific affIrmative action plans only from federal 
government contractors employing members of the six offending unions. Secondly, 
sanctions could be avoided if the contractor showed a "good faith effort" to achieve the 
goals contained in the affIrmative action plan. In other words, even if specific numbers of 
minorities had not been hired, the contractor could show that he had tried to achieve the 
target. 
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The Background to the Philadelphia Plan 
The origin of the Philadelphia Plan lies in the attempts of the Department 
of Labor under both Johnson and Nixon to alleviate racial tensions within the 
construction industry. Johnson's Executive Order 11246, issued in September 1965, 
abolished the old President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO) 
and created the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) in the Department of 
Labor. The construction industry created some special problems for Johnson's newly 
formed OFCC when it began operating in 1965. On the one hand, there were few more 
visible situations more egregious to local black populations than exclusively white 
construction workers undertaking building work in largely black communities. In 
Philadelphia, a racial clash in which 39 people were injured broke out in 1963 when 
pickets led by the local NAACP chapter sought to close down a school construction site 
in protest at the white monopoly in the construction trade. In Westchester, New York, 
protests erupted during the winter of 1966-67 when protesters demanded that blacks be 
given a share of the construction jobs involved in building a mall in New Rochelle. 13 The 
issue of union discrimination, while not new, had previously been avoided in the interests 
of Democratic Party unity. Both the unions and the civil rights movement were pillars of 
the Democratic Party coalition and the prospect of a protracted war between them could 
only harm Democratic interests. These protests, however, proved hard to ignore, 
especially after the Watts riot in August 1965 pointed towards the cities as the epicentres 
of race relations problems. 14 
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Second, the structure of the construction industry presented problems for 
the government. It operated through hiring halls. For most employees in the construction 
industry, seniority with a single employer did not exist. Contractors hired whatever 
labourers they needed from the hiring halls for specific projects then discharged them. 
The employee then returned to the hiring hall to await another project that needed that 
employee's specific skills. Seniority normally decided the order in which workers with 
similar skills were hired. I5 Craft unions had exclusive jurisdiction over particular skills 
within a given territory. Employers were not free to hire from outside the union hall, 
having signed exclusive contracts with the union involved. New employees were, in 
general, referred by existing employees to the hiring hall where they would begin an 
apprenticeship program administered within a particular area by a Joint Apprenticeship 
Program made up of union and employer representatives. Apprenticeship programs were 
subject to regulation by the Bureau of Apprenticeships and Training within the 
Department of Labor, set up in the 1930s to regulate relations between workers and 
contractors and generally made up of ex-union officials. Apprenticeships for skilled 
trades generally took between three and five years. I6 Furthermore, the parties ostensibly 
governed by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act were numerous. Construction 
contracts were generally let to a general contractor who subcontracted out most of the 
work to several specialised contractors. Federal assistance did not go directly to 
construction companies but went through local "applicants" who were usually units of 
local government. Thus the activities of various unions, several levels of contractor, the 
Joint Apprenticeship Programs and whatever federal, state or local agencies were 
1· d 17 invo lved needed to be po Ice . 
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Government action against recalcitrant contracting comparues proved 
successful in the case the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company in 1966, as 
has been noted above. I8 But in the construction agency, because of its specific structures, 
progress in terms of black employment was glacial. These practical problems, along with 
the unwillingness of the Democrats to risk alienating either of its constituencies, meant 
that little was accomplished in the way of equal employment within the construction 
industry during the Johnson presidency. "One of the practical problems of the contract 
compliance program [set up by EO 11246] was its failure to delineate in detail the extent 
of the affirmative action obligation.,,19 Between 1966 and 1968, the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance (OFCC), created by Johnson's EO 11246 in September 1965, was 
wrecked on the same rocks that had sunk its ineffective predecessors. Again, the question 
of how to enforce affrrmative action was left unanswered. The agency began to look at 
new means of enforcement, especially within the very visible construction industry. 
Originally, the agency attempted to force construction contractors to employ minority 
labor in terms to be negotiated after a contract was awarded. The Comptroller General, 
the official appointed by the President and charged with ensuring that Congress's 
interests were looked after in government contracts, objected that the scheme was a 
violation of the rules of competitive bidding. In May of 1966 the OFCC established a 
pre-award program for the construction industry only. In doing so, it hoped to avoid 
confrontations with each of the separate organisations involved in the contract. (This 
method was no radical departure, however. The language in Executive Order 11246 
specified that bidders should file compliance reports before, or as an initial part of, their 
bids.) In 1967, the OFCC made its first attempt to implement the program in St. Louis. 
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However, a Justice Department suit effectively threw a spanner into the works. A 
construction company, working on a National Park Service site, hired a black plumber 
and two black helpers who were not members of AFL-CIO Plumbers Local 35. A 
walkout by five locals of the Construction Trades Council prompted the Justice 
Department to initiate a pattern-or-practice suit. Amongst a complex and drawn out suit, 
the OFCC's new program could not be tested normally.2o 
In San Francisco, huge federal investment in the Bay Area Rapid Transit 
(BART) system meant that OFCC leverage could be brought to bear. But the San 
Francisco plan specified no numbers or other standards against which employers could be 
judged. According to Graham, the area was a union stronghold and the indirect style of 
confrontation adopted by the union - where, on paper, compliance was fulsome but not 
matched by numbers employed - stymied the agency. In Cleveland, a local contractor 
pursuing a NASA contract offered in June 1967, after some coaching within pre-award 
negotiations, to provide a "manning table" specifying the numbers of minorities to be 
hired in each trade. By mid-November 1967, other contractors had promised, in response 
to delays in awarding $83m in Cleveland area contracts, to hire 110 minority craftsmen 
out of total crews of 475 in the mechanical trades and for operating engineers. The 
problem here was that there was little local involvement and thus little conception 
amongst black groups that anything had been achieved through local participation.21 
Johnson's Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz, was informed of a local 
initiative in Philadelphia by an obscure interagency board, the Federal Executive Board, 
which had the purpose of co-ordinating the disjointed programs of federal agencies in 
Philadelphia (similar boards existed in other US cities). The plan was to integrate some of 
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the city's exclusively white construction unions. The plan targeted unions that held only 
four percent of the area's 225,000 union members, about a quarter of whom were 
construction workers. The eight offending locals in Philadelphia were in relatively high-
paying trades: electrical and sheet-metal workers, plumbers, roofers and water-proofers, 
structural iron-workers, steamfitters, elevator constructors and stone masons (a tiny union 
that was later dropped as being insignificant). Taken altogether, these eight unions had 
less than one percent minority workers. In the plan, the contract compliance committee 
would set no fIrm targets, as this would suggest illegal quotas. Instead there were ranges 
of four to eight percent were set for 1970, nine to 15 percent for 1971, 14 to 20 percent 
for 1972 and 19 to 26 percent for 1973. The vacancy rate in the construction industry in 
Philadelphia was assumed to be seven and a half percent per year.22 Contracts would be 
held up until bidders submitted detailed manning tables that listed by trade the specific 
numbers of minority workers they pledged to hire. The plan affected the existing 
arrangements whereby unions would provide through "hiring halls" the required number 
of workers to contractors.23 
The advantages of this plan over the others were that it was locally led and 
co-ordinated but, even more saliently, contractors became responsible for hiring their 
stipulated quotas of minorities, whatever the unions' hiring hall policies. The federal 
government, therefore, was one removed in the chain of command. Additionally, without 
the complex negotiations between different federal agencies and the necessity of 
imposing a plan from outside entailed in federal initiatives, the local initiative seemed 
more likely to work. If Wirtz needed more compelling reasons for giving the go ahead for 
this plan, they came in the form of massive riots that erupted throughout many American 
159 
cities when the plan was being considered in the summer of 1967. Relations between 
Philadelphia'S two million blacks and its white citizenry, tense before the third summer 
of rioting, seemed to be at breaking point. 
The legal test of the Philadelphia Plan actually began in Cleveland. The 
frrst test cases were filed and litigated. Jones indicates that it was Cleveland that 
provoked the fIrst resistance: "It was against this backdrop that the screams of 'quotas' 
began to be heard ... ,,24 By the time copies of the Philadelphia Plan were circulated, 
however, the head of the Associated Contractors of America, William Dunn wrote to all 
chapter presidents of the Association of General Contractors to organise a campaign in 
opposition. 25 There is little evidence that the plan was adopted as anything other than 
emergency measure to reduce tension within some urban areas. Certainly, Wirtz was 
willing to back away from the plan in the face of the builders' opposition, especially 
when the Department of Labor's relationship with organised labor looked increasingly 
fragile after the AFL-CIO became more aware of the plan. If the plan was intended as a 
model for future Equal Economic Opportunity activity or as a new defmition of 
affIrmative action, the conceptual framework was somewhat undermined when Wirtz 
claimed in a speech to the AFL-CIO's Building and Construction Trades Department that 
the situation in Cleveland and Philadelphia had got to the point where "symbolism was 
more important than substance, evidence more important than equity." He promised them 
that Philadelphia was an exceptional case. John Macy, chairman of the Civil Service 
Commission, assured anxious members of Congress in January 1968 that "There are no 
intentions to implement such a plan on a nationwide scale. ,,26 
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Peter G. Nash claims that 1400 minority workers were brought into the 
Philadelphia area construction industry as a result of the fIrst Philadelphia Plan.27 
However, when opposition to the Plan grew the Federal government abandoned it. 
Johnson was diverted by an agreement that occurred in early 1968. The Model Cities law 
of 1966 required that ghetto residents be give "maximum opportunities" to participate in 
the building efforts to rehabilitate the slums. Construction unions, happy at the prospects 
of a building boom, agreed to train underqualified slum dwellers in new, government 
funded "trainee" categories. It was much better for the entire program to have labor in a 
co-operative mood; with a projected building boom, labor would be able to hold the 
program to ransom. The Philadelphia Plan was rescinded with the result that "many of 
the 1400 beneficiaries did not remain on Philadelphia area construction sites. ,,28 
The lame duck administration, its attention elsewhere, did not stand up to 
opposition to the plan. The key opponent that stopped the Plan from being implemented 
was the unlikely Elmer Staats, the Comptroller General of the US. On November 18 1968 
Staats, having ruled before that post-award contractual stipulations were illegal, now 
stated that all pre-award contractual requirements not specified would be disallowed. 
Contracts could only be awarded on the basis of a low bid and must include any specific 
requirements. What he objected to was the withholding of requirements until after a bid 
had been accepted, which he saw as unfair to the bidder. The Department of Labor failed 
to challenge the ruling. 29 
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Nixon to the Rescue 
Only the incoming Nixon administration saved the Plan. To the surprise of 
civil rights activists, the new administration, elected eleven days before Staats handed 
down his ruling, made some effort to resuscitate the Plan. Secretary of Labor-designate 
George P. Shultz, a tough-minded professor of Labor Relations from the University of 
Chicago, announced on December 30 1968 to the Industrial Relations Research 
Association that the nation's most important problem was black unemployment - above 
productivity, inflation and industrial unrest. He spoke of the need for special measures 
and claimed that, in the new, straitened circumstances employers "cannot conduct 
business as usual.,,30 Shultz hired black Republican entrepreneur Arthur Fletcher, a 
former professional football player who had lost the electoral race for lieutenant governor 
in Washington the previous year, as Assistant Secretary of Labor. Fletcher's main brief 
was to iron out the problems of the Philadelphia Plan. He sought to overcome the 
difficulty posed by Staats by creating, in the invitation for bids, suggested ranges of 
targets for minority employment within which contractors could choose their own 
specific targets. Staats repeated his key arguments against this "Revised Philadelphia 
Plan" - contractors must know all requirements before putting in a bid. Department of 
Labor counsel Lawrence H. Silberman prepared a 44-page legal brief to defend the 
revised plan, arguing that Staats' objection to post award-negotiations was illegitimate as 
pre-award goals for minority hiring in the form of percentage ranges provided ample 
guidelines for contractors to draw up their own affirmative action plans. Silberman's 
report was released by Labor on July 16 1969. Staats agreed with Silberman on this 
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point. But, as Silberman had anticipated, Staats' further objections came over the ban on 
minority quotas in the Dirksen amendment in Section 703(j) of Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act. Silberman pointed out that an affirmative action program existed under 
Kennedy's EO 10962 before the passage of the Civil Rights Act. He further argued that 
targets were not prohibited under Title VII, only quotas or preferential hiring. He further 
pointed out that Congress had defeated an amendment by Senator John Tower (#962) that 
would have made Title VII the exclusive federal remedy for employment discrimination, 
removing any role for the President. In doing so, Congress implicitly approved the 
President's program to combat racial discrimination in employment.31 
Hearings in Philadelphia occurred on August 26 and 27 1969, after 
Fletcher had announced the new order on June 27. Confidently, Shultz announced on 
September 23 that other plans called "hometown solutions" would operate similarly to 
the Philadelphia Plan but would be tailored to the specific needs of cities. Opposition in 
Congress grew, however, partiCUlarly from the guardian subcommittee on Separation of 
Powers, headed by North Carolina Democrat Sam Ervin. On October 26 and 27, the 
subcommittee ostensibly discussed S.931, Republican Senator Paul Fannin's bill to 
suspend the use of Johnson's EO 11246 and make Title VII the sole means of EEO 
enforcement. However, Fannin's bill would have created a massive discussion on civil 
rights, which would have had the effect of rallying the more numerous civil rights liberals 
to the cause of defeating Fannin's bill. A simpler way of defeating the Philadelphia Plan 
was to attach a rider to a minor Senate appropriations bill concerning damage by 
hurricane Camille that stated that no congressional appropriation shall be available to 
fmance, either directly or indirectly through any Federal aid or grant, any contract or 
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agreement which the Comptroller General did not approve. The rider had been proposed 
by another Southerner, West Virginia's Democratic Senator Robert Byrd. 
"Demonstrable Deeds" and The Battle in Congress 
Perhaps the most curious aspect of the debates on the Philadelphia Plan in 
both Houses of Congress in December 1969 was the unwillingness of many on either side 
of the debate to discuss the Philadelphia Plan itself. It was as if participants recognised 
the dilemma posed by affirmative action and wished to avoid it in discussion. Those 
opposing the Philadelphia Plan attempted to steer the debate away from a general civil 
rights discussion and towards a discussion about the balance of power between Congress 
and the Executive or towards a formal discussion of the implications of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. Samuel J. Ervin had been the force behind the attacks on the Philadelphia 
Plan as chairman of the confusingly-titled (but important nonetheless) Subcommittee on 
Separation of Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary. The committee held hearings on 
the Philadelphia Plan on October 27-29 1969. In his opening statement, Ervin assured 
members that "During the next two days, our purpose will not be to debate the wisdom of 
the Philadelphia Plan ... ,,32 
On December 18 the conservative forces launched a successful surprise 
attack on the Philadelphia Plan. Though congressional conservatives did not command 
the authority they had at the time of the passage of the 1964 Act, they still knew a few 
tricks of the trade. Southern Democrats, ensconced in powerful congressional committees 
by virtue of seniority, had managed to stave off attempts at liberalisation by more liberal 
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Democrats up until 1964. Now they had been undermined by the apparent contradiction 
between their stalling aims and the serious social consequences manifested in the 
consecutive summers of rioting that many blamed on the delaying of racial reform. 
However, though no longer the force they once were, they certainly retained the guile of 
congressional old-timers. 
The rider they introduced gave veto power to the Comptroller General 
over any program involving contracts.33 The sides of the battle were also confusing - the 
issue split both parties. Those supporting the rider (and thus opposing the Plan) included 
Southerners opposed to further civil rights legislation, those with po litical ties to labor, 
and a number of congressmen opposed to what they saw as usurpation of powers 
previously held by congress by the White House. The debaters on both sides of the 
question tried to distance themselves from any position on the Philadelphia Plan. 
Whatever else this congressional battle demonstrates, however, the contribution of Nixon 
towards saving the plan proved crucial. 
Using the political gauge devised by A. James Reichley in his assessment 
of the congressional power politics during the Nixon and Ford administrations, it is 
possible to see how the parties divided34: 
REPUBLICANS DEMOCRATS 
Fundamentalists Traditionalists 
Stalwarts Centralists 
Moderates Regulars 
Progressives Liberals 
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In opposition to the rider (and thus in favour of the Philadelphia Plan) 
were Republican Moderates and Progressives along with Democratic Regulars and 
Liberals. Southern Republicans like Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and John Tower 
of Texas as well as a string of non-southern Republican conservatives like Barry 
Goldwater and Paul Fannin of Arizona - joined forces with southern Democrats and 
those with close ties to labor. Many Republican stalwarts, whom Reichley characterises 
as not opposing change but anxious for it to come very slowly, also voted for the rider. 
These included Senators Roman Hruska and Carl T. Curtis of Nebraska, Norris Cotton of 
New Hampshire, Milton R. Young of South Dakota and Bob Dole of Kansas, who would 
later defend affirmative action when standing as Republican candidate for President. 
Missing, having died a few months earlier, was the man who negotiated the stipulation 
against proportionally based hiring in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Republican 
Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen. Dirksen had been a key force against the 
Philadelphia Plan during Johnson's tenure. 
Aligned against the rider in the Senate were what Reichley termed the 
"Republican Moderates" such as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and Hugh Scott of 
Pennsylvania. According to Reichley, these Senators were prepared to accommodate 
change but seldom initiated it. They were managerial and pragmatic. Nixon's political 
origins were from this camp. The Republican Progressives - a small but powerful bloc -
also joined the defense of the Philadelphia Plan. Nelson Rockefeller, their banner-carrier 
in later days, Jacob Javits, Mark Hatfield, Charles Percy, William Scranton, Daniel 
Evans, and Richard Ogilvie all opposed the rider. Democratic Regulars and Liberals, 
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looking at the Philadelphia Plan as part of efforts to strengthen black civil rights, joined 
Nixon's unlikely cavalcade. 35 
Those supporting the rider had at least one powerful weapon on their side. 
In the discussion around Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the prohibition against 
quotas had been made very clear. The relevant section read: 
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, 
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee 
subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to 
any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such 
individual of group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to 
the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin employed ... in comparison with the total number or percentage of 
[such] persons ... in any ... area, or in the available work force in any ... area. 36 
The inclusion of this stipulation within the Act had been unproblematic in 
the run-up to its passage in 1964. The aforementioned discussions on the above 
amendment to the original bill, introduced by Everett Dirksen, indicates that liberals saw 
it as reasonable. In 1964 few believed that merit-based hiring programs constituted a 
barrier to black equality. Even if some did, the Democrats' reliance on support from the 
unions and employers organisations for civil rights measures made it seem tactically inept 
to insist on rewriting existing seniority systems. 37 
The situation in 1969 had changed radically, however. Changes much 
deeper than simply a realignment of congressional partisanship were occurring. No 
longer were the forces that had argued out the 1964 Act in existence. The coalition that 
Bayard Rustin identified as the power behind the Democrats' civil rights activism -
''Negroes, trade unionists, liberals, and religious groups," had fragmented under the 
immense pressure of the failure to meet the expectations that the civil rights movement 
had generated.38 The institutions that nearly all Americans had seen as the vehicles upon 
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which racial equality would ride, the schools, political assemblies, political parties, labor 
assemblies and churches trumpeted by Gunnar Myrdal in the 1940s, lost nearly all their 
authority and influence over racial issues after consecutive summers of rioting 
emphasised their powerlessness to allay the racial crisis. As the pundit Gary Wills put it, 
"(t)here was a sense everywhere, in 1968, that things were giving. That man had not 
merely lost control of his history, but might never regain it.,,39 By 1969 the imperative to 
restore racial peace and calm inside the ghettoes remained while these institutions fought 
for their own survival. 
December 18 
Liberals were taken by surprise when the minute rider was proposed by 
Democratic Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia. Byrd evidently hoped that Senators 
would pass the supplemental appropriations bill quickly in order to join their families for 
the Christmas holiday: "I know all Senators want to get home. Senators have reservations 
on planes. We all want to get home to see our families. There is an excellent chance that 
we can get out of here sine die Saturday night if we can pass this bill today.,,40 
Republican Senators Jacob Javits from New York, Edward Brooke from Massachusetts, 
Hiram L. Fong from Hawaii and Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, joined by Democrats such 
as Senator John O. Pastore from New Jersey, fought a rear-guard action against the rider. 
Fong argued frrst that the rider should not have been debated; the Philadelphia Plan 
should have been debated before the rider was attached. He also attempted to steer the 
debate towards a general civil rights discussion and away from the specifics of the 
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Philadelphia Plan. "The discussion surrounding the negotiations of such voluntary plans 
(hometown plans based on the Philadelphia Plan model) as well as the implementation of 
those plans have provided a significant channel for civil rights tensions. ,,41 Javits, taking 
a different tack, insisted that the Philadelphia Plan was not the real target of the rider - it 
was an attack on many civil rights measures. The Philadelphia Plan was not particularly 
important, he said: "This would be Napoleon Bonaparte with grapeshot clearing the 
whole street and not just the Philadelphia Plan." " ... 1 thought it proper at the threshold to 
question why this 155 millimetre howitzer is used to knock off a small target, the 
Philadelphia Plan." Later, he stated plainly that he would "much rather that it would say 
that the Philadelphia Plan is a nullity." He also declared that the Davis-Bacon Act, 
governing wage determination, would be negated by the rider, paralleling Ervin's 
declaration three days previously that the Philadelphia Plan would contravene the Taft-
Hartley Act.42 Hugh Scott raised the issue of rioting in his contribution to the discussion: 
"The last thing 1 want to see in America is people to think that the laws are not adequate, 
that the protection of the law has failed them, and that, therefore, there remains for them 
only this dreadful abitrament of confrontation through violence.,,43 
The pro-rider forces, taking their lead from Ervin, argued that they were 
simply insisting on a strict interpretation of the law or that the dismissal of the 
Comptroller General's objections was essentially a power-grab by the executive. The 
Philadelphia Plan was beside the point. Roman Hruska of Nebraska submitted that "it is 
not only the Philadelphia Plan that is involved." Pearson pleaded that "I do not want my 
comments to indicate any lack of enthusiasm for any plan, whether it is the Philadelphia 
Plan or not." Republican Senator Gordon Allot of Colorado, supporting the rider, insisted 
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that "I support what the President is trying to achieve through the implementation of this 
plan ... The question here is not - and I want to make this clear - the correctness of the 
Philadelphia Plan. ,,44 Liberals supporting the rider often did so because they supported or 
were sponsored by organised labor - the older dividing line between liberals and 
conservatives - and seemed unwilling to admit that the new issue upon which 
conservatism and liberalism would have to defme themselves was race. The Philadelphia 
Plan, in that it removed from the control of unions the question of hiring or, indeed, 
membership of the unions themselves, attacked directly their authority. However, the 
absence of debate outside this arena indicates that by this time labor's influence was on 
the wane. Some southerners such as John McClellan of Arkansas insisted that the 1964 
Civil Rights Act had been contravened.45 Most, perhaps, wished to avoid the obvious 
irony of insisting on the letter of a law they had fought so hard to defeat. 
Despite a concerted defence, the conservatives triumphed in this first vote. 
By a vote of 52-37, the Senate voted that the rider was germane to the bill concerning 
Hurricane Camille.46 Once the question of whether the rider was germane to the bill was 
lost, Javits attempted to include an amendment that struck out the period (full-stop) at the 
end of the rider and adding "and actions hereunder shall be subject to judicial review as 
provided by Chapter 7 of Title 5 of the US Code.,,47 Javits's rider was defeated but more 
narrowly, by 40-44. Some Republicans who had voted for the rider also voted for Javits's 
amendment, including Bob Dole of Kansas, Jack Miller of Iowa, James Pearson of Iowa 
and Ted Stevens of Alaska. 48 
After these losses the Nixon forces were immediately galvanised into 
action. There is much evidence that Nixon became personally involved in the 
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considerable effort dedicated to savmg the Philadelphia Plan. Immediately after the 
Senate vote, he drew up plans to galvanise the civil rights movement in support of the 
Philadelphia Plan in an extra-Congressional campaign.49 He also issued powerful 
statements opposing the rider. Unlike some of his allies in the Senate, Nixon made the 
Philadelphia Plan the focus of his defence and made no attempt to bargain with the 
conservatives, as he had earlier the same year over school desegregation. He opened his 
fIrst statement to congress on the subject with the contention that "the House of 
Representatives now faces an historic and critical civil rights vote. ,,50 In the second of 
Nixon's statements to Congress, read out by Jerry Ford in the House, he defended the 
idea of the Philadelphia Plan in the name of taxpayers, white and black. 
By December 22, when the House debated the bill in its entirety, the 
rhetorical temperature had been raised considerably. Pro-rider forces attempted to steer 
the discussion away from the Philadelphia Plan. Veteran Democratic Representative 
George H. Mahon of Texas, who sponsored the bill, attempted to set the tone of the 
debate. "Mr. Speaker, the Philadelphia Plan is by no means and to no extent the actual 
issue involved here. The issue involved is the integrity of the House of Representatives ... 
This is not a civil rights issue at all ... It is not a Philadelphia Plan issue at all ... It is 
simply, as I stated, a question of the power, the authority, the position and the prestige of 
Congress." Congressman Roman Pucinski of Illinois went one better: "This is the most 
brazen power grabs you have ever been confronted with," he told congressmen.51 Many 
Democrats feared the repercussions of the Philadelphia Plan within labor groups and 
organisations that had provided support for them. Democratic Representative from 
Michigan, Jamie O'Hara, a labor supporter, wished back the past: "I would like to see a 
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colorblind America in which the color ofa man's skin makes no difference." Democratic 
Representative Chet Holifield from California reminded the House of his civil rights 
credentials: "I voted for every one of the civil rights bills because I believe in civil rights 
and I believe in the rights of labor and I have voted to protect labor." Rep. James G. 
Fulton, a Republican from Pennsylvania, complained of the situation. "Mr. Speaker, this 
is a question of where two of our US progressive policies contravene each other. One is 
civil rights and the other is the right offree and collective bargaining."s2 
The pro-rider forces began using wider arguments. Pucinski fumed that the 
cost of construction would increase dramatically because contractors would be forced to 
hire untrained black labor as well as the trained white labor to complete the job. He also 
sharply observed that "if you think it will stop in Philadelphia or the building industry, 
you are mistaken." The ant i-rider forces, taking the lead from the President, argued 
specifically in favour of the Philadelphia Plan from a civil rights perspective. Freshman 
Republican David Dennis from Nebraska felt that color shouldn't matter but 
unfortunately did. "(I)n theory, you should not have to legislate (sic) anything along these 
lines ... But, as a matter of fact, as we all know, sometimes it does (matter)."S3 House 
Minority leader Gerald Ford argued against those who wished to reassert the rights 
contained within the 1964 Civil Rights Act. "All those social rights are important, but if 
you do not have ajob, it does not do you much good."s4 
Some of the more radical supporters of civil rights attacked the 
Philadelphia Plan itself, complaining that it was one of the more conservative measures 
that might be taken to strengthen civil rights. However, they also opposed the rider, 
which might have prevented any civil rights plan that used financial leverage to pressure 
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public and private institutions into redressing civil rights concerns. Augustus Hawkins, 
black Democratic Representative from California, opposing the rider, complained that the 
Nixon administration, rather than voting for Hawkins' bill to strengthen the powers of 
EEOC, "prefers to confuse the issue with a new and different approach unsupported by a 
single civil rights authority or organization." He continued, saying that "it must be 
understood that this plan is only one, and not necessarily the best of tools for opening 
opportunities. ,,55 Bob Eckhardt of Texas expressed the frustrations of Democrats 
supporting a Republican initiative. "I grasp this small forceps even though it has been in 
the hands of the other party and there have been much larger tools and more effective 
ones that they have eschewed. ,,56 Democratic Congressman James C. Corman of 
California perhaps expressed a reason for Nixon's victory when he stated that "the 
fundamental issues are the same, it seems to me, and the words are almost the same as on 
every other civil rights matter. ,,57 
At the end of the debate, those opposing the rider had 208 votes, those in 
favour 156. Republicans supported Nixon 124 to 41.58 Though the bill was returned to the 
Senate the same day, the pro-rider forces had been soundly defeated. In the Senate, the 
pro-rider forces went through the motions. It was difficult for those like Ervin who had 
opposed the 1964 Civil Rights Act to now insist that the Philadelphia Plan was a betrayal 
of the letter and the spirit of the law. Those opposing the rider insisted that the Plan was a 
pragmatic measure needed only for the construction industry, denying that the Plan was 
especially significant in changing policy and stressing its specificity. Republican Senator 
Charles Percy argued that "This plan is not coercive ... It is merely a device for bringing 
all sides together to work out geographical areas for training and employment in the 
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construction fields." Republican Hugh Scott cited Grover Cleveland in order to argue 
pragmatism against the bombastic charges of opponents of the Plan: "It is a condition, not 
a theory, that confronts us." A roll-call vote to drop the rider succeeded 59 
Order No.4 
Clearly, Shultz and the rest of the administration originally expected little 
opposition to the Philadelphia Plan and saw the potential to make a distinctive 
contribution to civil rights. In a Department of Labor press release, released on 
September 23 1969, Shultz confidently announced that " ... we expect the Plan developed 
for use in Philadelphia to provide useful general guidelines." "The Nixon Administration 
now has a civil rights vehicle" announced Fletcher.60 A draft of Order No.4 signed by 
John Wilks on November 4 1969, extended the Philadelphia Plan's model of proportional 
representation by race and selected ethnicity in employment to virtually all federal 
contractors. An outgrowth of Section 60-1.40 of OFCC regulations, Order No. 4 stated 
that affIrmative action programs had to be separately created for each of the contractor's 
establishments. Every contractor with more than 50 employees and holding federal 
contracts worth at least $50,000 (the Philadelphia Plan had a cut-off of $500,000) was 
required to set "significant, measurable and attainable" hiring goals and objectives. It 
stated that "The rate of minority applicants recruited should approximate or equal the 
ratio of minorities to the applicant population in each location. ,,61 
The enforcement process detailed in the Order showed what that the 
Administration was determined to use sanctions only as a last option and that it expected 
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compliance to be fairly automatic. First, there was "conference, conciliation, mediation 
and persuasion." Next, if that failed, employers would be issued a "show cause" order, 
asking them to show why action leading to debarment and contract termination should 
not be taken. Third, the employer would be issued with a notice of intent. Last, if all else 
failed, came contract termination and debarment from any more government contracts 
until "the contractor has established ... personnel and employment policies in compliance 
with the provisions of' the Executive Order. Much of this process had been in place for 
over a decade. According to legal expert Peter G. Nash, the OFCC simply seized upon an 
old compliance procedure included in the procurement procedure that had been included 
in the procurement regulations at the request of the Vice President in 1956 whereby 
contracting officers are obliged to evaluate a prospective contractor's ability to comply 
with the equal opportunity clause. It had never been used because "there existed no 
standards against which to make such a determination." Order No.4 remedied this 
problem. However, it is important to keep in mind that, as with the Philadelphia Plan, an 
employer needed only to show that a "good faith effort" had been made to achieve the 
goals that had been agreed.62 
Sam Ervin, having got hold of a copy of the Order, charged in January the 
next year that the Labor Department had lied in the hearings. The Labor Department 
responded by stating that ''through an administration error, a draft was circulated 
prematurely, not secretly as an order." Despite the plausibility of Ervin's case (and the 
publication of his charges in the New York Times), few seemed to care whether it had 
been published in the Federal Register or not. The cavalier treatment of Ervin's 
reasonably legitimate complaint gives some indication that Nixon, at least in 1969-70, 
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was far more concerned about criticism from the civil rights movement and civil rights 
liberals than he was about carping from those on the right.63 Shultz was able to issue a 
reworked Order No.4 on February 3 1970. Published in the Federal Register, the new 
Order required contractors to file an affIrmative action program within 120 days of 
signing a contract. Employers' plans would identify the ''underutilization'' of blacks, 
Spanish-surnamed Americans, American Indians, and Orientals. Such underutilization 
would be determined from, amongst other things, the "minimum population of the labor 
area surrounding the facility" (seemingly, a climb-down from the earlier version) and the 
"percentage of the minority work force as compared to the total work force." The 
contractor must indicate "specific goals and timetables" based on these criteria. The 
Order included the Philadelphia Plan's insistence that contractors must only show that a 
"good faith effort" was made to achieve the goals. 64 
It is possible that this move was less an attempt to generalise the 
stipulations of the Philadelphia Plan than a defence against the charge of inconsistency 
from builders who were taking Shultz to court. Certainly, the Wall Street Journal cited a 
"knowledgeable source" who explained that this was the real reason behind the Order. 
Whatever the case, no action was taken to ensure compliance with these stipulations 
outside of the construction industry until years after its implementation.65 However, no 
one was under any illusions as to what the Philadelphia Plan's "affIrmative action" really 
meant. Both the Philadelphia Plan and Order No.4, whenever they were discussed, were 
assumed to mean quotas. The distinction that had been made in defence of the Plan 
against Staats between quotas and "goals and targets" was ignored by most pundits. The 
New York Times reported blandly that "Allen [Dr. James E., United States Commissioner 
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of Education] Bids School Aides Around Country Back Job Quotas for Minorities." 
Similarly, Jones, defending affirmative action programs in 1970, simply referred to 
"employment quotas." The term "quotas" was the common descriptor of affirmative 
action programs taken on by the government used by all except those in the 
administration. Outside of congressional circles, the term excited no real controversy 
whatever until late 1971.66 
The Hometown Plans 
On January 25 1970, the New York Times reported that a "hometown 
solution" had been created. Chicago had been, in late 1969, subject to black picketing of 
construction sites and thus had need of some sort of a solution. Interested parties, 
including the main contractors, city and state officials, and local civil rights had drafted a 
plan in response. The result, agreed by Shultz and Mayor Richard Daley, promised to 
provide 4000 new jobs a year for five years for minorities in private and public 
construction. Daley hailed it as "an example to the entire nation.,,67 On February 9, Shultz 
designated 19 cities as targets for adoption of more hometown solutions, warning that 
they would have Philadelphia-type plans imposed upon them if they failed to come up 
with an acceptable hometown solution. On March 18 the New York Times reported 
hopefully that hometown plans had been implemented in Chicago, Pittsburgh and Boston. 
"The more success such attempts achieve, the less need there will be for Philadelphia 
Plans and other forms of government compulsion. ,,68 
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The hometown plans or hometown solutions, as they were sometimes 
called, differed in several ways from compulsory plans. Targets and goals were agreed by 
local parties before gaining the federal government's seal of approval and thus varied 
greatly from city to city. They normally covered not simply federal contractors but all 
construction work in the city or area. Being voluntary, of course, there were no sanctions 
imposed against those contractors not honouring the agreement. However, with the 
Philadelphia Plan in the background, the implication was that a federally-enforced plan 
would replace any hometown plan that failed to achieve results. 
On March 22 1970, the New York Plan, "the city building industry's 
answer to the Philadelphia Plan," was launched. The emphasis within many of these early 
plans was on training and the New York Plan was no exception. AFL-CIO construction 
union representative (and later Nixon cabinet member) Peter J. Brennan said it was a 
"comprehensive work-learn program with ... reasonable assurance of entry into the 
industry as a qualified craftsman." The plan had a goal of 800 minority members training 
in the first year. Brennan was prescient to note, however, that the difficulty might be that 
a minority group member might get on-the-job training for a construction project but 
would be unemployed again after three to four months.69 
Court Activism? 
Nixon clearly led efforts to adopt these early affIrmative action programs. 
He manoeuvred the Philadelphia Plan past obstacles erected by Staats and conservative 
politicians. But the administration did receive assistance from the courts. In United States 
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v. Ironworkers, Local 86 (1970), the court ensured that the intake of black applicants for 
apprenticeships in the Seattle area never fell below 30 percent. 70 Both the Cleveland and 
Philadelphia Plans were upheld in state and federal courts. In Ohio in the summer of 1968 
a building contractor failed to secure a contract for a Cuyahoga Community College 
project because his bid did not include a satisfactory manning table. He had submitted a 
manning table SUbmitting that the numbers of minorities he would employ would be 
subject to the availability of minority workers in local unions. The contractor failed to 
persuade the Ohio Court of Common Pleas that competitive bidding procedures had been 
breached or that the goals and timetables constituted preferential quotas. The Supreme 
Court declined to review it after the decision was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court a 
year later. 71 
Contractors bound by the Philadelphia Plan sued the Labor Department in 
1969. In the spring of 1970 a federal district judge rejected their claims and supported the 
Ohio courts in favour of the plan. However, it is important to note that the courts did not 
defend the Philadelphia Plan as a definitive model of race relations but as an action 
taken to ameliorate tensions within the inner cities. The model of affirmative action to 
which they related was closer to that of Kennedy and Johnson. When the court instructed 
Sheet Metal Workers Unions to take a percentage of minority applicants for 
apprenticeships, it felt compelled to say that "we impose no quotas, we grant no 
preferences."n Judge Charles R. Weiner held that the Philadelphia Plan "does not require 
the contractors to hire a definite percentage of a minority group" and emphasised the call 
for a good faith effort defensible in court. He noted that the union policy of racial 
exclusion was "repugnant, unworthy and contrary to present national policy. The 
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Philadelphia Plan will provide an unpolluted breath of fresh aIr to ventilate this 
unpalatable situation.,,73 
A year later, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied the contractor's 
claims. The court was careful to note that the OFCC did not impose a social policy on the 
states wholesale. "Rather, they acted in one area in which discrimination in employment 
was most likely to effect the cost and the progress of projects in which the federal 
government had both financial and completion interests." As Moreno notes, the court's 
defence against the charge that the Philadelphia Plan violated Congressional intent 
centred on the fact of the construction industry'S specificity. No new general model of 
affirmative action emerged with the Philadelphia Plan. It is instructive that the court 
made these arguments in 1971, long after order No.4 was in effect.74 
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A Political Motive? 
Historians have pointed out the political motives Nixon had for backing 
the Philadelphia Plan. Presidential aide John D. Ehrlichman remembered that Nixon 
thought Shultz had shown "great style" in devising a plan that divide two stalwarts of the 
Democratic Party, blacks and labor. On this issue, as Ehrlichman observed, the AFL-CIO 
and the NAACP would be locked in combat leaving the Nixon administration in the 
"sweet and reasonable middle." 75 But the Philadelphia Plan also split the Southern 
Strategy's core coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats. Though it 
undoubtedly set core Democratic constituencies against each other, the RepUblican Party 
also looked in disarray after the vote. Little political good could have been accrued for 
Nixon by the Philadelphia Plan. As Nixon ruefully commented shortly after the 
administration's victory in Congress, "(w)hile our 'Libs' won't agree this hurts us with 
our constituency - we gained little on the play.,,76 
There were other compelling reasons why Nixon chose to implement this 
plan (detailed elsewhere in this dissertation). The racial violence that flared up in cities 
like Philadelphia, though nowhere near the level seen in previous summers, took place 
near construction sites.77 Mayor Joseph Barr of Philadelphia sent an urgent telegram to 
Shultz in September 1969, pleading with him to intervene: "Negotiations between the 
Black Construction Coalition and the Contractors and Building Trade Unions have been 
exhausted in an attempt to settle the differences. Therefore your immediate presence is 
necessary to determine what steps must be taken to resolve an explosive situation. An 
anxious city awaits your immediate reply ... We solicit your help in this hour of crisis.,,78 
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The Kerner Commission had recommended in 1967 stronger enforcement of Executive 
Order 11246 (see appendix 1) and for revisions to it "particularly as regards labor 
. ,,79 If N· had 
unIons. lXon ample reason for attacking the civil rights records of labor 
unions, he was certainly not the only one to do so. 
The overwhelming consideration of the administration during 1969 - a 
year before the next congressional election and more than two years before another 
election - was to alleviate tensions and blunt opposition to authority. If there were 
political motives for pushing the Plan, they were a defence against attacks from liberals 
within the Democratic Party, what John Skrentny identifies as "the politics of pre-
emption."so The material in the Nixon archives as well as in the Haldeman diaries 
confirms that the greatest sensitivity of the early Nixon period was towards attacks from 
the left, not the right. It was necessary, therefore, to pre-empt liberal attacks with liberal 
moves by the administration. John Finney of the New York Times, in a piece published in 
February 1970, used the word pre-emption when characterising the first year of the 
administration. It had, he said, shrewdly succeeded in "taking away or neutralizing every 
issue that might be exploited by the Democrats. ,SI 
An objection might be that the "Southern Strategy" constituted extreme 
sensitivity towards racial conservatives. This is undoubtedly true in terms of how 
programs were publicly presented. But Mitchell's "watch what we do" maxim applied to 
the administration's dealings with the South.s2 In terms of the content of programs or of 
how effective they were, Nixon feared the attacks from the left more than those from the 
right in 1969. And, as speechwriter William Safire once said of Mitchell, Nixon "saw the 
need to lean right when you were moving left, taking as many conservative friends with 
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you as possible when you had to go in a progressive position. ,,83 Before 1970 Nixon had 
no "New Right" strategy based on opposition to liberal measures of the Great Society. He 
had no real solid constituency and, while he had managed to gain the support of South em 
conservatives, it was by no means a lasting allegiance. He constantly experimented with 
different strategies to gain the allegiance of the "silent majority" of Americans, a task 
rendered difficult by its very silence. Polls indicated that the majority of Americans were 
still fairly liberal when it came to civil rights. 84 Nixon constantly scrambled for the 
middle ground on most issues. The Philadelphia Plan, at least in 1969, appeared to be 
within that middle ground. 
Whatever Nixon's motives, during the period of 1969-70, few within or 
outside the Nixon administration found anything compelling about the issue of 
preferential treatment in employment.85 The contentious issue of 1969-70, reflecting the 
fact that hopes were still invested in education as a tool for the creation of black equality, 
was school desegregation. After passage of the 1964 Act, HEW demanded that districts 
take affirmative steps to end racial discrimination within one year of the Act's effective 
date. When this deadline was not achieved, a new deadline was set for 1967. When this in 
turn was not met, the deadline was moved to the 1968 school year, or at the latest 1969. 
This, too, was later modified, administratively, to provide a 1970 deadline for districts 
with a majority Negro population, or for those in which new construction necessary for 
desegregation was scheduled for early completion. Meanwhile, The Supreme Court had 
ruled busing to achieve racial balance permissible as a remedy in Green vs. New Kent 
County, VA in May 1968.86 Leon Panetta, then a liberal Republican committed to civil 
rights reform, wrote a bitter account of his efforts within and eventual forced resignation 
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from the Nixon administration. Bring Us Together, published months after Panetta's 
resignation was announced on Feb. 17, 1970, detailed the failings of the Nixon 
administration in the area of school desegregation. Not once did it mention affirmative 
action. 87 
A response from the Nixon administration to criticism from the 
Congressional Black Caucus in early 1971 indicates the weight placed on civil rights 
issues of the day: 
The focus of this Administration has not been on dramatic confrontation, but on 
quiet achievement. 
-- Since 1968, funding for civil rights enforcement activity has been doubled. 
-- In the current school year alone, the number of minority children in the eleven 
southern states attending desegregated school systems has been tripled from the 
pervious [sic] year. 
-- Small Business Administration lending to minority enterprises has been 
increased seven-fold since 1968, from $28 million to $217 million ... 
-- Food assistance programs have been greatly expanded ... 88 
Again, the Philadelphia Plan was not mentioned. Looking at discussion of 
the Philadelphia Plan in 1970 and 1971 within the administration, it becomes evident that 
it was seen as evidence of the administration's concern for civil rights rather than the 
blunt instrument against them affirmative action would later become. Occasionally, either 
Nixon or one of his aides would complain that no one had heard of the Philadelphia Plan. 
In March 1970 Nixon scrawled in the margins of a memo concerning efforts to publicise 
civil rights efforts of the administration: "E - Maybe what we need is a 'white' paper on 
the Civil Rights actions of the Administration - Have it put out by our top Black 
Appointees. I believe the record is impressive on things done (Phil plan etc.) + things [?] 
(Family Assistance)." Leonard Garment also suggested later in the year a plan to 
publicise the administration's civil rights efforts with the "Philadelphia Plan Revisited." 
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He mentions "home town solutions", a "major Department of Labor effort" nov.' 
functioning in 1 02 cities.89 
The fact that the administration was simultaneously trying to keep quiet 
about school desegregation efforts and promoting its affirmative action efforts gives 
some indication of the obscurity of the Philadelphia Plan. So does the lack of mention in 
the New York Times of the Philadelphia Plan, affirmative action or "quotas." In 1970 the 
Philadelphia Plan received mention in the paper (mostly in relation to the hometown plan 
in New York) each month up until October. In 1971, the plan received mention only five 
times. In 1970 or 1971 the terms "affirmative action" or "quotas" did not attract enough 
attention to merit an index category. 90 
Proving how different the context in which the issue was raised in 1972, 
the New York Times reported in September 1971 that the Democrats were willing to 
outlaw preferential hiring altogether in exchange for cease-and-desist powers for EEOC. 
To win the support of Democratic Representative Edith Green of Oregon, who, according 
to the New York Times, maintained a substantial following among conservative 
Democrats, Democratic leaders agreed to sponsor three crucial amendments. 9 I One of 
them would have prevented EEOC from imposing hiring quotas or requiring preferences. 
Made by Democratic Congressman John H. Dent of Pennsylvania, it stated that "All 
authority, functions, and responsibilities vested in the Secretary of Labor pursuant to 
Executive Order 11246 ... are transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission. The Commission shall be prohibited from imposing or requiring a quota or 
preferential treatment with respect to numbers of employees or percentages of employees 
of any race, color, religion or national origin.,,92 Dent made it clear that this meant goals, 
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too. "If I did nothing else in this law but wipe out the contract compliance feature and put 
it under the jurisdiction of EEOC ... then I would have done sufficiently (sic),,93 As the 
New York Times noted, this "would rule out the so-called Philadelphia Plan ... ,,94 
In an interesting debate indicating the ideological confusion at that time 
over the issue of affrrmative action, Republicans argued for the legality of quotas and 
Democrats united against affrrmative action. Gerald Ford told the House that the Dent bill 
- known as HR1746 - would make it harder for a black man to get a job and urged the 
house to pass instead HR924 7, the substitute bill sponsored by the Nixon administration 
known as the Erlenbom substitute.95 Augustus Hawkins, co-sponsor of the bill, had 
accepted Dent's amendment as one of three to his bill, HR1746. He attacked the 
Philadelphia Plan as he had in the debate over it in 1969: "In the first year of the 
operation do you know how many blacks got jobs? Less than 100. Do you know how 
many women have gotten jobs in the history of the Philadelphia Plan? Not one. ,,96 Edith 
Green, who had been a civil rights activists during the 1950s and early 1960s, also 
attacked quotas. Left-leaning black representative Shirley Chisolm tried to calm the 
waters, justifying her support for HR1746 by saying that the power to issue cease and 
desist order will allow EEOC to "make construction workers and other groups do that 
c. • I ,,97 Rad' I which they have to do in order to be able to prevent prelerentIa treatment. lca 
Democrat from New York Bella Abzug was the only Democrat supporter of HR1746 to 
say that she was opposed to Dent's amendment, though " .. .I can accept the amendments 
to get an overall bill which gives enforcement powers to the EEOC. ,,98 
Some who might have voted against HR1746 without the amendment were 
swayed by the efforts of the Democrats. Republican Richard G. Shoup of Montana 
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attacked HR1746 as it would result in "forcing employers to practice illegal 
discrimination because of race.,,99 Democrat John R. Rarick of Louisiana swung his 
weight behind the Dent amendment, pointing out the many tentacles of affirmative 
action, including the Small Business Administration's 8(a) program (discussed later): 
"What has occurred and destroyed the State public school systems of this great Nation 
now threaten the laboring system that has built America." 100 Most conservatives, 
however, were not swayed by Dent's amendment and worried more about what an 
empowered EEOC might do than about affirmative action programs. Thirty-three year-
old Republican Senator William Steiger of Wisconsin summed up the feeling of most of 
the House when he objected to the "smokescreen of setting quotas" and the "smokescreen 
of preferential treatment." The real issue, he explained, was "what kind of enforcement 
powers should be granted to the EEOC.,,101 HR1746 lost the day. 
When the Er lenbom substitute came before the Senate, Sam Ervin, the 
primary force against the Philadelphia Plan in 1969, failed to raise any points about 
"quotas." Instead, he accepted its existence and did not argue for its annulment. He did 
not question the substance of the Philadelphia Plan but had an amendment passed that 
prohibited the OFCC from finding an agreed affirmative action plan inadequate in 
Nixon's version of the EEOC bill (which did not give cease-and-desist powers to EEOC). 
As Schuwerk noted, "(t)here were proponents of strong civil rights legislation on both 
sides of the question [about whether to give EEOC cease and desist powers] and very 
little attention was directed to the propriety of the substantive remedies available under 
the OFCC program." 102 Nixon emerged with another victory and his bill was made law 
in 1972 with affirmative action intact. 
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The Failures of the Philadelphia Plan and the Hometown Solutions 
Besides being fairly obscure at the time, the Philadelphia Plan and the 
"hometown solutions" could be not counted as successes in their own terms. First, and 
almost immediately after Nixon struggled to defend the plan in Congress, the initiative 
failed to offset the criticism Nixon attracted from the civil rights movement and other 
groups concerned with civil rights. He had not managed to set the civil rights agenda with 
the initiative and criticisms over other aspects of his administration's civil rights policy 
overshadowed any credit for the Philadelphia Plan. The Philadelphia Plan did not succeed 
in its preempting the liberal agenda. 
Jill Quadagno indicates that, for the intended beneficiaries of the Plans, 
they had been successes: "Yet the Philadelphia Plan worked. Through the early 1970s the 
Philadelphia Plan was implemented in cities throughout the country. Minority 
representation in the skilled craft unions increased significantly during this period." She 
also states that: "Hiring practices among federal contractors also experienced an 
enormous shift. In 1966 the workforce of federal contractors was disproportionately 
white; by 1974 their workforce had become disproportionately black." 103 All the 
evidence, however, seems to contradict Quadagno's assertion. Neither the Philadelphia 
Plan nor the hometown plans worked. The Chicago Plan that Mayor Daley had hailed as 
"an example to the entire nation," the first of the hometown plans, failed to live up to 
Daley's (or, more to the point, black Chicagoans') expectations. Within eight months, the 
Civil Rights Commission complained that there were only 75 minority members in any of 
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the training programs set out in the Chicago Plan, the Washington Post spoke of the 
"disarray" of the Chicago Plan and Herbert Hill, one of its architects, flatly called it a 
,,-c, ·1 ,,104 S hs 1· . lal ure. orne mont ater It collapsed amId a fmancial scandal in which the Plan's 
director, Alderman Fred Hubbard, disappeared and was later accused of embezzling more 
than $100,000 in federal funds designated for the program. 105 
Any improvement in relations between white construction workers and 
black civil rights groups lobbying for minority construction jobs was not obvious in 
Seattle. On June 7 1972 it was reported that construction workers armed with crowbars 
battled pipe-swinging blacks at a building project on the Seattle Community College. 
Two white workers were hospitalised and five blacks, including Republican 
Representative Michael Ross, were arrested. 106 Usually, the failures of hometown plans 
to make any impact on black unemployment were less dramatic. More typical, perhaps, 
was the situation in New Rochelle, New York. A campaign mounted in the winter of 
1966-67 demanded a black share of construction jobs in the building of a mall in a black 
neighborhood. Nearly five years later, and a year after the adoption of a hometown plan, 
three black apprentices - a plumber and two electricians - fmished their three-year 
apprenticeships and were becoming journeymen. Ninety-six out of hundreds of white 
candidates for apprenticeship programs were minority members. As Napoleon Holmes, 
listed in the New York Times as New Rochelle's "most influential and effectual black 
leader," stated of the demonstrations he had led five years previously: "We accomplished 
tokenism." 1 07 
Some problems were common to all of the hometown plans. Relations 
between the various groups effected by the plans, while only occasionally as rancorous as 
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those between blacks and white construction workers in Seattle, were difficult. For 
example, in Chicago in 1972 a new plan launched in July of 1972, which promised to hire 
more than 10,000 minorities for construction jobs by 1975, had to be scuttled when one 
of the local black groups, the Coalition for United Community Action, and a Spanish-
speaking group, the Spanish Coalition for Jobs, protested that their position within the 
plan was not equal to that of the Urban League. Two months later, the plan was 
resuscitated but, after nine months of the plan being in operation, the Urban League 
pulled out, complaining about the refusal of unions and contractors to uphold the targets 
set for them. Finally, in January of 1974, an imposed plan was installed. 108 Such 
problems were not restricted to Chicago. Leonard Garment, charged with replying to the 
Black Caucus Report criticising the Philadelphia Plan and the Hometown solutions, 
accepted publicly in May 1971 that these sort of problems hampered the hometown 
solutions: 
Admittedly, there are problems attendant with this approach. It is difficult and 
tedious to obtain agreement between these oft-conflicting parties ['construction 
contractors, building trade unions, and the minority community'] ... Because of 
the great advantages [local initiative, voluntary nature] to the approach, the 
Department [Labor] has an obligation to make them work. 
In the same month, Shultz had to admit at a press conference that "Some 
of the hometown solutions have not worked as well as we had hoped; some have." He 
failed to specify exactly which ones had worked well. Shultz ordered a report from staff 
after difficulties in enforcement ensued. Mark Alger from the General Government 
Program Division told his boss: "We are analyzing the efficacy of our policy on 
hometown solutions due to problems we encountered in developing and implementing 
them.,,109 The Nixon Administration clearly favoured voluntary plans over imposed ones. 
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In public, officials stressed the importance of the local plans and the desirability of a co-
operative spirit within the construction industry. Privately, they preferred the distance 
between themselves and the hometown plans. The real attraction for the administration, 
implying a certain cynicism about the chances of success for voluntary plans, was, as 
Larry Silberman put it, "the inability to trace failure of hometown agreements to the 
Federal Government ... ,,110 
Besides the imposition of Philadelphia Plan-style plans in five cities, the 
number of original 102 cities with "functioning" hometown plans had dwindled to 45 in 
April 1972. Throughout the early months of 1972 Assistant Secretary of Labor Richard J. 
Grunewald travelled the country re-Iaunching hometown plans. By July there were 50 
federally approved plans with cities such as Peoria, Illinois promising to reserve 158 
construction jobs for minorities over the next five years. ll1 In 1973 OFCC conducted 
what it termed a comprehensive audit of the voluntary plans then in practice. It found that 
in terms of '''placement credits" (OFCC's term for the successful placement of minority 
workers in construction jobs,) 3,243 had been achieved against total goals and targets of 
6,573. Four out of forty plans attained or exceeded their targets but, in two of those, 
individual participating trades had failed. As the Civil Rights Commission observed, 
many of the 3,243 "worked only thirty days or slightly longer." Nor did all of the 3,243 
have union memberships - many simply had permits to work from the union office. The 
Civil Rights Commission concluded its assessment of the audit reports by saying that 
. hi'f fth I ,,112 
"(t)he audit results almost certainly exaggerate the ac evements,l any, 0 e pans. 
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Imposed Plans 
The Congressional Black Caucus, the United States Civil Rights 
Commission, Arthur Fletcher and other civil rights interests felt that the hometown plans 
were inadequate because they did not impose sanctions on transgressors (though Fletcher 
did not say so until after he left the administration in early 1972). They felt that all the 
plans should be made involuntary. 1 I3 But the imposed plans fared little better than the 
voluntary ones. Again, problems ensued that had bedevilled the hometown plans. The 
fITst was that, because of the way the construction industry worked, results would not 
pour in quickly if they poured in at all. The building trades operated a tightly controlled 
apprenticeship program (itself created by New Deal legislation) whereby apprentices took 
three to five years to learn a trade before they could become qualified. Apprentices might 
drop out before their apprenticeships were complete and there was no absolute guarantee 
that the apprentices would become qualified journeymen. An indication of this problem 
can be seen in Chicago where 75 minority members were accepted on training programs. 
Of the 46 that were placed in on-the-job training, only five were employed in 1974.114 
Another was identified by the US Commission on Civil Rights after reviewing available 
data more than two years after the implementation of the Philadelphia Plan. It said: 
Of the five existing imposed plans [Philadelphia, Washington, San Francisco, 
Atlanta, and St. Louis. New York and Seattle, unsurprisingly, were later added to 
the list] those in Philadelphia and Washington DC are the oldest and the only ones 
for which employment data are available. In neither case have the results been 
encouraging. . .. The massive enforcement activity required indicates that a new 
approach is called for since the Federal Government does not have the resources 
to cope with such noncompliance if encountered nationwide. lls 
The idea behind selective enforcement was that an example would be set 
for all contractors; most, it hoped, would effectively police themselves when it was 
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known that the government would take action. OFCC worked with tiny percentages of 
the total workforce when it dealt with imposed plans for a reason; it simply did not have 
the staff even to monitor, let alone enforce, compliance. Hence, monitoring was patchy at 
best. There were only two ways, given limited resources, of measuring success or lack of 
it. First, contractors could report how many minority "man-hours" had been worked as 
opposed to all hours worked. There were several problems inherent to this method of 
monitoring. It relied on the honesty of the contractors in reporting accurately. Because of 
the specifications on the forms used, the term minority was not broken down into its 
constituent partS. II6 It was favoured by Department of Labor press releases probably 
because results could be made to look favourable even if they were insignificant. For 
instance, one press release in December 1973 reported that in Philadelphia, out of 3,818 
hours worked by plumbers and pipefitters during a ten-month period, 852 of them had 
been by minorities. This made up 22 percent, within the range of targets and goals of20-
24 percent set by the Philadelphia Plan. However, when taking into account the estimated 
average for the construction industry at that time of 39.1 hours per week, the total 
minority employment was equivalent to one unspecified "minority" person working half 
of the ten-month period. 1 17 
The second method of monitoring employed by OFCC was a count, made 
onsite on a specific day. Difficulties also existed here. First, the visit was arranged. Some 
contractors, it was reported, employed a method of avoiding an accurate count by 
"motorcycling" - sending a minority worker from site to site - or by "checkerboarding" -
sending all minority employees to federally fmanced projects (the only inspected by 
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OFCC officials). Richard Rowan and Lester Rubin, who conducted a study of the 
effectiveness of the involuntary Washington DC plan, observed: 
Minorities are not being left on the bench when contractors need them for 
compliance purposes. Despite unemployment in some unions minorities in the 
. ' 
umons are rarely unemployed .... We offer the possibility that relatively few 
minorities are being used to meet man-hour goals and that permit-holders - not 
new union members - are being used to meet the requirements. I 18 
Not surprising, given the OFCC's inadequate monitoring efforts, few 
sanctions were imposed, despite ensuing problems in the imposed plans. By September 
1970 it had been reported that ''violation of the Philadelphia Plan is very wide-spread." I 19 
But OFCC's movement towards effective sanctions proved tortuous. Debarment actions 
were initiated against seven companies. Seven notices of intent to impose sanctions were 
sent in 1970. Yet, by September 1971 an OFCC memorandum entitled "Need for 
Compliance Enforcement in the Construction Industry" revealed that "these sanctions 
[cancellation of contracts and debarment] have never been used in the construction 
industry.,,12o By July 1975 only six construction contractors had been debarred or had 
agreed to consent decrees. All six were speciality contractors and none was large. Five 
were in Philadelphia and one was in Denver. Even these sanctions were mild; all but one 
of the debarment orders had been lifted by August 1974. Not that the situation in 
Philadelphia had changed - it was still included on the list of imposed plans in March 
1975.121 As the Chicago Tribune, perhaps indulging in a bit of schadenfreude after the 
debacle of Chicago's hometown plan, remarked in 1972, the Philadelphia Plan 
. h' h d - +. bl" 122 
"nominally had sanctions t at ill t e event prove uneulorcea e. 
The genius of the plans had been to create pressure without having to 
enforce any sort of sanctions. Any real successes of the Philadelphia Plan must be seen in 
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light of the large number of contractors in other industries and recipients of government 
assistance (such as colleges and universities) that imposed upon their own structures 
affirmative action plans after seeing the government's determination to implement them 
in the construction industry. Problems emerged, however, when contractors consistently 
failed to put in a "honest and good faith effort" to achieve the targets and goals set for 
them in areas with imposed plans. The federal government was remarkably loath to 
impose sanctions. 
Who Gained? 
The intended beneficiaries of the programs in the construction industry 
failed to gain materially from either imposed or hometown plans more than ten years 
after the plans had been developed. (It might be argued, though, that black Americans 
gained symbolically by the appearance of minority labourers on construction sites.) Any 
advance in the interests of unemployed black youth came in the thousands when the 
problem was properly measured in the millions. Over a year in operation, the 
Philadelphia Plan gained 41 jobs for minorities on construction sites while the black 
unemployment rate remained at 12 percent. The hometown plans, numbering over a 
hundred and covering whole states in some instances123 resulted in a little over 3,OOOjob 
placements by 1973 - hardly enough to cheer up the millions of unemployed African-
Americans. In terms of participation in the referral units in building trade unions, there 
was little progress. Between 1970 and 1972 the number of black union members rose by 
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three percent. However, the total proportion of blacks within building trade unions did 
not change. 124 
Far more effective in the construction industry than affIrmative action 
programs was the onset of recession and "stagflation." In May 1971 the New York Times 
reported a "slowdown in housing construction and purchase." The national 
unemployment rate grew to 4.8 percent - the highest in five years - and amongst inner-
city blacks in Philadelphia the rate was over 12 percent. The open shop share of 
construction workers doubled from 20 percent in 1968 to 1975. Union membership - and 
a guarantee of decent wages - was also declining. In 1970 construction workers had been 
among the highest paid workers. By the end of the decade their weekly earnings declined 
by more than 12 percent. By 1974 unemployment among all construction workers had 
skyrocketed to 12.4 percent. Yet the Philadelphia Plan had assumed a vacancy rate of 
seven and a half percent per year! 125 Instead of blacks moving up to participate on an 
equal level with whites in a high-paying industry, the entire industry declined so much 
that the unemployment level within it matched that of inner-city blacks. 126 
However, there is no question that the programs, having been pushed 
successfully by the most senior officials in the Nixon administration when challenged in 
Congress, died of neglect. Beginning in 1970 Nixon began to direct civil rights efforts 
towards the black community outside of the ghettoes. Instead of apparently fruitless 
efforts within the inner-cities, policy would concentrate on the black middle class. Black 
colleges received huge support. Black-owned business received support and contracts to 
an extent never envisaged when Nixon promised to promote black capitalism or even 
when he created the Office of Minority Business Enterprise in March 1969. Such 
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programs as Model Cities designed to help the ghetto were dropped (See Chapter 5). 
Nixon initiatives like the Philadelphia Plan and the hometown solutions - aimed at ghetto 
employment as they were - could not be dropped but could be left to languish after their 
enforcement proved complicated. Though other civil rights initiatives fared reasonably 
well, the Philadelphia Plan and the other hometown solutions effectively disappeared. In 
early 1974, Paul Delaney of the New York Times commented that "(m)inorities, 
especially blacks, had seen one of the Administration's main efforts in civil rights - the 
various plans to put minorities in construction jobs - die for lack of enforcement." I 27 
It would be possible to argue that the most important gains had been made 
by minorities in other industries where, prodded by news of an imposed plan in 
Philadelphia, employers quickly volunteered their own affIrmative action plans. The 
Philadelphia and hometown plans did set a pattern for later, more successfully 
implemented affirmative action programs. They provided a useful bridge between 
voluntary civil rights efforts employed in the 1960s and court-mandated minority hiring 
in the 1970s. Nixon felt that "while legal segregation is totally wrong, forced integration 
of housing or education is just as wrong.,,128 The hometown solutions were voluntary 
agreements entered into by local parties. But even the Philadelphia Plan and order No.4, 
by using economic necessity rather than more awkward and expensive enforcement 
mechanisms, could be seen as voluntary in that contractors voluntarily bid for 
government contracts. Construction workers in effect volunteered to work next to blacks. 
Unions could maintain a lily-white complexion if they no longer wished to work on 
government contracts. This distance from direct coercion engendered in the Philadelphia 
Plan eased the Nixonian and Republican mind, fearful as it was of government 
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compulsion. Forced integration in the workplace, when wages were paid indirectly by the 
federal government, at least gave a veneer of choice. 
In the end, other Nixon administration initiatives, detailed in the next 
chapter, contributed more to the institutionalisation of affirmative action than did the 
Philadelphia Plan. However, it successfully tested this particular method of civil rights 
enforcement in the courts and in Congress. Because of the particular nature of its target _ 
construction projects that were generally very visible and often within the confmes of the 
ghetto - courts backed the goals and targets for minority hiring called for by the 
Philadelphia Plan despite the express outlawing of quotas under Section 703(j) of the 
Civil Rights Act. Though the courts did so in a period when riots still threatened to erupt, 
crises in black employment clearly existed in many industries outside of construction and 
away from the seething cauldrons of the inner cities. Thus the government could extend 
"goals and targets" to other areas with little fear of legal reprisals. Of equal importance, 
the Revised Philadelphia Plan withstood the attacks of Congressional and political foes. 
Southerners and conserVative Republicans lost the argument that the Philadelphia Plan 
and Order No.4 amounted to illegal quotas. 
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Chapter 7 
NIXON'S OTHER "GOOD DEEDS": ADMINISTRATION 
INITIATIVES CONTRIBUTING TO THE INSTITUTIONALISATION 
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
The Philadelphia Plan and the hometown plans may have been, ironically, 
the least successful of affirmative action programs initiated by the Nixon Administration. 
After the Philadelphia Plan's acid test in Congress in 1969 (and even more so after the 
Courts backed it), other programs designed to use the Federal Government's fmancial 
muscle to insist on black representation emerged. Instead of being policed inadequately 
by Federal authorities, these programs succeeded largely by self-policing. They 
contributed, in the end, more to the institutionalisation of affIrmative action than the 
higher-profIle Philadelphia Plan. 
One quiet but important initiative by the Nixon administration in 1969 
involved a move to reinterpret Executive Order 11246, signed by Johnson on September 
23 1965. E011246 required contractors with the Federal Government to agree not to 
discriminate in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin (a 
1967 EO superseding 11246 included women alongside minorities). Part III of the order 
also required recipients of Federal fmancial assistance to require nondiscrimination 
clauses in construction contracts fInanced by Federal assistance. Though the Order had 
specifIed any "applicant for Federal assistance" for whom "any grant, contract, loan, 
insurance, or guarantee" might be given, this language appeared in a section dealing with 
construction contracts and, presumably, referred to areas given grants by the Federal 
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government to finance construction. 1 In the four years since the order was issued the 
order had only been applied only to procurement-type contracts and not to grants, loans, 
guarantees, or other arrangements for Federal fmancial assistance. 2 
Assistant Attorney General Jerris Leonard, head of the Civil Rights 
Division within Justice wrote to Attorney General John Mitchell on February 22 1969 
asking him to write to heads of departments that granted financial assistance. Leonard 
wished to extend the rules on non-discrimination governing federal contractors to all 
recipients of any sort of federal aid - grant and loan recipients rather than simply 
contractors. "(E)xisting statutory authority," according to Leonard, could be used to 
require that "as a condition to receiving the assistance, recipients execute assurances that 
they will not discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed, or national origin against 
their own employees." The assurances would provide "an administrative enforcement 
mechanism by means of which could be enforced on a day-today basis." "State and local 
agencies could be required to make regular reports on the number of minority group 
persons they employ; and the Federal agencies could conduct routine compliance 
reviews." Although Leonard felt that court proceedings were normally the best method of 
enforcement, ''the sanction of cutting off funds from state and local agencies would also 
be available, if needed." The proposal provided "a vehicle by which the Federal 
Government could enforce the existing constitutional obligation.,,3 
On April 14 1969 Mitchell sent the proposal with his recommendation to 
Nixon's urban advisor, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Senior Counsel to the President Arthur 
Bums, and congressional liaison Bryce Harlow, amongst others. Harlow and Bums 
objected to the proposal on the basis of Congressional opposition; Moynihan 
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"wholeheartedly" supported the proposal. Assistant Attorney General (and later, Supreme 
Court Chief Justice) William H. Rehnquist's office inveighed against the proposal. 
Rehnquist's assistant, Richard K. Berg, spotted the importance of extending EO 11246 to 
all recipients of Federal Government money. Though supportive of the proposal as a 
whole, Berg, argued for a strictly constitutional perspective on 11246 on the basis that the 
obligation to take affirmative action "has not, to our knowledge, ever received a precise 
administrative or judicial interpretation, but its inclusion in the passage would certainly 
appear to denote some broadening of the present legal duties of the affected state and 
local agencies." He ended his letter by stating: "It is therefore our recommendation that 
the assurance be phrased simply in terns which express an obligation co-extensive with 
that of the Constitution, and that the requirement for 'afftrmative action' be deleted.',4 
Whether Nixon was directly involved in the fmal decision of whether or not to extend the 
remit of 11246 (or, as Rehnquist's office had requested, to get rid of affIrmative action 
altogether) is unclear from the correspondence. In any case, however, Harlow, Rehnquist 
and Burns lost the argument. The term affirmative action appeared in the letter to heads 
of all departments. 
This subtle reinterpretation of Johnson's executive order by Nixon staff in 
the spring of 1969 represents a substantial broadening of those affected by affIrmative 
action. A background document noted that "the order has historically been applied only 
to procurement-type contracts and not to grants, loans, guarantees, or other arrangements 
for federal assistance" and had "seldom applied" to state and local governments. As the 
document pointed out, though the order required that construction contractors hired by 
government and other bodies that received federal assistance not discriminate, the order 
207 
"does not require that the recipient agency itself not discriminate." Johnson's Attorney 
General Ramsey Clark, in a letter dated June 20 1967, had specifically rejected a similar 
proposal.s 
For the first time since WWII, the concept of contract compliance was 
broadened and set a pattern for future civil rights enforcement that would become much 
more important in terms of black employment and in creation of the apparatus to enforce 
affirmative action "targets" than the Philadelphia Plan or any of the "hometown 
solutions." Included for the first time were at least two sites where some of the highest 
profile affirmative action programs were later implemented. The vast majority of 
universities and colleges - as recipients of federal aid - now came under the remit of 
11246, setting up the arguments and disputes that later erupted on campuses and in the 
pages of academic publications throughout the country and in the Supreme Court in the 
DeFunis and Bakke cases. Local and state governments, employing, at the time, larger 
and larger numbers of people, had been included in the original order but had, 
traditionally, not been targeted. The ease with which the Federal government could use 
economic arm-twisting to pressure higher education authorities and state and local 
government officials stands in contrast to the difficulty it faced against unions and 
construction contractors. 
A second move by the Nixon administration during the first few months of 
office pressured the largest single employer in the country, the Federal Government, to 
take positive steps to employ minorities. On March 28 Nixon stated: "I want to 
emphasise my own official and personal endorsement of a strong policy of equal 
opportunity within the Federal Government. I am determined that the Federal Branch of 
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the Government lead the way as an equal opportunity employer.,,6 On August 8 1969 
Nixon issued Executive Order 11478 to ensure that affirmative action took place within 
government employment. Nixon stressed that more than nondiscrimination would have to 
occur in Federal Government employment: 
No more serious task challenges our nation domestically than the achievement of 
e q u a l i ~ y y of opportunity for all our citizens in every aspect of their lives regardless 
oftherr race, color, religion, national origin or sex .... Discrimination of any kind 
based on factors not relevant to job performance must be eradicated completely 
from Federal employment. In addition, we must, through positive action, make it 
possible for our citizens to compete on a truly equal and fair basis for employment 
and to qualify for advancement within the Federal service.7 
Despite the fact that the language he used conformed to the ant i-
discriminatory language contained in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the shifts within the 
administration were very real. In November of that year, the US Civil Service 
Commission (CSC) reported on these changes that had been implemented after EO 
11478. Full-time Equal Economic Opportunity representatives had been designated in 
each CSC regional office to work directly with agencies on EEO provision. "Federal 
agencies have been directed to develop affirmative action plans in sufficiently specific 
detail to carry out the new directions in equal employment opportunity. Agencies have 
submitted EEO plans; we have reviewed them; and these plans are now being used to 
measure agency performance." The CSC had also developed incentive programs for 
"managers, supervisors and others in achieving EEO" and "directed agencies to include 
in the ratings of supervisors and evaluation of their performance in the area of equal 
employment opportunity so that a measure can be made of their commitment to action in 
this area." Memos indicate that the word 'quota' was used openly in describing the civil 
services' program. Not only did the phrase "sufficiently specific detail" point to "targets 
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and goals," the parallels of this enforcement apparatus bears a very close resemblance to 
the affIrmative action machinery in place within the government and in large corporations 
today. 8 
Revenue Sharing 
One of the problems that prevented the reinterpretation ofE011246 from 
being effective was the complex nature of the distribution of Federal funding. The 
profusion of block grants administered by the Johnson administration made it difficult to 
regulate equal employment within the recipient bodies. The recipient bodies varied in 
their makeup and many were simply unprepared to report accurately on the makeup of 
their workforces or the workforce of any contractor. Giving grants to local elected 
authorities at least eased the difficulties of monitoring and ensured that regulatory 
procedures could become standardised. Revenue sharing was to become part of Nixon's 
attempt, following from campaign promises, to make government more effective. 
Revenue sharing was one of the most consistent aspects of Nixon's (and 
the Republican Party's) domestic platform, part of the ''New Federalism" that Nixon had 
promised to both party and nation before the election.9 During the previous two 
Democratic administrations, and particularly in relation to Great Society policies, 
categorical grants had been given directly to representatives of recipient groups, 
bypassing local elected authorities. These grants were designed to meet some need that 
ostensibly met some national need, such as Federal aid to disadvantaged children. By 
1969 there were at least 500 categorical grants programs as more and more areas of 
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concern appeared, administered by vanous agencIes in varIOUs departments, some 
inevitably overlapping. The problem of categorical grants had been in existence for some 
time and reform of the Federal Grant program had been initiated under Truman and 
Eisenhower. As was the case with so many of Nixon's programs, Johnson had begun to 
move towards reforms but had not implemented his plans by the end of his tenure. 10 
With revenue sharing, Nixon wished to provide funds in the form of block 
grants directly to state and local administrations, bolstering their authority amongst 
recipients, giving them more power and responsibility. The idea Nixon had in mind when 
he proposed the General Revenue Sharing Act of 1969 (ftrst touted in April 1969 11 ) was 
to strengthen the links between individual citizens and their governments, to revitalize 
local and state politics. Nixon held forth on the issue continually throughout 1969: "If 
there is one thing we know, it is that the Federal Government cannot solve all the nation's 
problems by itself; yet there has been an overshift of jurisdiction and responsibility to the 
Federal Government. We must kindle a new partnership between government and people, 
and among the various levels of government. ,,12 Nixon's impetus toward revenue sharing 
and reform of the Federal Grant program was clearly borne of the recognition that the 
reforms of the 1960s had created an impersonal, bureaucratic, dehumanised and 
centralised form of government and that reforms returning power closer to the people had 
to be implemented. More speciftcally it was designed to "alleviate a malaise caused by 
the breakdown of Great Society expectations without overreacting and shutting off aid 
entirely." 13 Another problem it was designed to address was the alienation of the average 
American from local politics; voters barely participated in local elections in the late 
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1960s. It was estimated in 1968, for example, that less than 30 percent of the voter age 
population casts a ballot in separately held city elections. 14 
Nixon, however, struggled with an uncooperative Congress in his efforts 
to enact revenue sharing. He managed to create only two block grants before he resigned 
despite six years of continuous (if not intense) struggle, and both differed substantially 
from what the president initially proposed. IS However, when the Revenue Sharing Act 
was finally signed into law on October 20 1972, the newly created Office of Revenue 
Sharing gained power over all aspects of the program being funded through 
nondiscrimination provisions in the Act. For example, if money was used to buy police 
cars, nondiscrimination provisions of the Revenue Sharing Act then also extended to 
employment practices, police protection services, treatment in jails and other functions of 
the police department. The Act provided for auditing including "possible failure to 
comply substantially with the civil rights provisions of the law." It was the first federal 
agency to include civil rights matters as part of regular audit requirement. I6 
Minority Business Enterprise 
Perhaps the greatest contribution of the Nixon administration to creating a 
quota-based affirmative action paradigm was the Minority Business Enterprise program. 
Fulfilling his promise made during the 1968 election campaign to give blacks "a piece of 
the action," Nixon signed Executive Order 11458 on March 5 1969, creating the Office of 
Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE). Again, the blueprints for minority business 
schemes had been drawn but never developed under Johnson, who developed "Project 
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Own" within the Small Business Administration (SBA) in August 1968 to increase loans 
to black businesses. Johnson had instead emphasised that loans went to help the poor of 
whatever race in the slums. 17 Nixon publicised the signing of the Executive Order widely. 
He signalled the direction in which he wished the new agency to progress: 
This is not a substitute for the many other efforts that continue to be needed if we 
are to make headway against the ravages of poverty. It is a supplement, dealing 
with a special but vital part of the broader effort to bring the members of our 
minority groups into full participation in the American society and economy. 
What we are doing is recognizing that in addition to the basic problems of poverty 
itself, there is an additional need to stimulate those enterprises that can give 
members of minority groups confidence that avenues of opportunity are neither 
closed nor limited; enterprises that will demonstrate that blacks, Mexican-
Americans and others can participate in a growing economy on the basis of equal 
opportunity at the top of the ladder as well as on its lower rungs. IS 
The new OMBE had no program budget and no authority. The OMBE 
functioned in a "leadership and catalytic role;" its remit was to co-ordinate the efforts of 
116 existing programs in 21 different federal agencies. It had 10 employees and a total 
budget of $46,000 in 1969:9 The SBA, created by the Small Business Act of 1953, began 
a procurement program called 8(a) after the establishment of the OMBE that provided 
"for the reservation of a certain proportion of government contract business to minority 
frrms.,,20 The OEO made grants under Title ID of the Economic Opportunity Act to 
provide advice, counsel and technical assistance for present and future minority 
entrepreneurs in special impact areas. The EDA (Employment Development Agency) 
operated in "depressed areas," making business loans where the SBA cut off at $350,000 
and providing technical assistance for entrepreneurs. 
Few took the idea very seriously when Nixon first touted the idea 
(including Nixon himself). The Russell Sage Foundation put up money for a conference 
of scholars on Black capitalism. However, as conservative intellectual Irving Kristol 
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indicated to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, many intellectuals had already discarded the idea 
as hopeless. Kristol said that "[0 ]ver these past months, I have concluded that it 
[economic regeneration of the ghetto through themes such as black capitalism] has only a 
little substance, of a not terribly interesting variety, and I therefore lost interest in the 
conference." There is no record of the conference ever occurring. 21 Privately, Nixon held 
out little hope for minority enterprises. Writing notes just five days after signing EO 
11458 in the margin of a news report concerning the failure of the Watts Manufacturing 
Company, Nixon delivered a message to Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans, whom he 
had asked to manage the new agency: 
To Stans 
This shows the enormous problems in our minority enterprise program 
1. Any small business has a 75% chance of failing 
2. Minority small business has a 90% chance of failing 
good luck!22 
After boasting at the start of the program that ""hundreds of companies" 
would make millions of dollars available to minorities, only nine companies, even by the 
summer of 1970, had kept to their commitment of $150 thousand each with two-to-one 
federal matching money and not all of that nine had granted loans after a year of the 
program. 23 In June of 1969, Phillip Pruitt, head of the Small Business Administration's 
(SBA) minority entrepreneurial program, an important creation of the OMBE, resigned 
with a blast at the administration for failing to give adequate financial support for the 
high-profile black business program. By the end of the summer Frank Hoy wrote in the 
Washington Post that "It has now become apparent that the practical problems were 
fundamentally underestimated." A severe critic of "black capitalism" was Andrew 
Brimmer, the only black member of the Federal Reserve Board and whom Nixon claimed 
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had backed the idea during the campaign. Hoy noted that "(n)ot one non-govermental 
witness, from Roy Innis, chairman of CORE, to the American Bankers Association 
commended the Administration.,,24 Developments during the fIrst year of the OMBE's 
existence did not augur well, to say the least.25 
But the OMBE retained a political importance for Nixon because of its 
ideological acceptability to conservatives such as Texas Republican Senator John Tower 
as well as because of Nixon's high profIle promise to give blacks "a piece of the action" 
through "black capitalism." It simultaneously met the liberal demand to "do something" 
about the ghettoes and the conservative proposition that capitalism was the solution to the 
problems of the ghettoes. The OMBE's historical signifIcance was as a stream that would 
feed into the quota-based affIrmative action paradigm. Though, at this stage, the OMBE 
meant little programmatically, it prefIgured the "set-asides" that would later be castigated 
by opponents of affirmative action. Still at the "experimental" stage in 1969, it increased 
its total worth of minority contracts from $8.9m in 1968 to only $10Am by the middle of 
1969. Although Congress appropriated $36m for SBA loans, Nixon froze the funds, 
forcing the SBA to rely on bank loans at 12 percent interest. However, during fiscal year 
1969, the SBA's loans to minority groups had nearly tripled - from 1676 contracts worth 
$29.9m to 4120 worth $93.6m.26 The OMBE that Nixon had privately mocked grew into 
a huge and important program. OMBE's operational budget skyrocketed from a pathetic 
$46,000 in 1969 to $52.5m in FY1974.27 By May 1971 422 new contracts had been 
added worth $35.2m. By the end of that year, there were 811 contracts worth $65Am; in 
fmancial year 1972 a total of 1714 contracts were worth $149Am. Lending to minority 
enterprises under the program increased from $28m in 1968 to $217m in 1971. In 1975 
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the Small Business Administration gave loans and guarantees to minority enterprises 
totalling $651m.28 Despite Nixon's early reservations, the agency became an important 
part of civil rights efforts not only of his administration but for subsequent 
administrations up to the present day. In Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980), the Supreme Court 
backed a congressional program that set aside 10 percent of federal construction contracts 
to fIrms owned by minorities. The presiding judge noted that Congress, "for the fITst time 
in the Nation's history has created a broad legislative classifIcation for entitlement to 
benefits based solely on racial characterisitics.,,29 Such was the legacy of this program. 
From the beginning, the administration admitted that quotas would be 
established for the OMBE. At a meeting that was probably held in September 1969 (the 
document has no date but was found amongst documents dated September 1969), John 
Ehrlichman recorded a meeting about the SBA. Besides noting that a "new attitude" was 
necessary (For those administrating? For the administration itself?), Ehrlichman noted in 
a matter-of-fact style that "Quotas estab. ,,30 In fact, this program - not the Philadelphia 
Plan, the hometown plans or Order No.4 - crystallised the legal, philosophical and 
ethical concerns of administration officials over the efficacy of the racial basis of OM BE 
award programs. An undated document (from its location, it appears to have been written 
in mid-1970) entitled "Rationale for Delivery System & Federal Restructuring" listed 
under a heading, "The Problem:" "The Constitutional question - present eligibility under 
the OMBE focus is determined on the basis of race. According to several constitutional 
lawyers this raises serious 14th Amendment questions." The document also noted that 
''the emphasis on race in the minority enterprise program has a polarizing effect and 
hi ,,31 S· ·1 I T contributes to the alienation of ethnic and blue-collar w tes. mll ar y, a reasury 
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Department memo to Leonard Garment, special consultant to the President, dated 
December 15 1970, indicated concern that it was "exceedingly difficult to concentrate 
economic benefits on economic activity selected only by the racial characteristics of the 
would-be entrepreneurs." A memo from "Procurement and Size Standards" in the SBA in 
1969 to Terrence Scanlon, a program officer in the O"MBE, indicated a working 
definition for the term "minority" in its 8( a) program but confusingly added that, in fact, 
8(a) was open to those of any race. 32 Administration official Peter M. Flanigan also 
argued over who constituted a "minority" for the purpose of the O"MBE: "It's one thing to 
help the Blacks who are admittedly underprivileged. Its quite another thing to suggest 
that simply because someone has an ethnic background (like me) he deserves special 
attention for job placement." (There is no indication, however, that "Irishness" was 
included as a minority for the purposes of the O"MBE!) Though the Philadelphia Plan 
existed at this time, no one in the administration debated these points in relation to it. 
These early programs were certainly the rehearsal for the "quota" issue that would arise 
later. 
Nixon had promised in campaign speeches that "there is no significant 
area where additional civil rights legislation is needed. ,,33 He told Americans that the 
Republicans were "the party not of empty promises, but of performance. ,,34 He set out to 
make existing civil rights legislation more effective by implementing programs that 
would work. The Philadelphia Plan, despite its high profile, did not work but these other 
programs initiated more quietly, did. They constituted what Hugh Davis Graham called 
"rulemaking to bind recipients of federal dollars.,,35 All of these programs contributed to 
the affirmative action paradigm. Whether or not Nixon himself was involved in creating 
217 
these programs or in the decisionmaking process surrounding them _ apart from the 
Philadelphia Plan - is unclear from the evidence. But it is entirely clear that Nixon 
directed policy away from attempting to reform the ghettoes and towards creating 
stability within the black middle class, the subject of the next chapter. 
1 See Appendix II. 
2 ~ e e Republican document boasted that the Republican Party "put teeth in to Executive Order 1 1246 _ 
WhICh sat four years without significant action after it was issued in 1965." While there is no date on the 
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Chapter 8 
CHANGE IN POLICY IN 1970 
In 1970 Nixon agonised over decisions about the Vietnam War. Most 
available archives indicate his preoccupation with it and its repercussions in Congress 
and throughout the American population. It is possible, in the morass of war-related 
material, to miss one of the most important changes for race relations policy this century.l 
At this stage, the confusion and profusion of policies, though not stopping by any means, 
gave way to a clearer picture of the civil rights strategy of the Nixon administration. 
Many Nixon scholars and civil rights historians agree with Dan Carter that "(t)he year 
1970 marked a critical turning point for the Nixon administration.,,2 Most of those 
arguing that Nixon was led in domestic policy by overriding political concerns see a 
rightward shift when his more conservative advisers within the administration appeared 
to win out. Nixon speechwriter William Safrre and John Skrentny, among others, have 
suggested that the hardhat march against the peace campaigners in New York in May 
1970 turned the Nixon administration against early liberal civil rights "blunders," among 
which they number the Philadelphia Plan.3 Most agree Nixon clearly wished to capitalise 
on the sentiments of the "silent majority" that he assumed the hardhats represented. He 
also feared George Wallace's ability to capitalise on these sentiments. But questions 
remain about why Nixon continue to pour money into some civil rights strategies while 
abandoning others. Clearly, the decisions made at this time indicate more than a move to 
the right - a more accurate characterisation of the shift might be a focusing of policies 
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devised to aid black Americans, signalling an abandonment of the ghettos in favour of 
creating a stable black middle class. 
Of the highest import in the factors leading to the shift was the fact that the 
turmoil of the late 1960s appeared to be under control. "For whatever reasons - increased 
legal, extralegal, and illegal surveillance; the end of the draft; the exhaustion of radical 
cadres - incidents of New Left and campus violence decreased dramatically after 1970.',4 
Events such as the ''New Mobe" had passed off peacefully, 1969 had been riot-free. 
Nixon's fIrst priority upon taking office had been to "lower our voices," to calm what 
nearly everyone imagined to be an inflamed situation. After a year in office, Nixon took 
stock of his civil rights efforts. He had done ''well where least expected" and "poorly 
where [he] should have succeeded" commented journalist Joseph C. Harsch in the 
Christian Science Monitor at the end of 1969. "Administration spokesmen see as their 
greatest success a general lowering of political temperatures on the domestic scene. And 
they are correct. Why, is a bit of a mystery. Certainly, the administration has not catered 
to the disgruntled. Its public posture is sternly unsympathetic to rebellious students, and 
militant Negroes. Yet ghetto streets and college campuses have been less disturbed than 
in previous years.,,5 Nixon's advisers agreed, even the "libs" in the camp. Moynihan 
wrote in 1970 that "(s)uddenly the riots ended. Again, no one knows why. But the 
demands for ever-increasing municipal services did not end with them. To this moment 
the typical justification advanced for any new urban program is that it will reduce the 
likelihood of future urban violence, while the principal argument against any decrease in 
existing programs is that it will automatically trigger such violence." Moynihan noted 
that the problems had changed, indicating that unemployment in the bigger cities was 
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becoming the primary issue: "As crises go this one is not as dramatic in its onset as the 
rioting, but it is likely to last longer and have considerably more political impact. ,,6 In 
another 1970 memo, Moynihan advised his president to take credit for the end of the 
riots: "As you are blamed when it rains (or, in this case, will be if it starts to rain again). 
you might as well take credit when the sun shines.,,7 
Second, Nixon had fulfilled many of his campaign promises regarding 
civil rights but continued to fail to placate racial liberals and civil rights organisations. 
His administration had supported the 1968 Civil Rights Act by bringing suit, in July 
1969, against an association of real estate brokers and 13 of its suburban Chicago 
members, charging racial discrimination in the sale of housing. Efforts at desegregating 
Southern schools could be called moderately successful, despite the ensuing controversy, 
and Nixon might have been encouraged by his softer approach to the issue. The 18.4 
percent of black pupils attending majority white schools in the 11 Southern states in 1968 
had risen to 38 percent in 1970.8 He had very publicly issued executive order 11458 
establishing the Office of Minority Business Enterprise on March 5 1969. With the 
Philadelphia Plan, Nixon had proved that he would put himself on the line for a civil 
rights measure. Yet none of these actions - referred to by administration members as 
"zigs" to counter conservative "zags" - seemed to please his liberal critics or to "blunt 
the vigor of their resentment and political opposition" as Nixon put it. 9 He had, in regard 
to the Philadelphia Plan, "gained little on the play." A disgusted Nixon exclaimed in the 
summer of 1970 that "(T)he NAACP would say my rhetoric was poor if I gave the 
Sermon on the Mount."}O 
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Third, the threat from the left, in the form of instability and rebellion, was 
on the wane, the threat from the right appeared to be waxing. Nixon now worried that to 
continue the programs of the Johnson administration might weaken his fragile electoral 
base. In 1970, George Wallace appeared to be more of a threat than did any Democratic 
candidate - Nixon secretly poured $400,000 (from his reelection campaign kitty collected 
and hoarded before the Campaign Reform Act of 1970) into the campaign to elect 
Wallace's rival in the gubernatorial race for Alabama, Albert Brewer, in an effort to 
derail Wallace's 1972 campaign for the Presidency. 11 The "sweet and reasonable middle" 
that Nixon had attempted to fmd in 1969 appeared to be disappearing fast. 
Finally, evidence indicated, as Nixon had openly suspected, that many of 
the policies put in place by the Johnson administration designed to reform the ghettoes 
were ineffective. One of the major problems was the apparent unenforceability of policies 
aimed at gaining compliance for these efforts. Nixon inherited the Johnson strategy to 
achieve black equality by ensuring that education facilities were equal, by attempting to 
integrate the suburbs and to create bases for political participation through the 
Community Action Programs (CAPs) as well as, through EEOC, and by pushing for 
black employment gains. By 1970, all programs devoted to achieving these ends 
languished for want of effective enforcement mechanisms. Though there were modest 
gains in southern school desegregation, it was found in northern school desegregation 
cases that private sector actions in real estate and home lending led to residential 
segregation that made school integration impossible. Busing between school districts 
became the favoured remedy of the courts but - quite apart from Nixon's reservations -
created a very messy and costly solution. Additionally, it ran up against concerted 
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opposition from white (and some black) parents that, for racial motives or o t h e r w i s e ~ ~
objected to busing their children to different areas or having black children bussed to 
local schools. Nixon also thought that efforts to desegregate the suburbs would fail. "It is 
important to break down barriers," Nixon told a reporter in 1967, "but the fellow who 
spends all his time talking about open housing is pursuing a will-o'-the-wisp. I know 
that's the exciting way to do things. Marching feet. Protests.,,12 After taking office, Nixon 
felt vindicated in his earlier position. Between January 1 1969, the date the 1968 Open 
Housing Act became effective, and July 1970, the Housing Section of the Justice 
Department - despite its reputation as an activist agency (Nixon frequently complained 
that it was "against us. ,,13), filed only about 50 cases though it received thousands of 
complaints. By the middle of 1970, ffiJD had not yet issued regulations spelling out how 
the Act should be enforced. 14 
The efforts at strengthening black communities through CAPs and other 
experimental projects in the ghettoes had also failed. As soon as capable leaders emerged, 
they would make it their first priority to get out of the ghetto, quite naturally. Of equal (if 
not more) concern to Nixon was the fact that ghetto leaders tended to be those most vocal 
in their opposition to ''the system.,,15 Neither, as has been discussed in Chapter 4, could 
EEOC be counted as a success. It is, of course, possible to argue that the Nixon 
administration simply did not make adequate efforts to insure that many of these 
programs would work. But it is undeniable that serious problems faced those who would 
have implemented these programs. Whereas courts could order large corporations or state 
and local authorities to change their ways with "pattern or practice" suits, it would be 
impossible prove cases against individuals. What would be the penalties? Who would pay 
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for the resolution of the matter? Who specifically was responsible? The more ingrained 
within American life the problem of racial divisions appeared to be, the more difficult it 
became for the courts or the federal government to enforce remedies. At the same time 
the pressure for the administration to do something about the problem of civil rights, 
especially from powerful liberal interests, was, if anything, increasing. Evidence of these 
failures poured in during Nixon's fust year of office, signifying a crisis of enforcement of 
civil rights legislation. Yet Nixon had promised to enforce civil rights legislation, stating 
in his 1968 campaign that no new legislation was needed, only the will to make it work. 
Nixon made it clear that he would "cut and run" rather than invest more time, effort and 
money into making these failing programs work. 
Helping the strong instead of the weak 
Nixon's answer in the face of these problems - following one of the most 
important and consistent themes of his presidency - was to further rationalise policy. 
Instead of policies that aimed at impossible goals, policy would be concentrated on 
making successes of more limited actions. Instead of concentrating efforts on either 
destroying or renovating the ghettoes, policy would concentrate on aiding a black middle 
class, not to integrate them into the American mainstream, but to take their place with 
Americans of other races and ethnicities. Nixon insisted that Black Americans could 
remain separate in terms of housing, schooling (at least in a de facto sense) and even 
socially but must have the right to earn. Black Americans would no longer be treated as a 
bloc. Democratic programs that attempted to create equal opportunities by promising 
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universal benefits, such as Model Cities, housing funds, emergency public-service jobs 
for the unemployed and community action programs, would be de-emphasised favour of 
programs that were tailored to specific groups. Ethnic groups and the "silent majority," a 
phrase Nixon popularised in a speech in November 1969, would become more prominent. 
The crisis that seemed to immediately provoke Nixon's rethink on civil 
rights occurred in February 1970 over the school desegregation issue and, especially, 
because of the departure of Leon Panetta. Nixon ruminated over the problems of race 
relations. He spent most of the afternoon of February 18 talking to Harriet Elan, "[White 
House aide Dwight] Chapin's Negro secretary," in order to gain the opinions of a 
"responsible, intelligent Negro." Haldeman recorded in his diary on February 28 th that 
"Obviously, P deeply concerned. Later kept saying to me there's no adequate solution 
and nothing we can do in the short haul to settle this, it will have to take one hundred 
years, but people don't want to wait." 16 In the face of repeated failures to alleviate the 
conditions of the ghettoes (and, perhaps, because ghetto rioting was less of a threat than it 
had been last year) Nixon had attended a meeting with a "black group" that Moynihan 
had organised. 17 Notes taken by Haldeman (declassified in 1996) indicate the conclusions 
Nixon was coming to: 
Shift of policy of helping and backing the strong - instead of putting all effort into 
raising the weak 
Recognize there is no "black community" ... 
how to give the black middle class cultural legitimacy 
blacks - as things get better - feel small slights more ... 
we should discourage the people who live on agitation 
esp. those on Federal payroll 
create a disincentive for agitation 
build incentives for the strong + positive 
give the fellowships to them instead 
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don't really know how to help the weak 
+ and even if we did - the proportionate cost is so great ... 
devise p ~ o g r a m s s to make sure that for those who have made progress, that 
progress IS permanent ... 
d?n't aim manpower programs at unemployed black male teenager ... 
dIrected to street-comer society won't work ... 18 
Nixon outlined here a subtle yet significant switch in emphasis for the 
administration towards racial programs, well before the hardhats marched. The clear 
message coming from this meeting was: Efforts within the inner city are likely to fail and 
the focus should now be on creating a stable and strong black middle-class. 
Coming so soon after Moynihan's "benign neglect" memo to the President 
of January 16 1970, many historians as well as contemporary observers concluded that 
Nixon's shift in 1970 was no less than a counsel to ignore black concerns. 19 Leaked to the 
New York Times, shortly after it was written, the memo caused Moynihan to offer to 
resign, given the furore attending its publication (his offer was refused by Nixon). 
Moynihan wrote that: 
The time may come when the issue of race could benefit from a period of "benign 
neglect." The subject has been too much talked about. The forum has been to 
much taken over to hysterics, paranoids, and boodlers on all sides. We may need a 
period in which Negro progress continues and racial rhetoic fades The 
administration can help bring this about by paying close attention to such progress 
- as we are doing - while seeking to avoid situations in which extremists of either 
race are given opportunities for martyrdom, hero ics, histrionics or whatever. 
Greater attention to Indians, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans would be 
helpful. 20 
Nixon scribbled beside this passage, "I agree." First, however, the point 
must be made that the memo clearly referred to the issue of race and not to African-
Americans. The message here, rather than neglect per se, was that racial rhetoric should 
be toned down. Secondly, other parts of the memo indicate that Nixon used Moynihan's 
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memos as catalysts for his own thinking rather than direct sources of his ideas. In another 
section, Moynihan declared: 
T h ~ r e e i ~ ~ a silent. black majority [Nixon circled "majority" and wrote "minoriti" 
b e s ~ ~ e e It]... It IS mostly working class, as against lower middle class. It is 
pohttcally moderate (on issues other than racial equality) and shares most of the 
concerns of its white c o ~ t e r p a r t . . This group has been generally ignored by the 
government, and the media. The more recognition we can give to it, the better off 
we shall be. 
Taken altogether, Nixon thinking on race appears to been stimulated by 
this memo but not exactly along the lines set out by Moynihan. Nixon wrote in the 
margins beside Moynihan's point, "H- follow up (Graham's groups and Browns [?] -
Negro business men - bankers - Elks, etc. Let's poll this + go after the probably 30 % 
who are potentially on our side - Garment et al- are directing our appeal to the wrong 
group (both in case of Negroes and whites)." In other words, Nixon ignored Moynihan's 
''working class" category. He did not decide to neglect blacks. Instead, he sought to stop 
the issue of race from being used as a sledgehammer against his administration. By 
dividing up black Americans and concentrating on middle-class blacks ("recognize there 
is no black community") he could accomplish this goal by achieving some progress for at 
least some black Americans.21 
With regard to civil rights, the theme outlined in his statements to the 
"black group" came up again and again. In a meeting in June consisting of Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman, and rising star Charles Colson (with other nameless individuals possibly 
present), Nixon instructed them to pay attention to the black middle-class: "There are 35 
percent of blacks we can do good with," Nixon told Haldeman. Nixon instructed him to 
"fmd $100 mill[ion] for black colleges" which were ''vitally imp[or]t[ant] to have ... so 
blacks dev[ elop] capacity to run something... whenever integrated - whites will 
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dominate." From this statement, it becomes evident that this switch in policy direction 
happened for more than just political reasons. Had Nixon wished only to attract votes, he 
certainly would not have requested $100m for black colleges. As Moynihan had pointed 
out in his January 16 memo (and as Nixon agreed), young educated blacks detested white 
America and this group could hardly be mined for Republican votes.22 The administration 
must, Nixon continued, "encourage the good blacks, fmd some honest Mexicans - have to 
develop some 'leadership. ",23 He worried that the 1964 Civil Rights Act clearly called for 
efforts to be taken to achieve racial equality but "we recognize clearly that the methods 
chosen to carry out the law have all failed.,,24 
The political Nixon certainly took Moynihan's advice to neglect blacks 
seriously. By July 1970 Nixon instructed his staff to switch priorities in domestic 
priorities: 
We have, for the last year and one-half, overloaded schedule activity to Blacks, 
youth and Jews. From here on, until further notice, there are to be no Jewish 
appointments set up per se. There are to be just enough Blacks to show we care ... 
The concentration is now to be on Italians, Poles, Mexicans, Rotarians, Elks, 
Middle Americans, Silent Americans, Catholics, etc.25 
A year later, Nixon had distilled the essential message of his instructions 
when he instructed White House aide Charles Colson: 
Blacks 
Youth } forgee6 
Nixon explained to the then-up-and-coming staff member Colson at a staff 
meeting in July 1970 that the administration "won't do Watts thing." An overly solicitous 
approach to blacks, Nixon said, "doesn't win Negroes, could alienate whites. Look at 
Wallace strength in Gallup [poll?]" He told Colson that the administration must "play 
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more to labor." Colson, who was the administration liaison between the White House and 
organised labor, readily agreed.27 
Many of the programs launched with the purpose of aiding black 
Americans languished. The Philadelphia Plan received little mention within the 
administration after Nixon's success in ensuring congressional attempts to disallow it 
failed, as discussed previously?8 Nixon had set forth the Family Assistance Plan (F A P ) ~ ~
an initiative by Moynihan, on August 8 1969, a radical overhaul of the welfare state 
which would have guaranteed an income to all American families. However, the plan, 
with its attention to alleviating ghetto problems (Nixon told Haldeman in the same month 
that "you have to face the fact that the Whole problem [of welfare] is really the blacks.29) 
and grand universalist designs, fell out of favour with Nixon in 1970. Even after the 
House of Representatives approved the Plan by almost two-to-one on April 16 1970, 
Nixon instructed Haldeman to make sure the effort failed. 30 
The Civil Rights Act of 1968 that outlawed discrimination in housing also 
appears to have been put on hold. A row broke out between the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD), with Secretary George Romney at the helm, and Justice 
over the Blackjack case. To exclude a low- and middle-income-integrated housing 
project, Blackjack, Missouri, changed its zoning laws. In response, Romney then asked 
the Justice Department to file suit, a move supported by the Federal Court of Appeals 
ruling that HUD had an affirmative action responsibility to consider what impact site 
selection would have on integration. In September 1970, Mitchell called Romney to the 
White House and told him to back off. "The White House decided to study discrimination 
in housing, putting all policy decisions on hold until the study was completed. For nearly 
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a year, the civil rights laws regarding housing were suspended, though hundreds of grants 
were approved in the interim. ,,31 
However, not all black Americans were neglected, lending weight to the 
theory that Nixon's ultra-political concern with most issues did not extend to civil rights 
decisions. Despite continued and even increased hostility from civil rights groups, the 
Nixon administration steadily increased funding for civil rights programs. Outlays for 
civil rights enforcement increased as did outlays for civil rights programs generally. In 
Financial Year (FY) 1968, $64m was earmarked for civil rights programs. In 1969, 
funding went up to $75m, in 1970, $94m, 1971 $114m, and in 1972 the figure rose to 
$141 m. Outlays for Title VI compliance, a problem over which the civil rights movement 
had attacked Johnson, increased between 1969 and 1972 from $7.5m to more than 
$18.6m.32 
The beneficiary of this shift in course in 1970 was the black middle class. 
And, unlike the Philadelphia and hometown solutions, the administration could point to 
some fairly short-term successes. They boasted in 1973 that the total income of blacks 
rose from $38.7 billion in 1969 to $51.1 billion in 1972. State and local government 
employment has increased steadily - from 6.3m employees in 1960 to 12m in 1975.33 
They could have also pointed to an increase in black and minority employment in full-
time state and local government, which, between 1973 and 1974 (after the passage of the 
Revenue Sharing Act of 1972), increased by 12 percent against a total gain in state and 
local government employment of nearly five percent. 34 Minority enrolment for master's 
and doctoral degrees increased from 7.7 percent in 1970 to 9.1 percent in 1972. The 
authors of a study critical of voluntaristic efforts to implement affirmative action 
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programs, had to admit the success of the Nixon administration's pressurising tactics 
upon minority college enrolment: "(I)t is clear that between 1968 and 1978 these 
voluntary affirmative action programs did bring thousands of black, Chicano, Native 
American, and Asian students into universities who otherwise would not have been 
there. ,,35 The strategies to build up the black middle classes had worked in a way that 
attempts to alleviate ghetto conditions had not. 
Busing 
Many Nixon scholars have expressed surprise that Nixon could strongly 
support the Philadelphia Plan even as he came out against busing to achieve racial 
balance. Here Nixon's position, despite his lack of any sort of corresponding action, was 
against court-ordered busing from the beginning. At fIrst glance, the two positions appear 
to be opposite: affirmative action in employment sought to racially balance workforces 
and busing sought to racially balance student populations. Safrre even has Nixon saying 
in early 1970, while he steered a course between the views of his conservative and liberal 
advisers, that, after Brown: "The subsequent decisions about quotas and racial balance are 
wrong - you'll delight the racists when you say that, but so what, it's true.,,36 However, 
thematic links exist that connect a position in favour of racially balancing workforces and 
against racially balancing schools. Both positions are consistent with a belief that the 
limits to America's ability to integrate black Americans within the rest of the population 
had been reached. 
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The weaknesses of a strategy for creating racial equality through education 
were suggested in the Coleman Report (see Chapter 3). A key point in this study, not 
missed by Moynihan, was that black scores in SATs in the fIrst grade were far lower than 
whites'. Negro median test scores were 43.4 for nonverbal and 45.4 for verbal skills. 
"Majority" scores were 54.1 and 53.2 respectively. Though this difference had grown by 
12th grade, the implication that racial inequality developed before children attended 
school. The report concluded that: "For most minority groups, then and most particularly 
the Negro, schools provide no opportunity at all for them to overcome this initial 
deficiency; in fact they fall farther behind the white majority in the development of 
several skills which are critical to making a living and participating fully in modern 
society. ,,37 In other words, the psychological badge of prejudice, the social scientific 
underpinning of Brown, was not as significant as thought in the past. As a researcher who 
contributed to the Coleman data remembered, "One of the central sociological hypotheses 
in the integration policy model is that integration should reduce racial stereotypes, 
increase tolerance, and generally improve race relations. Needless to say, we were quite 
surprised when our data failed to verify this axiom.,,38 
It is unclear whether Nixon saw the report or knew of its [mdings before 
he took office. Once in office, Moynihan mentioned the results of the report in at least 
three memos.39 A large part of Nixon's public antipathy towards busing can certainly be 
understood as political grandstanding and, perhaps, as a manifestation of his hatred of 
liberals who favoured busing, The divisiveness of the issue at the time is remarkable. The 
National Black Political Convention held in Gary Indiana on March 12 1972 condemned 
busing to achieve desegregation as "racist, suicidal, methods" based on the "false notion 
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that black children are unable to learn unless they are in the same setting as white 
children." CORE's Roy Innis, who supported the resolution, was opposed by the 
NAACP. AFL-CIO President George Meany and the Philadelphia Urban Coalition, on 
opposite sides of the Philadelphia Plan controversy, both attacked Nixon for his anti-
busing position.4o Nixon supported a moratorium on busing after considering and then 
backing away from a constitutional amendment in opposition to the Courts' generally 
supportive decisions on busing. His reasons, as he told staff, were entirely political; he 
had not approved of it as a method of rolling back busing orders but as a means of 
pressurising the Democratic Party. Elsewhere, Nixon considered purposefully losing a 
vote for a busing moratorium in July 1972 in an effort to avoid the difficulties involved in 
the issue. In response to a memorandum telling the President that the White House did 
not have the votes necessary to take any of the pending constitutional amendments to the 
House floor but had the possibility of securing a moratorium, Nixon scrawled: "E -
Maybe it is best not to get this. Then we will have the issue. ,,41 
However, even if Nixon had paid scant attention to Moynihan's memos, he 
instinctively agreed that efforts to integrate children had failed and were likely to fail. He 
had consistently held these views even before the report was issued. In 1967, Nixon 
stated: "It is a mistake to think that the problem in education is going to be met by 
busing. I am convinced that the damage there would far outweigh the benefits, and 
besides, most of the problems would remain.,,42 Ehrlichman said of his boss that "(h)e 
was against busing because he didn't believe black children would gain anything in the 
process and certainly the white kids would be disadvantaged by it.,,43 Thus, Nixon felt 
sure that integration of schools was pointless and potentially harmfuL During the early 
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part of his tenure, he steered away from confrontation with the courts to avoid a 
constitutional crisis but, as the weight of public opinion moved against busing, Nixon 
became more forthright in his opposition to it. "Forced busing is wrong," he told Safrre 
with some feeling early in 1972, "and 1 don't care if it does sound like demagoguery - I 
want to say so loud and clear. The courts don't believe the folks." Nixon finished the 
conversation by saying emphatically, "I happen to believe this.,,44 
The stress on education reflected - in part - the hope that children 
educated in multiracial schools might overcome some of the damaging racial separation 
as adults. Black students might become equal by attending better schools; white students 
might learn tolerance and understanding. The hope of eventual integration of American 
society is implicit within busing. Affrrmative action had, in Nixon's eyes, the more 
modest goal of ensuring that black Americans could earn a living. Affrrmative action 
could be divorced from the overall goal of socially engineering an integrated A m e r i c a ~ ~
busing could not. Those who would have called themselves liberals in 1969 or 1970 
would have championed busing for this very purpose. Nixon quietly supported the 
affirmative action measures and noisily opposed busing to distance himself from the 
immense expectations of the Great Society while dealing with the race problem as he 
found it. Employment quotas could be used as part of "federally managed race relations" 
without any attempt to socially engineer change. An individual like Nixon could harbour 
doubts about the capabilities of blacks and support quotas in employment as a means of 
creating racial peace. 
At least some of the importance of affirmative action programs lay in their 
ease of operation. They gave a coherent direction to policy throughout every level of 
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government and provided links between the White House and a liberal bureaucracy often 
at odds with its political overlords. Skrentny makes this observation in a recent article: 
" ... whereas judges have often ordered specific firms or public institutions to enforce 
racial hiring goals as compensation for past discrimination, and some civil rights groups 
may have made compensation arguments, many of the original justifications for 
affirmative action were guided by bureaucratic pragmatism. ,,45 A crisis existed in a 
bureaucracy that had largely incorporated the mission of the Johnson administration's 
Great Society but had not successfully implemented many of its programs. Richard 
Nathan, an official for domestic policy in the Nixon administration for nearly four years, 
stated that the "relationship between the President and the bureaucracy is the key to 
understanding domestic affairs under President Nixon. ,,46 By the middle of 1970, the 
relationship between the Nixon administration and the bureaucracy appears to be the key 
reason for the proliferation of affirmative action. 
A policy vacuum occurred, more or less, when Johnson's "Great Society" 
was being abandoned. It affected those who wished to distance themselves from the 
Kennedy/Johnson administrations more than those who continued to believe in Great 
Society goals. The Nixon administration, as discussed in earlier chapters, struggled upon 
taking office to fmd any real domestic policy direction. In 1969 much of domestic policy 
simply continued the programs of the previous administration. The overall goal was, at 
that stage, simply stability. However, more thoughtful members of the administration -
Nixon included - worried that some more overarching goal that would determine the 
direction of domestic policy should be arrived at. In particular, Pat Moynihan mentioned 
the problem on many occasions. In The Public Interest magazine in 1969, Moynihan 
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published an article entitled "Toward a National Urban Policy" that was widely circulated 
amongst the Nixon staff. Nixon himself marked a copy that was kept on file. The theme 
of the article was that an overall policy instead of a collection of aimless programs, was 
needed. In it Moynihan notes that between 1960 and 1968 the number of government 
domestic programs rose from 45 to 435.47 
Nixon's response, especially after setbacks experienced with his Supreme 
Court nominations and the response to the F AP, was to blame the intransigence of the 
bureaucrats for his frustrations. Nixon was constantly at odds with many of those that 
ostensibly worked for him and had great trouble cutting back programs he had targeted. 
As Melvin Small comments, "Nixon faced an iron triangle of bureaucrats, lobbyists, and 
members of Congress who together could either alter or sabotage programs ... Of most 
concern was the permanent bureaucracy, many of whom were liberals or Democrats. ,,48 
In the summer of 1971, Nixon complained, "We've checked and found that 96 percent of 
the bureaucracy are against us; they're bastards who are here to screw us. ,,49 Later that 
year, Nixon responded to a news item concerning a column that called the bureaucracy 
"the strongest political force in the nation and the most serious threat to freedom." Nixon 
noted to Haldeman that although a public refutation was necessary, "there was a lot of 
truth in the Editorial. ,,50 
He sent out feelers to staff, asking for their ideas on what the 
administration domestic policy was and what future domestic policy might entail. On 
July 21 1969 Nixon took one of his many philosophical turns in a meeting with his aides. 
Amidst prognostications like "Power of US must be used more effectively at home and 
abroad in the next four years or US goes down the drain as great power," Nixon told his 
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staff that the basic approach to domestic policy should be that anything old was wrong. 51 
Of course, this was no substitute for an actual policy direction and Nixon knew it. During 
the same month, Nixon announced the creation of a National Goals Research Staff that 
would "study and report on emerging trends in demography, education, economic 
growth, environment, technology assessment, and the use of social indicators to identify 
America's emerging social needs.,,52 In October he asked his aide Ken Cole to assemble 
his campaign promises regarding domestic policy in a vain attempt to trace some sort of 
outline around his promises. 53 
Moynihan continued his earlier theme in a speech gIven at Hendrix 
College, Arkansas, April 6 1970 called "The Concept of Public Policy in the 1970's." 
Again it was extensively circulated throughout the higher echelons of the administration 
and a copy annotated by Nixon sits in the files. In this article Moynihan sees as at least 
one of the reasons for the social dissatisfaction evidenced by the riots as "the structure of 
American government and the pragmatic tradition of American politics, [which] has too 
much defined public policy in forms of program, and in consequence has inhibited the 
development of true policy." Moynihan indicated that he received a "very positive 
response" to the piece and Nixon scrawled his comments in the margins: "Pat - A very 
perceptive piece - we must proceed in this direction or we will end up with a hodge 
. h I ,,54 podge of programs - perpetuated by the bureacracy + WIt no centra purpose. 
In the spring of 1970, Nixon reorganized existing domestic policy by 
creating a Domestic Council to be headed by John Ehrlichman. The council took over the 
task of the National Goals Research Staff which had achieved little and was effectively 
abandoned soon after its creation (itself an indication of the problems of creating a 
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philosophy on which policies could be hung). Nixon again pushed for policy direction in 
the summer of 1970, perhaps spurred on by Moynihan's memo. He asked for a 
"statement as to what the Administration's general policy is in the domestic field of about 
1000 words that will indicate what we are proposing to do by way of messages to 
Congress and requests for legislation to accomplish our other major objectives of law 
enforcement, stopping inflation, urban problems and good government, etc.,,55 Whereas 
crime policy might be formulated, the problem was actually that civil rights dominated 
the domestic policy agenda and that, with no real position on civil rights articulated, the 
domestic policy of the Nixon administration lacked any real meaning. A young Bryce 
Harlow aide, Lamar Alexander (later elected Republican Governor of Tennessee, 
appointed Secretary of Education during the Bush presidency, and, most recently, 
candidate for Republican nomination for President), stated in a memo in June 1970 that 
he saw "an immediate problem" in regards to domestic policy: "Remarkably, this 
Administration lacks a policy toward its biggest domestic program -- race, or, what to do 
about blacks.,,56 John Ehrlichman, who increasingly took over the reigns of domestic 
policy, stated in August of that year that he wished to "continue the discussion started last 
meeting of what the Nixon Administration's philosophy of government is and to arrive at 
some tentative but clearly stated policy proposals." His purpose was to create "a broad 
domestic policy and program [whereby] decisions could be made and against which 
existing policies and programs could be evaluated." Ehrlichman fretted that "We are now 
almost halfway through the first term of this Administration. I think it is appropriate that, 
in light of our experience so far, we reexamine the basic principles on which we have 
b . ,,57 een operatmg. 
240 
The re-examination was not as much a problem as the formulation of some 
new philosophy of government or overarching domestic policy. By the end of the year, in 
a piece reflecting the results of the 1970 congressional elections, in which the 
Republicans had fared relatively poorly, Nixon could only order that: "We should 
terminate or diminish as many of the Democratic programs as possible so that we can 
shift the dollars in to Nixon programs. We need to develop more than rhetoric, we have to 
make some actual progress in policy development.,,58 Whatever other domestic policy 
formulation had occurred, a positive civil rights policy continued to elude Nixon. At the 
end of 1971 a Republican oversight committee observed that " ... after a period of 
attention to the mechanics of governing, many in the Nixon Administration were starting 
to give more time to the substance of policies. In the field of civil rights there has not 
been a policy or even package of policies under previous Administration nor has one yet 
developed under President Nixon. Confusing and even contradictory policy statements 
and actions have been the pattern and practice. ,,59 
Thus, Nixon had great trouble cutting back programs he had targeted. 
Nixon expressed his frustration with the bureaucracy when he said of the army, 
somewhat ruefully: "Only place in the govt where they say 'yes sir' - Everyone else says: 
"yes, but - ,,60 The shadow of the Great Society continued to dictate policy during this 
period. 
Nathan observed that Nixon's cabinet members were often led by rather 
than leading the sections over which they presided: 
It soon became clear to new appointees, if it was not already at the outset, that 
these experts would be needed close at hand to supply the necessary facts about 
program complexities and to help shape in generic terms the p r o p o ~ a l s s t ~ e 7 . .w?uld 
want to put forward for Administration approval as new pollcy IDltIatlves. 
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T h e r e a ~ e r , , in many obvious. and s.ubtle ways, the praise and respect of the 
agency s p : n n a ~ e n t t staff ~ a s s mcreasmgly made a function of the performance of 
these ~ r ~ s I d e n t l a l l y y ~ p ~ o m t e d d o . ~ c i a l s s as spokesmen and advocates for the 
agency s. mterests. As If m recogrutlon of this point, John Ehrlichman remarked at 
~ ~ Key B I s ~ a y n e e p r ~ s s s b r i e f ~ g g late in 1972 that after the administration appointed 
key officIals to high posts and they had their picture taken with the President 
"We only s e ~ ~ them at the annual White House Christmas party; they go off and 
marry the natlves. ,,61 
Nixon's initial frustrations were focussed on an uncooperative Congress. It 
had been Congress, after all, that had prevented him from appointing his choices for 
Supreme Court nominee, that overrode his attempts at revenue sharing, that had attacked 
even his most innovative programs, such as the Philadelphia Plan and the F AP. Thus, 
until the election of 1970 indicated the fruitlessness of his efforts, he threw himself into 
creating a more friendly Congress. 
However, even before the off-term elections, plans were made to 
circumvent Congress by focussing on controlling the bureaucracy. With the creation of 
the Domestic Council in July 1970, patterned after Kissinger's successful National 
Security Council, there came a "decided shift in approach. More attention was paid to 
opportunities to achieve po licy aims through administrative action as opposed to 
legislative change, the former to be accomplished by taking advantage of the wide 
discretion available to federal officials under many existing laws. ,,62 Instead of an 
ambitious legislative agenda Nixon wished to ensure that the bureaucracy would 
successfully implement existing programs. From the beginning, the relationship of the 
Nixon White House to the career executives in the various departments was ambivalent. 
Political scientists Richard Cole and David A. Caputo observed: 
On the one hand, the Nixon White House viewed senior career executives as,. on 
the whole, disloyal. On the other hand, the bureaucracy was seen as a pOSSIble 
alternative for achieving at least some of the domestic objectives which Congress 
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appeared ~ n w i l l i n g g to approve. Redirecting the basic values and partisan loyalties 
of the senIor levels of bureaucracy became a major focus of the Nixon White 
House and the major political strategy used to pursue the administration's 
domestic policies.63 
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Chapter 9 
NIXON'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
P o l i ~ i c i a n s s are by nature proud people. You must never question their larger 
motIves or their political instincts. But you must also assume that they are 
constantly balancing principle against interest and that your best hope for bringing 
them along is persuading them that supporting your position will enable them to 
serve both simultaneously. 1 
His role ... has been that of a man who had to liquidate, defuse, deflate the 
exaggerations of the romantic period of American imperialism and American 
inflation. Inflation of promises, inflation of hopes, the Great Society, American 
supremacy - all that had to be deflated because it was beyond our power ... His 
role has been to do that. I think on the whole he's done pretty good at it.2 
Historians attempting to deal the contradictions within Nixon's character 
tend to see different sides to Nixon. Many see a relatively liberal "Jekyll" Nixon in 1969 
being taken over by a darkly conservative "Hyde" later in his fITst term. William Chafe, a 
trenchant critic of the Nixon administration and writer of one of the most popular books 
on the post-1945 era, noted the "dual personality ofNixon.,,3 Civil rights lawyer Eleanor 
Holmes Norton saw ''two civil rights Nixons, neither of them particularly principled," 
though the more liberal one on civil rights apparently died in 1970.4 Michael Genovese 
saw a shift rightwards on civil rights in late 1970, one that married Mitchell's "southern 
strategy" with Nixon aide Daniel Patrick Moynihan's "benign neglect" strategy: "If there 
were two Nixons on civil rights early in 1969, by late 1970, it was the anti-civil rights 
side of the Nixon personality that would come to dominate the policy and political 
agenda."s Nixon biographer Tom Wicker related Nixon's actions to what he saw as a 
"psychic bipolarity" that originated from the dramatic personality and philosophical 
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differences between his mother and father. Similarly, Nixon speechwriter Ray Price saw 
a "'light side,' considerate, caring, sentimental, generous of spirit, kind, and a 'dark side,' 
mean-spirited, vindictive, angry, ill-tempered.,,6 
A second theme that links assessments of Nixon's civil rights perspectives 
sees Nixon as essentially unconcerned about domestic issues, including civil rights. 
Those hostile to Nixon usually refer to Watergate as the most important (but not the only) 
indicator of his lack of any real principles. Nixon defender Joan Hoff also speaks of 
Nixon's "aprincipled" behaviour.7 Connected to this theme of Nixon forsaking civil 
rights once it appeared politically expensive not to do so, is the idea that Nixon lost 
interest in domestic policies and left others to create domestic policies. Hugh Davis 
Graham is perhaps the best known exponent of this view. Graham states in an article 
entitled "The Incoherence of the Civil Rights Policy in the Nixon Administration," that 
"no coherent theory of civil rights to govern the new Republican administration's policy 
choices" arose. He sees a policy vacuum that was filled with "aggressive men ... pursuing 
their own agendas. The result was a confusing and indeed quite contradictory array of 
civil rights initiatives and policies.,,8 In many ways, this perspective, in relation to 
Nixon's personal beliefs regarding race, is that he had none and did whatever was 
expedient in terms of votes. Vernon Jordan of the Urban League said of Nixon: "He 
didn't care about the basic issue.,,9 James Farmer said of his former boss: " He had no 
strong feelings on any social issues. He was capable of doing either good or bad with 
1 ~ ~ ·1· ,,10 equa ~ a c l l t y . .
The "aprincipled" (or unprincipled, depending upon one's animosity 
towards Nixon) theme is perhaps the most important consensus about the Nixon 
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character, one which links the many actions as president. According to this version of 
events, the lack of principles meant that no moral barriers would get in the way of 
political goals. Hence, Watergate. Hence, the southern strategy; hence the leftward and 
rightward "zigs" and "zags" and the criticism from Patrick Buchanan as well as from 
numerous liberal pundits; and hence the inability of scholars and insiders in the Nixon 
White House to fmd coherent themes with which to characterise the Nixon presidency. 
Nixon thus becomes the archetypal modern political villain, one for whom power is no 
longer, as it was for Johnson, simply a means to achieve goals, be they noble or ignoble, 
progressive or simply deluded. Nixon was, as the New Yorker put it, the "man to whom 
nothing mattered except power."ll 
The Key 
One problem with analyses of Nixon is that they use contemporary moral 
perspectives to understand an administration that existed at a time of flux in moral and 
social values. Nixon was, as Gary Wills noted, a post-war man caught up in a time when 
values were changing. l2 Many perspectives that we hold today were only being created at 
this time. What was liberal in 1965 may appear conservative today. What is considered 
the most progressive radical perspective on racial issues today - for instance, maintaining 
black identity - would have been unpardonably conservative at a time when integration 
was still the aim. The categories of left and right are not useful tools of analysis when 
looking at the Nixon presidency because the values characterising American society in 
the post-war period are hardly recognisable today. Melvin Small observed: ..... by looking 
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at what Nixon accomplished in domestic and economic policy, and not what he said 
about those issues, one can understand why observers in the year 2000 might label him 
the last liberal president." 13 It would be more accurate to call him the last president 
during a liberal era. Nixon - rightly seen as a conservative at the time of his presidency -
may now appear liberal in respect of the present political climate because his 
accomplishments carried much of the baggage of a more experimental era. Nixon in some 
ways bridged the two eras and in other ways displayed characteristics of both. 
This bridging role becomes clear when examining the history of 
affirmative action. Attitudes towards quota-based measures changed 180 degrees between 
the passage of that epitome of post-war liberal measures on civil rights - the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act - and today. John Skrentny notes that "progressive thinkers in 1967 shared a 
view with civil rights conservatives of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s: that the Civil Rights 
Act proscribed only intentional discrimination, outlawed only hiring practices which 
intentionally used an individual's race against him or her.,,14 Though this is undoubtedly 
true, the demand for a strict reading of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in 1967 came from 
within an expectation (or at least a hope) of the imminent integration of blacks within the 
American mainstream, at a time that many still believed that, as historian Kenneth 
Stampp put it, that blacks were, after all, "only white men with black skins." 15 The real 
movement that has taken place since the 1960s has been conservative in its general 
lowering of aspirations, jettisoning of radical hopes, and narrowing of horizons. It is in 
this change of context that affirmative action - seen during N i x o n ~ s s time as a 
comprolTIlse between radicals wishing for quick integration and conservatives who 
wished to maintain social distance between the races - has n ow come to represent the 
cutting edge of liberalism. 
The "vision thing" 
Reflected in both the aprincipled and the "schizoid" theme is the fact that 
Nixon appeared to be devoid of any real vision of society, at least in terms of domestic 
policy. He had neither the liberal optimism of a Kennedy or a Johnson nor the convinced 
conservatism of a Reagan. Nixon hardly believed in his own programs in relation to 
African Americans; though he had touted "black capitalism" in the run-up to the 1968 
election, he did not believe his own rhetoric. Former Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) head and Nixon appointee Dean Burch claimed, "The man didn't 
believe in anything. He didn't believe in a religion or principle or anything. He was 
totally cynical.,,16 In this sense he was perfectly suited to bring about a policy that can be 
construed as a last attempt to make the civil rights goals of the 1960s a reality at a time 
when many questioned the very core of their principles. 17 Nixon - the "pragmatic 
liberal,,,18 as he called himself, or "the least ideological statesman," as Pat Buchanan once 
said of his former boss1 9, was entirely bereft of the optimism of the post-war years about 
the possibility of racial integration, so obvious in his predecessor, Johnson. Nor was he a 
"true believer," as he sneeringly referred to Vice President Spiro Agnew, White House 
aides Pat Buchanan, Bryce Harlow and others on the right in the correctness of 
conservative principles.2o His "aprincipledness" that Hoff and others pointed to allowed 
him to implement programs that Johnson, despite developing the thesis behind 
affirmative action in his famous Howard University speech' 1965 d d . ill ,are not implement 
himself No one else was in a better position to "liquidate, defuse, deflate the 
exaggerations of the romantic period of American imperialism and American inflation," 
as Walter Lippmann put it.21 
However, the pragmatic Nixon was not bereft of principle. Historians have 
pointed to liberals within the Nixon staff - especially Ehrlichman, Moynihan and 
Leonard Garment - as largely responsible for what are often seen as progressive moves 
on civil rights, including affirmative action.22 This is at least partially true, as is the 
contention that political gain could be made from dividing the Democrats between civil 
rights and labor supporters. But there was also a more personal basis to Nixon's 
commitment to affirmative action that must be discussed - the right to earn. 
To see Nixon's espousal of affirmative action as a huge contradiction 
between is to mistake both the meaning of affirmative action and the meaning of the 
Nixon presidency. Affirmative action began as a conservative measure designed to deal 
with a racial crisis. At first, its intention was to alleviate conditions within inner-cities. 
Later, it became an essential tool in stabilising and incorporating sections of the black 
middle class. Only later, when conservative opposition arose and, more importantly, 
when strategies attempting integration of schools and housing appeared to fail, did 
liberals defend affrrmative action as the last stand of civil rights. Neither should the 
Nixon administration's espousal of affrrmative action be seen only as part of a six-year 
grasp for political power. Though the meaning of affrrmative action changed, though the 
content behind the form altered, Nixon's espousal of affrrmative action as a means of 
extending the right to earn to blacks was consistent throughout his career. So was his 
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attack on quotas in 1972; the right of any individual to earn must not be abridged. Nixon 
reasoned. 
The Nixon Philosophy and Affirmative Action 
Confusion surrounds the various accounts of Nixon, either as a man or as a 
President, when it comes to civil rights. As John Skrentny observed, his civil rights 
agenda remains a mystery for historians and even those implementing his policies.23 Even 
Nixon's closest advisers plead ignorance regarding his true feelings on black Americans. 
Perhaps the difficulty involved in answering this question is the only maxim upon which 
virtually all observers - historians, political theorists and those who worked closely with 
Nixon - agree. As speechwriter Ray Price, who observed Nixon in private as well as 
public moments, observed, Nixon remains "a paradox wrapped in an enigma inside an 
incongruity. ,,24 
Nixon declared in a secret memo to presidential aide John Ehrlichman that 
his feelings on race "are, if anything, ultra-liberal.,,25 He wished to be seen as "a man 
prepared to everything practically possible for the blacks," as Rowland Evans and Robert 
D. Novak observed.26 During his tenure as vice-president, he had overseen the 
administration's efforts in the civil rights field; he had been favoured by civil rights 
leaders over John F. Kennedy in the 1960 election as the candidate of choice for black 
Americans before Kennedy made the fateful call to the Birmingham jail where Dr. Martin 
Luther King was being held. Throughout his presidency, he saw himself as a man 
prepared to "do what's right" for African-Americans. As biographer Stephen Ambrose 
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indicated in his even-handed assessment of Nixon, he never appealed directly to the white 
backlash and privately as well as publicly told GOP candidates that they could never win 
b . h 27 Y outsegregatmg t e Democrats. He told black leader James Farmer. at the time of his 
resignation as Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in December 1970, 
that he wanted to help blacks. "I care," Nixon told Farmer, "I just hope people will 
believe that 1 do care. ,,28 
The assessment of Nixon by contemporary observers within the civil rights 
movement was negative. For them, and for many modern historians, Nixon was a 
politician of the right, and all analysis of his actions stemmed from that basic fact. "For 
the fIrst time since Woodrow Wilson," said the chairman of the board of the NAACP in 
1970, "we have a national administration that can be rightly characterised as anti-
black. ,,29 Roy Wilkins, the executive director of the NAACP, said that Nixon wished to 
"tum the clock back on everything" and had sided with the "enemies of little black 
children. ,,30 Historians are a little more charitable than contemporary observers, perhaps 
with subsequent administrations in mind. More sympathetic accounts of Nixon suggest 
reasons why Nixon got such bad press from civil rights movement figures. Journalists 
Evans and Novak's contemporary account suggests that Nixon's anti-black image might 
have been because of "his uncomfortable shyness and unwillingness to deal with 
d . h N ,,31 outsiders, applicable to everybody but very pronounce WIt egroes. 
The confusion surrounding Nixon's stand on civil rights reflects a general 
confusion in historical and contemporary journalistic accounts about the Nixon 
personality, one that is relevant to a study of the reasons for the initiation affirmative 
action during his presidency. Clearly, complex and personal issues - what Bruce Mazlish 
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in 1972 termed the ''Nixon Problem" must be examined. 32 As Mazlish stated. when 
Nixon was elected in 1968, "friends and foes alike conceded that they did not know who 
the 'real' Nixon was, or how he might be expected to behave. ,,33 What were the basic 
elements of the Nixon personality that might have influenced his feelings on race and 
racial issues? 
Perhaps the only characteristic that might have made Nixon sympathetic to 
the plight of black Americans was what Len Garment called an "instinctive sympathy for 
the underdog.,,34 Sudden, deeply felt moments of passion occasionally emerge in the 
Nixon records, apparently triggered by some event or issue. In response to a news item 
about a plane crash involving the Wichita, Kansas football team, where insurance 
companies said they that may not pay claims because the pilots was improperly certified, 
Nixon wrote, no doubt harking back to his days playing with a small-town, local football 
team: "Flanigan - Get on this - Don't let these bastards get out of paying this claim. ,,35 On 
more than one occasion, Nixon told a story that especially affected him about a son, 
graduating from an Ivy-League college, who is ashamed because his father is not 
university educated and appears crude. Nixon told his aides that "nothing bothered him 
more than this because the young man's education was obtained only because of the hard 
work of the father." He added at one meeting where he told the story, "the worst thing 
you can do to a man is snub him; it's worse than exploiting or enslaving him. ,,36 Here, the 
president of the United States reveals an earlier version of himself - the young man who 
attended university when his father could not. It also revealed the continuing sensitivity 
about the rejection he felt he had experienced from Eastern elite circles. The insecurity 
borne of rejection both by the best New York law firms and by the FBI after Nixon 
graduated from Duke, the alienation he felt from his Eastern Establishment " f r i e n d s ~ ' ' who 
led the movement to get Eisenhower to drop him from the Republican ticket in 1952 - all 
remained with him throughout his life and could have some bearing on his attitudes 
toward race. 
A second, related characteristic was Nixon's resentment of privilege. 
Parmet suggests that Nixon's attachment to the Republican Party may have been related 
to this hatred of the elite, rather than antipathetic to it: "'More than conventional 
Republican conservatives, however, Nixon kept seeing conflict in terms of a class 
struggle.,,37 Many accounts analyse the Nixon character in terms of class hatred and 
resentment against more privileged classes. Virtually all see this as a flaw, as one of 
many of the undesirable aspects of the man, such as his virulent hatred of the press, were 
based. 38 It is also possible to see this quality in a positive light, both in energising 
Nixon's campaigns and projects and in that it may have lent sympathy to the plight of 
others. Again, it is possible to see this "negative" characteristic as potentially positive in 
terms of Nixon' s attitudes towards race. 
The Private Nixon and Race 
In assessing the private attitudes of a political figure towards a subject as 
. th t f ce the researcher often works with very little evidence. Political contentIous as a 0 ra , 
d 'd aking "off the cuft" about issues like race, especially in periods figures ten to aV01 spe 
h 'b'l't f race riots appears reaL Additionally, it is difficult to know where t e POSSI 11 Y 0 
f h d "m'gger" for instance is a careless use of a term that was whether use 0 t e wor , ' 
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accepted when the subject using it grew up or a declaration of the subject's true feelings 
about African-Americans. Moreover, what evidence there is can often be contradictory. 
As Myrdal noted: "The moral struggle goes on within people and not only between 
them ... There are no homogenous 'attitudes' behind human behaviour but a mesh of 
struggling inclinations, interests and ideals, some held conscious and some suppressed for 
long intervals, but all active in bending behaviour in their direction. ,,39 With that caveat in 
mind, it is possible to view Nixon's background as fairly liberal on the issue of race. 
Both Nixon himself and friendly biographer Herbert Parmet contend that 
Nixon inherited a moral position as regards to civil rights from his Quaker upbringing: 
"His Quaker background was notably free of such [racial] bias, and nothing in the record 
contradicts that history for either the man's public or personal life." Larry Hood saw 
Nixon's experience at Duke University, where he experienced a Jim Crow society fIrst-
hand, as important in making him a committed racial liberal. 40 Nixon himself cited 
reasons for his self-professed racial liberalism as his "background -- background of my 
college education, Quaker school, and the like. ,,41 As early as 1946, before the Hiss 
affair, the Douglas campaign and before Truman's overwhelming interest in either 
subject began, Nixon stated that "We must be vigilant against the doctrines of the Bilbos 
and the Talmadges and the Gerald L.K. Smiths, who are just as dangerous to the 
preservation of the American way of life on the one hand as are the Communists on the 
other.,,42 If we are to accept Myrdal's rank order of discrimination, Nixon could have 
counted himself as among the most liberal of parents in the 1950s. When in Washington, 
Nixon sent his daughters to Horace Mann, a public integrated school, and later to Sidwell 
Friends School, an enlightened Quaker institution that had no racial or religious 
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barriers.
43 
It is likely that he was more predisposed towards liberal attitudes on civil 
rights than many of his compatriots. But he was more than ready to jettison his Quaker 
attitudes, as his participation in WWII demonstrates. Yet he spoke up and down the 
country on the issue with an energy that suggested a real belief in what he was saying. A 
new faith of anticommunism rather than the old faith of Quakerism spurred Nixon toward 
rhetorical racial liberalism in the 1950s. He touched on the theme of anticommunism in 
nearly every speech he made about race and civil rights. In a transcript of a 
radio/television speech the then-vice president made in 1953, the way in which Nixon 
viewed the problem is evident: 
Every act of racial discrimination or prejudice in the United States hurts America 
as much as an espionage agent who turns over a weapon to a foreign enemy. 
Every American citizen can contribute toward creating a better understanding of 
American ideals abroad by practising and thinking tolerance and respect for 
human rights every day of the year.44 
In virtually all speeches on civil rights, whatever the audience, Nixon 
repeats this theme. In some cases it was subsumed but was always present. At a rally in 
Harlem in 1956, the vice-president stated that: 
During the next four years there is no single issue which will be more important 
than civil rights. We must lead the way in providing equality of opportunity for all 
of our people regardless of race, religion, color or national origin. This is not a 
matter of charity or of politics -- it must be done because of what it means to our 
economic strength here at home: what it means to our standing throughout the 
world: and most important of all because, under our concept of government and 
religion, it is the right and moral thing to do. [emphasis added]45 
He warned listeners in Chicago in 1956 of the danger of the race issue for 
American prestige abroad: "I can state from my experience in travelling around the world 
that every incident of race hatred is blown up a thousand-fold and hurts us irreparably 
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abroad.,,46 Again, in 1957, he emphasised that discrimination was a liability because 
"( e )very time there is an instance of discrimination in the United States, it gives the 
Communists a weapon which they can use against us. ,,4 7 
Whatever the basis of Nixon's racialliberalisl1\ he could count himself as 
an activist in a period with few white civil rights advocates. He was a life member of the 
NAACP and had been thanked personally by Martin Luther King for his efforts in 
passing the 1957 Civil Rights Act. Nixon voted for anti-poll tax bill in 1947 and 1948.48 
He served as chair of the Committee on Government Contracts while Vice President. 
Nixon had an awareness, at least, of some of the barriers facing black Americans in the 
workplace. As Joan Hoff has pointed out, Nixon's activities in the 1950s appeared to set 
a course in the direction of his later espousal of affirmative action.49 In the Committee on 
Government Contracts' last report, entitled Pattern for Progress, its fIrst point about 
racial discrimination could be said to outline "institutional racisl1\" most famously 
discussed in Carmichael and Hamilton's Black Power: 50 
Overt discrimination, in the sense that an employer actually refuses to hire solely 
because of race, religion, color, or national origin is not as prevalent as is 
generally believed. To a greater degree, the indifference of employers to 
establishing a positive policy of nondiscrimination hinders qualified applicants 
and employees from being hired and promoted on the basis of equality.51 
Under "recommendations," the Committee called for the extension of the 
principle of equal opportunity to grant-in-aid programs with particular reference to those 
involving education, training, recruitment or referral, to programs where Federal 
subsidies were involved in housing and to agreements whereby the Federal Government 
contributed monies to state and local programs.52 Though it is possible that Nixon's 
position on the Committee was more titular than real and that he had little to do with this 
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effort (especially given its appearance in 1960 - a busy year for N i x o n ) ~ ~ these ideas had 
already been aired by Nixon himself earlier. In a 1955 radio broadcast he described 
employment discrimination as "like an iceberg; only a small part of it is visible." In the 
same broadcast Nixon signalled that non-discrimination was voluntary only in the sense 
that contractors voluntarily signed contracts with nondiscrimination clauses. 53 In 1957, as 
previously noted, Nixon wrote to the head of each Government contracting agency asking 
him to adopt a firmer approach in the compliance work. 
Critics might point out that though strong words were spoken, few actions 
took place. Patterns for Progress defensively pointed out that "(m)any of these 
milestones have gone relatively unnoticed by the general public because of the policy of 
releasing no publicity on individual complaints or government contractors." The truth 
was that many of the "milestones" were not significant enough to be noticed by the 
public. Their "achievements" included many talks with contractors, conducting surveys, 
many meetings, the making of promotional films, pamphlets and leaflets and setting up 
offices. Nixon's apparent liberalism on civil rights issues did not necessarily imply that 
he thought that blacks were equal. He defended colonialism, for example, when speaking 
before the "English-speaking Union of the Commonwealth" in 1958.54 
Whatever Nixon's innermost principles on the issue of race might have 
been, Nixon remained a true believer in anti-communism. Through it he expressed his 
loyalty to the post-war set-up, to the status quo. Anti-communism was, after all, the force 
that had enabled him to achieve national political prominence and retained a personal 
meaning for him throughout his life. 55 It took on a near-religious importance, as he stated 
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decades later: "Anti-communism is not a policy. It is a faith - faith in freedom. ,,56 This 
belief in his country - expressed as anti-communism - fuelled an early racial liberalism. 
Whatever reputation Nixon had for racial liberalism, it disappeared from 
the public eye when Nixon famously refused to intervene when Martin Luther King was 
jailed in 1960. Instead, Kennedy's telephone message of sympathy helped secure black 
votes. Between 1960 and his election in 1968, little in the way of records that might 
contain some insight into Richard Nixon's feelings about race have been released. In 
1964 Nixon avoided comment on the 1964 Civil Rights Act, perhaps in deference to the 
leadership of Barry Goldwater. However, he consistently warned Republicans away from 
racial politics. In speeches after Johnson's election he warned Republicans not to mine 
the "fool's gold" of racism. 57 In public, he consistently favoured equality for black 
Americans. 
Nixon the racist? 
An oft-repeated accusation regarding race was first aired by his aide John 
Ehrlichman in his memoirs of the Nixon years. Ehrlichman remembered: 
Twice, in explaining all this to me, Nixon said he believed America's blacks 
could only marginally benefit from Federal programs because blacks were 
genetically inferior to whites ... Blacks could never achieve parity ... but, he said, 
we should still do what we could for them, within reasonable limits, because it 
was the "right" thing to do.58 
Questions over the accuracy of Ehrlichman's memory have created 
something of a controversy amongst historians. As Joan Hoff pointed out, the Nixon 
administration "will be the best-documented in US history," given the extensive 
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recording, note-taking and general documenting of the administration's everyday 
activities. 59 It seems reasonable that within these voluminous records, it is possible to 
fmd some documentation supporting Ehlichman's claim, despite the "off-the-record" 
nature of the comments. However, no one has yet found any mention in the documents 
released by the Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP) to back up Ehrlichman' s 
memory of the phrase "genetically inferior." It is possible, of course, that Nixon 
explicitly told Ehrlichman to keep these comments off the record or that any recording of 
them has been deemed to be harming a living person and has thus been withdrawn from 
the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the guardian of the Nixon papers and arbiter of 
what is public and what is private amongst the Nixon papers. 
However, there is enough evidence now to suggest that Nixon did indeed 
believe, at one time or another, that blacks were inferior. Nixon's other right-hand man, 
H. R. Haldeman, published his daily diaries of life in the Nixon White House. The entry 
for Monday, April 28 1969 seems to back up Ehrlichman's recollections. In it Nixon 
claims that the ''whole problem" of welfare was "really the blacks." Nixon ruminated that 
''there has never in history been an adequate black nation, and they are the only race of 
which this is true". "Africa is hopeless", he claimed, ''the worst there, is Liberia, which 
we built".6o Joan Hoff called the Haldeman diaries into question after their publication, 
doubting especially the ethnic slurs that Haldeman claimed Nixon used.61 The entry in 
question, however, has an almost exact match in Haldeman's hand written meeting notes 
for the same day. Haldeman's hand written notes on yellow lined pad dated 4/28 read: "re 
Welfare - have to face fact its black - not poor, devise system that recognizes this that 
262 
appears not to. Get out of veil of hypocrisy and guilt. Never been an adequate black 
nation. Africa is hopeless. ,,62 
These ideas appear anything but liberal. There is further evidence that 
Nixon did not regard blacks as equals. Perhaps the most revealing document was written 
by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Nixon's aide and chief adviser on racial problems, in 
November 1971, after he had been appointed as US Ambassador to the United Nations. 
Moynihan responded to a request clearly made by Nixon for thoughts on an article in The 
Atlantic Magazine by Richard Herrnstein entitled "LQ." Released in October 1996 after 
originally being withdrawn by the Nixon Presidential Materials Project. this document 
shows that Nixon brought the subject of black inferiority up at a cabinet meeting when 
discussing the infamous article by Arthur Jensen published in the Harvard Education 
Review. Jensen claimed that the differences between black and white IQ test scores were 
more likely to be heritable rather than environmental. Though the memo was written by 
Moynihan, it reflects the interest Nixon took in the subject and contains many sections 
that were underlined or marked by Nixon. Additionally, Moynihan'S flattering style and 
his ability to pose an argument to Nixon as if Nixon had made it in the fIrst place give 
some clues as to Nixon's feelings on the subject. Certainly, the contents of this memo 
weigh in on the side ofEhrlichman's recollections. 
Moynihan had carried on correspondence with Arthur Jensen after he 
published the article in The Harvard Educational Review. Moynihan wrote to Jensen that 
hereditary differences "might be one" of the reasons for a disparity between male and 
female professional and managerial workers, among other things. However, in general, 
Moynihan disagreed with most of Jensen's contentions, less because he was sure that 
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they were wrong than from the certainty that, if he were right, social programs to help 
blacks were useless.63 
The most remarkable aspect of Moynihan's response is that he tacitly 
admitted that Herrnstein was right. Though he at no point agrees with either author, 
Moynihan evidently felt less than confident that these ideas could be successfully refuted. 
He insisted that the subject was kept under wraps and that government must proceed with 
programs designed to disprove Jensen whether they were correct or not. Nixon marked 
certain passages, among which was Moynihan's plea for silence: 
Frankly, I don't see how a society such as ours can live with this knowledge. 
Scientists can live with it: have done so. But how can it be public as against 
private knowledge? ... These are not the works of redneck preachers interpreting 
the Old Testament. The authors are liberal men of science ... But it is also clear 
that the fmdings Herrnstein summarizes provide a formidable argument against 
charges of discrimination in cases where individuals are selected on the basis of 
objective measurements of intelligence. At a yet nastier level persons opposed to 
school integration can certainly fmd ammunition in this material. Doubtless 
someone will soon discover -- what has been in the literature since 1915 -- that 
prisons are disproportionately filled with persons of low or retarded intelligence, 
and use this information for assorted ugly purposes. I need not go on: the 
"danger" of this knowledge is self-evident.64 
Moynihan outlined to Nixon that "a primary problem is how to deal with 
the widespread legal and social expectation of equality of outcomes with respect to 
socially defmed groups, primarily racial, ethnic and religious groups." In the Howard 
University speech, which Moynihan had helped to draft, President Johnson said equal 
results should follow equal opportunity. ''Now we are told by scientists that it can't be 
had." Moynihan continued his plea: "It seems to me essential for you to proceed on the 
assumption that the scientists have not proved their case.,,65 
There is no doubt that this memo was as much designed to flatter Nixon 
(as nearly all of Moynihan's were) as to convey an important message. Nevertheless, 
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taken in its entirety, it gives a snapshot of private attitudes towards racial issues in the 
Executive in 1971. Moynihan, on the liberal side of racial questions in the Nixon cabinet, 
felt he had no defence against the arguments of Herrnstein and Jensen. There was a 
suspicion, if not a fear, implicit in Moynihan's memo that the implications of the failure 
of social programs were that blacks may not have been equal to whites. The major 
decision, one that Nixon, in asking for the comments, must have been considering, was 
whether to explore further the possibility of challenging the views of Jensen and 
Herrnstein by adopting programs that attempted to solve the question of racial inequality 
or whether simply to attempt to "contain" racial issues. Moynihan put the case very 
squarely for the latter: "The duty of government is to do everything it can to minimize 
that component of inequality which results from environment. ,,66 The duty of 
government, at least in the eyes of the White House, had perceptibly shifted from 
Johnson's liberal goal of black equality to simply stabilise the situation - sotto voce. It 
might be said that racial reform gave way to race relations. 
In an earlier memo, Moynihan had been giving advice about crime. He 
expressed his opinion about the difficulty that Nixon, having drawn attention to crime in 
the election campaign and since, would face when subsequent programs failed to have an 
effect on statistics. The advice, which Nixon underlined and marked beside it, "Correct," 
would have been apposite for race relations: "What you can't control, you had better not 
draw attention to.,,67 
The most important implication of the Moynihan memo - if it is accepted 
that its sentiments broadly reflected Nixon's on the issue - is that Nixon held no 
particular views on race apart from the fact that it was a troublesome problem in the 
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United States, that it threatened disorder. Nixon maintained an open mind on the 
scientific and moral question of black inequality. The evidence shows at the very least an 
equivocal approach by Nixon to questions of black and white equality. At t i m e s ~ ~ its 
seems, Nixon thought that blacks and whites would eventually integrate. When 
discussing who might fill Supreme Court vacancies, he had originally favoured Jewish 
Republican Rita Hauser, a longtime Nixon supporter. But then he saw an article which 
quoted her as seeing no Constitutional impediment to same-sex marriages. Nixon said: 
"There goes a Supreme Court Justice! I can't go that far; that's the year 2000! Negroes 
[ and whites], okay. But that's too far!" Other memos suggest that he saw limits to the 
ability of American society to overcome racism. Commenting on a piece by Charles F. 
Palmer, President of the National Student Association in which he promised that, unless 
the problems of the "repression of black, brown and red people," poverty, the Vietnam 
war, the environment, women's and workers' rights were resolved, students would 
continue to protest. Nixon underlined a sentence - ''until these things have changed" and 
wrote: "1. They are being changed, 2. Except for V. Nam, none will ever be solved.,,68 
The fact that Nixon sought the opinion of Moynihan, one of his more thoughtful advisors, 
on racial issues indicates at least an interest in the subject. 
However, the issue of racial equality was, to Nixon, outside the most 
important concerns of his presidency - except in its ability to destabilize the country. He 
clearly had no core beliefs or convictions on the subject. The actual scientific issue of 
whether or not black Americans could ever be e q u a ~ ~ though of interest to him, was not 
one where he had to hold a consistent view. Though Nixon used the expression "doing 
what's right" in regard to civil rights many times, for him it meant doing whatever was 
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needed to maintain stability, whatever would fulfil his "obligation not to have the 
Goddamn country blow up" as he succinctly put it in one meeting.69 In other words, 
Nixon may have been "aprincipled" on the issue of race and thus interested only in a 
detached way about the issue of whether some biological inferiority prevented blacks 
from achieving equality. 
The Right to Earn and Affirmative Action 
Many observers miss the most important principle governing the decisions 
of the "aprincipled" Nixon, especially in regard to affirmative action. The positive side of 
the anticommunism to which Nixon subscribed so fervently was the belief that American 
capitalism remained the best, most fair system in the world. He passionately believed 
that, as he put it in his famous "Bridges to Human Dignity" radio address in 1968, ' ~ h e r e e
is no greater bridge to human dignity than the pride that comes with well-earned success 
in the free enterprise system.,,70 "A good job is as basic and important a civil right as a 
good education," Nixon told readers in his autobiography RN.71 In the last of his 
autobiographies, In the Arena, published in 1990, Nixon repeated his idea that "(t)he 
mainspring of capitalism is the rewarding of work and efficiency."n The subject of this 
belief in the rewarding of work and efficiency was the mirror image of Nixon himself -
of humble roots but, through hard work, an achiever who "paid his dues" and earned 
success. Though an intelligent man, Nixon never subjected this idea to any real scrutiny 
and it becomes clear that this beliefwas a simple faith borne of his own experience rather 
than an intellectual understanding of the relationship of dissident Protestant sects to 
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capitalist ideology. He proudly recounted being told that he had what it took to learn the 
law - "an iron butt.,,73 His book, Six Crises, published after his defeat by Kennedy in the 
election of 1960, told of the struggles during his political career.74 ''Nothing of any value, 
in business, in culture, in politics, in sports, or in any other field, was created without 
struggle," he lectured more recently. "Struggle is what makes us human instead of 
animals. ,,75 Equally, Nixon believed that nothing could come from nothing. Wills 
described the strength of this feeling within Americans - none more so than Nixon - in 
the 1960s: "A total disorientation comes over the American, a vertiginous fear that the 
law of moral gravity has been rescinded, when he thinks that someone might actually be 
getting something for nothing.,,76 
Nixon never counted himself as a laissez-faire Republican. In 1984 he told 
an interviewer: "I was basically for small business. 1 was never for big business. My 
source of strength was more Main Street than Wall Street.,,77 William Costello, who 
published one of the first biographies of Nixon, made the same point a quarter of a 
century earlier: "The operational Nixon leaned toward accommodation with 
traditionalism and fiscal conservatism. He retained a Horatio Alger Republicanism more 
reminiscent of some of the family'S progressivism, or even populism.,,78 He continued his 
commitment to this ideal throughout (and after, if it could be said to have ended before 
his death) his political career. 
This right to earn, or work ethic, was, of course, not exclusive to Nixon -
it found a resonance amongst many at the time. It can be seen as a defensive response to 
the pervasive questioning of American capitalist values occurring at the time, 
championing the American Dream. Gunnar Myrdal wrote in 1961 that work was "the 
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basis for self-respect and a dignified life.,,79 However, Nixon's fervent espousal of the 
right to earn is important for several reasons. First, it contradicts the received historical 
wisdom of the "aprincipled" Nixon. Second, the fact that Nixon included black 
Americans within his moral vision of a just society is evidenced by his real efforts to 
extend to them the right to earn, indicating that he at least held out hope that blacks might 
become equal. He was consistent in wishing to extend the right to earn to black 
Americans. Indeed, he saw lack of the right to earn as the major problem affecting black 
Americans. In 1956, Nixon told a rally in Harlem: "But in order to have human rights, 
people need property rights - and never has this been more true than in the case of the 
Negro today.,,80 In the 1968 campaign, Nixon referred to "(t)he forgotten Americans, the 
hard-working, the tax-paying Americans, [who] are black as well as white ... ,,81 His 
election pitch to black Americans was often cited: 
Black extremists are guaranteed headlines when they shout "burn" or "get a gun." 
But much of the black militant talk these days is actually in terms far closer to the 
doctrines of free enterprise than those of the welfarist 30's - terms of "pride," 
"ownership," "private enterprise," "capital," "self-assurance," "self-respect" - the 
same qualities, the same characteristics, the same ideals, the same methods, for 
two centuries have been at the heart of American success ... What most militants 
are asking for is not separation, but to be included in - not as supplicants, but as 
owners, as entrepreneurs - to have a share of the wealth and a piece of the 
action. 82 
As Ambrose notes, Nixon's black capitalism idea "implied a willingness to 
put aside the goal of an integrated society to concentrate on improving conditions in the 
ghettoes.,,83 Cynics might object that this was simply the political Nixon attempting to 
divide what had been solidly Democratic constituencies. It is certainly true that, if this 
was the aim, it patently failed. Nixon was forced to back away from his espousal of 
"black capitalism" after the concept was attacked right across the po litical spectrum. 84 
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However, as indicated above, Nixon's commitment to keeping the program gomg 
outlasted the furore about black capitalism. That Nixon was a "true believer" in the right 
to earn is demonstrated by his willingness to countenance such a radical program as the 
Family Assistance Plan (F AP). Though he had effectively given up on it by July 1970, he 
had resisted opposition from conservatives (and liberals) both inside and outside of the 
administration to jettison the plan for its radical nature.85 
More importantly for this discussion, the right to earn served as Nixon's 
overarching justification for all of the affirmative action programs discussed above. His 
statement to Congress defending the Philadelphia Plan in 1969 made it abundantly clear 
that it was this right to which he referred. Affirmative action first became important to 
Nixon as it afforded the opportunity to earn to black Americans: 
The civil rights to which this administration is committed is one of demonstrable 
deeds - focussed where they count. One of the things that counts most is earning 
power. Nothing is more unfair than that the same Americans who pay taxes 
should by any pattern of discriminatory practices be deprived of an equal 
opportunity to work on Federal construction contracts.86 
He told speechwriter William Safrre "That's why we have to hit this 
minority enterprise thing so hard - sure they laugh at it - but better jobs, better housing, 
that's the only way Negroes are going to be able to move to Scarsdale. ,,87 Nixon, it might 
be added, has a one hundred percent record - both in 1969 and 1972 - of defending 
affirmative action programs when they faced real challenges. His famous attack on 
quotas implied for many that Nixon was rescinding his support of affrrmative action. 88 
Phillip Hoffman, President of the American Jewish Committee, wrote to both candidates 
in the run-up to the 1972 election asking what they thought of quotas. The President 
wrote back on August 11 1972 declaring: 
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With respect. to these affirmative action programs, I agree that numerical goals, 
although an 1ll1portant and useful tool to measure progress which remedies the 
effect of past discrimination, must not be allowed to be applied in such a fashion 
as to, in ~ a c t , , result in the imposition of quotas, nor should they be predicated 
upon or dIrected towards a concept of proportional representation. 
I have asked the appropriate departmental heads to review their po licies to ensure 
conformance with these views. 89 
There was no necessary contradiction at that stage between this 
perspective and his espousal of various affirmative action programs. He was simply 
asserting the "right to earn" he thought affIrmative action afforded to black Americans 
for whites, too. It was not until some years later that the two appeared inextricably 
opposed, a subject dealt with in the last section. 
One last interesting aspect of Nixon's personal philosophy merits attention 
here. His departure from what had been before the Depression traditional Republican 
individualist laissez-faire values (and what under Reagan again became Republican 
values) is evident in his renegotiation of the concept of "rights," perhaps underlining the 
fluidity of political conceptions at this time. Thus Nixon espoused group rights over 
individual rights. In another radio speech, Nixon enunciated the changes that he 
envisioned for rights: 
Lincoln freed the slaves. Our uncompleted task is to free the Negro. Franklin 
Roosevelt promulgated the old, negative freedoms/rom. Our uncompleted task is 
to make real the new positive freedoms to.90 
In February 1968, Nixon explained a perspective rendered no less than 
remarkable given the parallels with Johnson's Howard University speech: 
Its time to move on to a new freedom. The old negative freedoms -- freedom from 
hunger, freedom from want, freedom from fear -- are no longer enough. The new 
freedom has to mean freedom for the poor as well as the rich, freedom for black 
as well as for white; and it has to mean not only freedom from but freedom to. It 
means freedom to grow, freedom to choose, freedom to travel, freedom to create, 
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recording, note-taking and general documenting of the administration's everyday 
activities. 59 It seems reasonable that within these voluminous records, it is possible to 
fmd some documentation supporting Ehlichman's claim, despite the "off-the-record" 
nature of the comments. However, no one has yet found any mention in the documents 
released by the Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP) to back up Ehrlichman' s 
memory of the phrase "genetically inferior." It is possible, of course, that Nixon 
explicitly told Ehrlichman to keep these comments off the record or that any recording of 
them has been deemed to be harming a living person and has thus been withdrawn from 
the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the guardian of the Nixon papers and arbiter of 
what is public and what is private amongst the Nixon papers. 
However, there is enough evidence now to suggest that Nixon did indeed 
believe, at one time or another, that blacks were inferior. Nixon's other right-hand man, 
H. R. Haldeman, published his daily diaries of life in the Nixon White House. The entry 
for Monday, April 28 1969 seems to back up Ehrlichman's recollections. In it Nixon 
claims that the ''whole problem" of welfare was "really the blacks." Nixon ruminated that 
''there has never in history been an adequate black nation, and they are the only race of 
which this is true". "Africa is hopeless", he claimed, ''the worst there, is Liberia, which 
we built".6o Joan Hoff called the Haldeman diaries into question after their publication, 
doubting especially the ethnic slurs that Haldeman claimed Nixon used.61 The entry in 
question, however, has an almost exact match in Haldeman's hand written meeting notes 
for the same day. Haldeman's hand written notes on yellow lined pad dated 4/28 read: "re 
Welfare - have to face fact its black - not poor, devise system that recognizes this that 
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Section III 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OUTSIDE OF THE 
POLITICAL REALM 
In the previous chapter, we observed that the bulk of policies we now 
know as affirmative action was created during the Nixon administration, either with 
Nixon's direct input or by advisers and aides. Other aspects of the problem, however, 
remain to be explained. Until the end of 1972 the term "affirmative action" meant little to 
those outside the federal bureaucracy. At what stage did this group of policies become 
cohered under the title "affIrmative action"? In other words when did affIrmative action 
become known as affIrmative action? Certainly, no one recognised the importance of the 
Philadelphia Plan, Order No.4, or even revised Order No.4 until they had been in place 
some time. A second, related question concerns the creation of affIrmative action as a 
public issue with defined positions. There was virtually no opposition until, on the pages 
of Commentary in late 1971 and 1972, writers started attacking "quotas." Even then, the 
discussion was relatively confused. In 1973 antagonism towards affIrmative action 
became more coherent but most Americans fIrst became aware of the issue with 
widespread publicity surrounding the Bakke case when the Supreme Court handed down 
its decision in 1978. The arguments against affIrmative action today often begin with a 
tragic tale of white males who, though eminently qualified for a positions, are passed 
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over in favor of women or minority candidates. This point - that affirmative action 
discriminates against white males - did not immediately gain resonance. As will be 
shown in this chapter, little of the emotive edge accompanying the debate today was 
evident, even as Order No.4 identified an estimated three-quarters of the American 
population as an "affected class."} Many of the features of the modem debate that are 
taken for granted today developed only gradually. 
To understand these questions, it is necessary to explore some of the 
social, cultural and intellectual developments that provided the context for the emergence 
of affirmative action. It will be suggested here that the context in which affirmative action 
is viewed has been crucial for determining the way it is seen. In the previous chapters, it 
is argued that the implementation of the first affmnative action policies was a response to 
a serious legitimation crisis that stalked the United States in the late 1960s. These policies 
replaced problematic traditional methods of ensuring equal opportunities through (and 
within) labor unions, government contractors, federal, state, and local government 
employment and, later, college and university admissions. However, they contributed to 
the further undermining of the institutions that they affected by implying both existing 
traditional methods of ensuring equal opportunities, especially the long-standing 
commitment to principles of merit, were bankrupt, and by indicting the institutions 
themselves as incapable of offering real equal opportunities. As pointed out in the fITst 
part of this dissertation, the biggest barrier these fITst policies faced was their apparent 
contradiction of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, with its formalising of the traditional 
unwritten American institution of equal opportunity for all individuals. Finally, 
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affirmative action policies undermined the belief that American institutions were capable 
of achieving such integration without government intervention. 
The Habermasian model is invaluable in understanding the process 
whereby a legitimation deficit creates the perceived need on the part of the State for 
intervention which in turn creates further legitimacy problems for the new State 
apparatus. Habermas correctly criticised Weber's assertion that the legitimacy of a State 
lay ultimately within what Weber termed the "rational-legal sphere." Habermas's theory, 
however, might be criticised for being ahistorical as well as for overemphasising the role 
of the State, particularly as the root of the problem. He leaves unexplained, for instance, 
the historical gaps between a serious legitimation crisis existing in the 1930s and the 
legitimation crisis at the end of the 1960s. It does not appear, when examined in specific 
historical circumstances, that the State becoming progressively involved in many spheres 
of American life during the Second World War led inexorably to a worsening 
legitimation crisis. Obviously, historical factors at least partially extraneous to the State 
affect the entire process. The most serious oversight on the part of Habermas seems to be 
his model's omission of the role of politics on the problem of State legitimation. The 
efficacy of many of the aforementioned institutions within American society existed 
because of the link between citizen and State. Their authority lay in their perceived 
ability to provide guidance and direction to the individual citizen, to enlist them in a 
cause, but also in the possibility that the individual citizen might be able to pull them in a 
direction conducive to his or her interests. Crucially, the perception of existing political 
and social alternatives must be present in order to motivate the individual citizen to lend 
authority to a given institution. Good and evil must be present to legitimate the authority 
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of religion (at least in its traditional sense). Trade unions flourished when the interests of 
workers were seen as an alternative to the interests of the owners. Political parties exist to 
pose alternatives visions of society and/or methods of achieving them to other political 
parties. Universities become technical training colleges without alternative ideas or 
schools of thought competing with each other. Democracy creates the idea that the citizen 
can influence the affairs of the State by choosing one political alternative over another. In 
a situation where there appears to be no alternatives, the authority and, indeed, the raison 
d' eire of these institutions is put into serious question. 
Besides the Habermasian imperative, then, we must place the perception 
of the closing down of alternatives in our understanding of how and why affirmative 
action became predominant. At one level, as we have seen, the destruction of civil rights 
programs relying at least partially on voluntarism on the part of white Americans, such as 
bussing and open housing, left affirmative action programs as the most important ways of 
accomplishing this goal. At another level, though, the creation within influential texts of 
an absence of alternatives ensured that affirmative action would become more than 
simply a group of policies 
Chapter 10 will examine, historically, how affIrmative action became an 
Issue. Chapter 11 will then look in particular at two influential and interconnected 
intellectual trends that provided a new intellectual context for affIrmative action, both 
justifying it as a coherent strategy and making it an issue. John Rawls' enormously 
influential A Theory of Justice changed the way in which many Americans viewed 
questions of merit and justice. Second, what might be called the "zero-growth" school of 
economics, based partially on but far outlasting economic diffIculties in the early 1970s, 
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removed political and social alternatives based on the premise of constant econonuc 
growth, ensuring that the earlier liberal idea that continuing material progress would 
underwrite racial and other social progress ("a rising tide lifts all boats") was bankrupt. It 
also turned focus upon issues connected with the realm of distribution rather than that of 
production. These trends, taken together, ensured that affirmative action grew from a few 
policies to an institution. Also, the zero-sum perspective, by emphasising a fmite number 
of resources, contributed to the most morally contentious issue of affIrmative action -
whether white males were victimised by these policies. 
1 Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy 1960-1972 
(Oxford University Press, 1990),412. 
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Chapter 10 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ISSUE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
The remarkable thing about affirmative action policies, given how many 
Americans have been affected by them, is that little comment greeted their arrival. 
Exceptions to quotas in the past tended to be argued in very general terms, usually 
invoking democratic principles. Though discussion took place in various arenas, 
references to it are scattered, implying that affIrmative action - in the modem sense - was 
not considered particularly important. The term "quotas" in the 1950s referred to setting 
maximum limits of blacks within white neighborhoods in order to prevent the perception 
that blacks would "take over" the neighborhood and the panicked white reaction to this 
perception - white flight. Chicago social activist Saul Alinsky proposed these sorts of 
quotas to the United States Commission on Civil Rights in 1959. He told them, "those 
who criticize the quota system for its undemocratic aspect have provided no practical 
solution." I In 1963-64 a minor controversy ensued after some civil rights leaders 
suggested that quotas of blacks might be needed to repair the economic damage done to 
African-Americans. As cited in chapter two, John F. Kennedy brushed aside the 
suggestion of quotas. New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller argued that quotas were 
both unlawful and counter to American principles.2 National Urban League Chief 
Executive Whitney Young and cleric Kyle Haselden explicated the argument in the pages 
of the New York Times Magazine in 1964. Young supported a domestic "Marshall Plan" 
for blacks in his 1964 book, To Be Equal. He invoked principles of distributive justice, 
noting that America has "long given special, emergency aid to the oppressed, the sick, the 
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handicapped and deprived." Haselden, though a sincere supporter of civil rights, rejected 
the idea of compensation and argued that race-conscious programs might perpetuate 
racism, stigmatize African Americans, and be unfair to those not helped and blame the 
living for the crimes of the dead.3 
George Wallace, picking up on the debate, objected that union seniority 
rights would be attacked by the suggestion of quotas.4 The Commentary discussion on the 
impact of the struggle for black civil rights on liberalism began by asking those present 
what they thought of recent suggestions of 10 percent quotas in jobs and college places 
for African-Americans. Academic Sidney Hook's objections (to suggestions by friends 
that Bronx High School of Science racially balance its intake of students) centred on the 
lowering of standards of achievement for blacks. Myrdal disagreed with preferences on 
the grounds that they could not work within a liberal framework. They would, he insisted, 
create democratic opposition amongst whites, allow less qualified to replace better 
qualified people, create tokenism and solidify divisions between the races. Most of all, 
Myrdal was concerned about the undermining effect that quotas would have on American 
institutions. These institutions were already in place, he maintained, to eliminate 
discrimination: "A local labor union may stand for discrimination, but the national 
association won't; it will be more liberal because it represents a greater investment of 
American ideals." Hook, however, argued that preferential treatment was not necessarily 
incompatible with liberalism and might find a limited place within the US in the future. 
In all the discussions around this issue, however, the argument that whites would be 
victimized was not heard. The debate was sufficiently obscure to disappear almost 
entirely within a year.5 
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Between 1965 and 1969 the issue of quotas hardly existed. Certainly. there 
was no solid left/right side to the debate. Senator Everett Dirksen, who had insisted on 
the inclusion of 703U) stipulating that the 1964 Act did not call for quotas, brought up the 
Philadelphia plan during 1968. After a clash with Comptroller General Staats, the 
10hnson administration dropped the plan, thus avoiding the issue.6 Few commentators 
noticed. Vieira repeated the objections Haselden had listed in 1964 and added that the 
government would relinquish its "educative role" against racism. 7 The provocative right-
wing columnist William F. Buckley, however, came out in favor of quotas. In a column 
in 1969 Buckley stated: "We must in fact encourage a pro-Negro discrimination."s If any 
other comments on the issue appeared, they remain hidden from view. In the 
congressional debate in 1969 the opposition to the Philadelphia plan did not oppose 
quotas except on the basis that quotas were against the law. Those in opposition 
highlighted the fact that the President was steamrolling over the interests of Congress, 
that labor's right to free bargaining was being usurped, and that the Philadelphia plan 
represented another attack on liberty. 
Little opposition to early affirmative action programs 
For nearly three years after the Philadelphia plan, the OMBE's 8(a) 
programs, Order No.4 and even Revised Order No.4 were in place, the issue of quotas 
remained largely outside of public discussion. Some dissent, however, did exist. First, 
labor reacted against the Philadelphia plan as it contradicted the seniority system that had 
been in place since the 1930s. AFL-CIO president George Meany objected strongly to the 
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plan as an "attempt to use the Building Trades as a whipping boy ... designed to give the 
Nixon administration a few Brownie points to offset their shortcomings in the civil rights 
field as a whole." The "greatest drawback to the plan," he said, "is that it diverts attention 
from the real solid task of training and qualifying minority workers for a permanent place 
in the ranks of skilled workers." Indicating that he did not oppose the principles involved 
in the plan, he criticised the plan for the fact that it "applies only to construction work.,,9 
In a letter to C. J. Haggerty, President of the AFL-CIO Building & Construction Trades 
Department, in January 1970, Meany praised the Chicago plan as a "significant forward 
step" and a possible guide for other areas of the nation. lO Not surprisingly, many 
observers felt that Meany's objections, given the lily-white composition of some of the 
unions involved, were groundless or, more to the point, centred on the fact that only 
construction workers had been targeted. When Sam Ervin objected to the circulation of a 
draft version of Order No.4, Meany had no comment. II 
An interesting and enlightening example of an early exchange on 
affirmative action policies between Macklin Fleming, Justice of the Court of Appeal, 
State of California, and Louis Pollak, Dean of the Yale Law School, was published in The 
Public Interest in the spring of 1970. 12 Yale Law School initiated a system of quotas for 
the fIrst year class of the fall of 1969 whereby 43 black students were admitted, of whom 
five qualified under the regular standards and 38 did not. Macklin Fleming objected that 
this would lead to separate law schools and legal institutions - one black and one white, 13 
that the under-qualified black students would suffer in such a highly competitive 
atmosphere (leading to "aggressive conduct" by black students I4), that Jews and 
"orientals" would suffer from the inevitable extension of quotas to other groups. Fleming 
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stated that "the American Creed, one that Yale has proudly espoused, holds that an 
American should be judged as an individual and not as a member of a groUp.,,15 Dean 
Pollak replied that standards had been relaxed as a matter of course with regard to black 
law students for over 15 years - "the admissions practices which you call into question 
are not really new." Pollak also argued that it was not blacks alone that had benefited 
from such a program. 16 
However, with these exceptions to the rule noted, Daniel Bell was no 
doubt correct to observe in 1973 that "(w)hat is extraordinary about this change [to 
affirmative action] is that, without public debate, an entirely new principle of rights has 
been introduced into the polity.,,17 Despite an extensive search, I have found no evidence 
that anyone in the media thought the new involuntary affrrmative action warranted 
comment rather than simply reportage. IS None of the leading liberal publications mention 
the issue once until the latter half of 1972. Though the New Republic does mention the 
controversy in 1972, the Nation contains no comment at all on the matter throughout 
Nixon's first term of office. 
Why was there so little interest? Despite the protests of some of those 
opposed to the programs, affrrmative action programs were understood not as affrrmative 
action per se but as particular programs that would help make real the promise of equal 
opportunities inherent in the American Creed. Affrrmative action programs had not yet 
been bundled together as having a common theme. For Nixon, they were bound together 
only as civil rights strategies compatible with his own mores. For most administrators 
they were simply minor civil rights programs overshadowed in particular by the bussing 
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issue and even by housing integration, a testament to the fact that the goal of integration 
of black Americans within the mainstream still dominated. 
Little political opposition can be found to affirmative action programs, 
apart from Ervin's faintly heard protest about Order No.4, after the initial attempts to add 
the rider to a Senate Appropriations Bill in December 1969. 19 In July 1972, in the run-up 
to the election, the issue of "quotas" came up but only amongst two specific groups, both 
of whom were targets for the Republicans. Labor, of course, had opposed the 
Philadelphia Plan. Many felt that the hardhat marches in May 1970 presaged the 
Republicans reneging on the commitment to the Philadelphia Plan (not least 
undersecretary Arthur Fletcher2o) in an effort to attract labor's vote. Certainly, labor's 
traditional support for the Democrats was by no means guaranteed. AFL-CIO leader 
George Meany refused to endorse the Democrats in the run-up to the 1972 election and 
much of the blue-collar support that the Democrats had been alienated by Democratic 
policies. However, labor's alienation from the Democratic Party's was more the result of 
the perception that the Democratic Party had moved away from its traditional 
commitment to labor in favour of new "alien" values. Even more important, many blue-
collar workers felt the Democratic Party's position on the Vietnam War threatened to 
"sell out" the interests of the country. 
In light of labor's wavering support for the Democrats, Nixon actively 
pursued blue-collar votes, putting the promising young aide Charles Colson in charge of 
garnering labor and Catholic support for the 1972 Republican effort. Colson worried 
about the effect of the Philadelphia Plan on labor support and wrote memos urging the 
end of affrrmative action in favour of the OMBE program.21 He also urged the 
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administration to rid itself of Arthur Fletcher, who had accused the unions of "getting 
away with murder" in regards to equal employment opportunity.22 Colson did not 
succeed in overturning the administration's affirmative action policy though Fletcher 
resigned in early 1972. 
Yet Colson's worries about the blue-collar vote and the Philadelphia Plan 
were needless. The unions, suffering a long decline of influence and power and protective 
of their alignment with civil rights groups, failed to get any real campaign against quotas 
off the ground. A demoralised and increasingly individuated construction work force had 
larger problems than the loss of the seniority system with which to contend. From the 
winter of 196911970, a recession had effected the industry. The overall unemployment 
rate climbed to nearly five percent in the spring of 1970, the highest it had been in five 
years. Building and housing starts were the lowest they had been for a decade.23 The 
issue also tended to settle down once it became clear that the actual number of black 
Americans hired on construction sites was low, given the difficulties in fmding qualified 
minority laborers and a prolonged apprenticeship period set by the Department of Labor's 
Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training (BAT). As Fletcher concluded, "the real test is 
going to come when the construction industry starts moving. ,,24 But the construction 
industry did not even budge. The paltry amount of new jobs meant that affirmative action 
had little visible effect. As Kevin Phillips, the right-wing Republican pundit who had 
worked for Nixon in 1968 and published The Real Majority predicting Republican 
dominance in the 1970s (and whom the administration in 1969 felt they had to distance 
themselves from) stated, the mood inside blue-collar circles had become one of clinging 
to what still existed rather than arguing about who should control intake of workers. In 
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late 1972 a news summary, circulated amongst White House staff, cited Phillips, then a 
syndicated columnist, extensively: 
... Phillips views appointment [of Brennan] as part and parcel of hardhat-cum-
Catholic strategy pushed effectively by Colson, and says obvious labor issues like 
minimum wage are no longer central to large group of old-line blue-collars who 
are increasingly preoccupied wlholding on to what they have in the face of 
sociological upheaval. Thus, Admin can win a "major political beachhead" among 
them w/out shifting many positions, says Phillips, noting "right to work" and 
quotas are dead issues.25 
In other words, Phillips felt that objections of labor to old Republican anti-union 
positions and Philadelphia Plan-related issues could be overcome by appeals on various 
other issues. On the Vietnam war and on other "social issues, in Scammon and 
Wattenberg's terminology, Nixon represented more continuation with past procedures 
than did the Democratic Party. For these reasons, amongst labor, quotas were a "dead 
issue." 
Other early objections to affirmative action 
The second group where resistance to affIrmative action occurred early 
was amongst Jews, especially Jews close to the New York City orbit and within 
academia. Antagonism had occurred between black Americans and Jews sporadically 
since the 1930s in New York City, often due to the proximity of the two communities and 
Jewish ownership of businesses in black areas. In the late 1960s some black leaders made 
blatantly anti-semitic comments in a dispute over the control over public schools that 
peaked between September and November 1968. When the former SNCC head, James 
Forman, after declaring that existing "white Christian churches and Jewish synagogues" 
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should pay blacks reparations of some $500 million, had announced his attention to 
disrupt services at Temple E-manuel, the Jewish Defense League attended with 175 men 
armed with baseball bats, pipes, and chains. Liberal, middle-class Jews, including the 
rabbi of Temple Emanu-el, who stated that Forman was welcome to use the pulpit, sought 
to distance themselves from these disputes. However, many disputes were breaking out 
within various colleges and universities where militant blacks were challenging existing 
authorities. Changes to institutions like Cornell, where 16 black students armed 
themselves with rifles and shotguns made demands for more black admissions, and City 
College of New York (CCNY) in 1968-69 created resentments amongst Jewish 
academics.26 
There was also the fear apparent in Macklin Fleming's letter that a quota 
system would inevitably mean that ethnic or racial groups proportionally over-
represented in top universities would suffer under any quotas. Such fears were not 
unwarranted. Leonard Garment, in defending affIrmative action policies, noted ironically 
that he had suffered exclusion from Columbia Law School in the 1930s because, within 
top law schools, a maximum quota on the number of Jews meant that better qualifIed 
Jews were passed over in favour of gentiles. 27 A debate arose from late 1971 on the pages 
of the American Jewish Committee's publication, Commentary. Jews (besides labor) 
were another group that CREEP (the Campaign to Re-Elect the President) attended to, 
amongst their many tasks. Commentary, a magazine dedicated to Jewish issues, carried 
more articles about quotas than other periodicals at the time. 
Missing from the early arguments around these policies, however, are 
many of the key points made in discussions about affirmative action today. In particular, 
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there appears to be no hard and fixed arguments against affirmative action per se. For 
instance, the substance of Alan Bakke's case - that he had been discriminated against as a 
white male - had yet to be heard, except from those who viewed all civil rights policies 
as attacks on whites.28 Nor did opponents tend to attack all affrrmative action policies. 
Justice Fleming, for instance, admitted that "racial quotas may serve a purpose in some 
contexts ... ,,29 Exponents of affIrmative action policies tended to downplay the difficulties 
presented in the arguments of opponents - many, as we observed previously, stressed the 
special-case nature of a particular program. Much of the early criticism on the pages of 
Commentary simply implied that a worthy program was being taken too far. Stephen 
Steinberg, in an article on quotas appearing before the storm had broken, told readers: 
... the quotas adopted in recent years are designed to increase the representation of 
disprivileged blacks. One can only speculate on whether this will significantly 
diminish educational opportunities for Jews. It is just as plausible that the 
increasing black enrolment will be at the expense of those students who 
previously were admitted less for their academic qualification than because they 
had the "right" family credentials or went to the "right" preparatory school. 30 
Writing in early 1972, Earl Raab commended a program put in place by 
the San Francisco School Board designed to "implement a program of faculty racial and 
ethnic balance which more closely approximates the racial and ethnic distribution of the 
total school population so long as such efforts maintain or improve quality of education." 
"No trouble arose over these policies" Raab asserted. However, "a subtle but critical line 
was crossed beyond affIrmative action" when the School Board decided to eliminate 71 
jo bs by a strict seniority system that applied to "Other Whites." (It is perhaps instructive 
that the only objection to affIrmative action here is when jobs are eliminated along an 
affIrmative action basis, rather than created.) Similarly, Elliot Abrams, in attacking "The 
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Quota Commission" (meaning EEOC), was careful to blame "an excess of z e a l ' ~ ~ rather 
than affIrmative action itself. 31 
Meanwhile, much of the logic behind affirmative action began to be 
accepted both within government programs and in court decisions. Affirmative action 
programs burgeoned, especially after, on March 8 1971, the Supreme Court handed down 
the historic Griggs v. Duke Power Co. decision. Black employees at the Power Company 
had argued that the company's requirement of a high school diploma or passing of 
intelligence tests as a condition of employment in or transfer to jobs at the plant breached 
their civil rights. By finding in their favour, the Court validated the idea of "disparate 
impact," whereby employer practices need not have the intention to discriminate but are 
judged as discriminatory if they have the effect of discrimination. The implication was 
that, if a disproportionately small section of a given workforce was black, a company 
must act to rectify the situation in order to avoid a lawsuit. Griggs legitimated in law the 
idea of institutional discrimination. 32 At the same time, HEW began issuing new 
guidelines that effectively extended affirmative action programs beyond their original 
meaning. A letter from HEW, dated March 31 1971, to the President of the University of 
Arizona in response to a request for clarifIcation, directed that: "Department heads should 
be advised that, in addition to recruitment of females, affirmative action requires that 
Government contractors considers other factors than mere technical qualifications. ,,33 It is 
notable that, before Revised Order No.4, including women within the category of 
"affected classes" for the purpose of affrrmative action plans of government contractors, 
was issued in December 1971, women were effectively included in the "affected classes" 
by HEW. In late 1971, a Democratic amendment to ban quotas was defeated and, after 
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the Erlenborn substitution bill won the day, EEOC gained the power to sue on March ~ ~
1972. 
Yet the discussion about quotas and affIrmative action was only just 
beginning. As Glazer was able to observe: "Clearly, in 1972, something new was 
happening.,,34 Because of the forthcoming election, the debate reached the ears of the 
President. Nixon might not have seen fit to comment had he not had his eye on potential 
new constituencies. The New York Times cited a "forthcoming study" in May 1972 that 
argued "that the Presidential election can be swung by either Republicans or Democrats 
with strategies directed at black, Spanish-speaking, Jewish, Italian, and Slavic voters. 
These groups make up 30 to 33 percent of the electorate, concentrated in major states.,,35 
A Harris Public Opinion Analysis, published October 12 1972, confIrmed what Nixon 
had instinctively known for some time. "Two of the sharpest fall-offs from the 
Democratic column in 1972 for President have been taking place among two quite 
different ethnic groups -- those whose ancestral origins trace back to Italy and voters 
whose religion is Jewish.,,36 Safire exclaimed that " ... for the fIrst time, the Nixon 
campaign was openly trying to get Jewish voters to switch, and the very fact of the effort 
was new." Though they voted overwhelmingly for Hubert Humphrey in 1968, by the end 
of 1971 Nixon sensed that an opportunity lay open. He directed his statements regarding 
quotas directly at Jewish interests, as the letter to Phillip Hoffinan written in August 1972 
indicates. Nixon made a similar attack on quotas in his Labor Day speech on September 3 
1972.37 
However, Democratic candidate George McGovern also denounced 
quotas, indicating that the political sides of the debate had not yet firmed. The 
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Democratic Party's relationship with quotas was even more ambiguous than that of the 
Republicans. They (later followed by the Republican Party) adopted their own quotas as a 
method of choosing delegates at the same time as the Philadelphia Plan was being 
debated. On November 19 and 20 1969, The 28 person Commission on Party Structure 
and Delegate Selection, chaired by McGovern, passed a motion on delegate selection 
after a discussion mirroring the one between Staats and the Department of Labor. The 
delegates debated whether "some reasonable relationship" between the racial, gender and 
age makeup of states and delegations should be ''urged,'' "recommended," or "required." 
In the end, the Commission "recommended" some form of proportionality for 1972, after 
which it would be "required." The 1972 delegation to the convention duly contained a 
representation including youth in tom jeans, black delegates wearing afros and dashikis, 
and militant feminists. 38 One delegate, no doubt expressing the hostility of a large 
percentage of labor delegates to the conference to these new elements, said at the 
Democratic Convention that he would work for "blood, sweat and tears" but wouldn't 
work for "sex, dope, and queers. ,,39 
The Republicans were able to effectively label the Democrats the "quota 
party" despite McGovern's protestations to the contrary and despite the fact that it had 
been the Republicans that had saved quotas from a Democratic attack at the end of the 
previous year. Moreover, the issue of afftrmative action was simply pushed aside. The 
major discussion - one which dominates discussion on domestic issues in the White 
House in 1972, was bussing. Thus, neither Nixon's nor McGovern's position on "quotas" 
. . d 40 
was much scrutlmse . 
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Growth in policies and confusion 
The situation in 1972 is best characterised as one of rapidly expanding 
affirmative action programs and political confusion about the issue. The New Republic 
felt it had to tell its readers what precisely affirmative action was and what the positions 
of the candidates regarding the issue were. It expressed no opinion either way, observing 
that both candidates had come out against quotas while supporting affirmative action 
programs. "It would be instructive to hear Mr. Nixon's opinion of the affIrmative action 
program ... But he hasn't given it; we'll have to be content with his stern message on 
quotas.,,41 Not surprisingly, public administrators also were confused as to what 
affirmative action was. David H. Rosenbloom, an American Society for Public 
Administration fellow with the CSC, set out three major strategies to attain equal 
employment opportunity in a 1972 article. The fIrst was to eliminate discrimination, the 
second was to ''take 'affrrmative action' to attempt to eliminate inequalities of 
opportunities," and the third was the ''utilization of numerical goals for minority and 
female hiring and promotion. ,,42 
The issue was perhaps best defmed within higher education, where it 
appeared to be largely confmed in 1972. Paul Seabury's article published in February 
1972 about quotas at universities provoked a flurry of letters to the editorial board at 
Commentary, published in the May 1972 issue (contrasting with the very few letters 
following Elliot Abram's article on EEOC despite the fact it was published later in the 
year). Even as Nixon uttered his denunciations of quotas, Assistant Attorney General 1. 
Stanley Pottinger, one of Nixon's more conservative staff members on civil rights 
questions,43 felt obliged to clarify the rules concerning universities enforced by HEW to 
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representatives of six Jewish groups, effectively mUddying the waters: "While HEW does 
not endorse quotas, I feel that HEW has no responsibility to object if quotas are used by 
Universities on their own initiative. ,,44 HEW had prodded 14 universities into submitting 
affirmative action plans during 1972 that involved the hiring of staff and intake of 
students, including Brown University. 45 Others created and implemented their own 
affirmative action programs after the federal government successfully defended the 
Philadelphia Plan in court. Even before the election, indicating that Nixon's attack on 
quotas had done nothing to stem the tide of affirmative action, HEW issued "Higher 
Education guidelines: Executive Order 11246," which put more pressure on universities 
to comply.46 Much as pressure on the universities made more of an impact than had 
pressure on construction firms and unions, however, the impact was still not yet large. 
Most affirmative action plans effective in the higher education sector used three or five 
year deadlines. By 1975, the number of African-Americans on previously white 
campuses rose from 1970 by an impressive 173 percent to a still modest 310, 000.47 
In 1973 affirmative action gathered pace. EEOC, armed with its new 
powers and backed by the courts on the legitimacy of disparate impact, brought charges 
against such large firms as General Motors, General Electric, Sears, Roebuck and Co. and 
against the union, the United Auto Workers.48 Between May 1973 and May 1974, 64 
percent of all non-postal federal employees hired were minority group members. By then 
blacks were over-represented in federal employment; they held 14.6 percent of all non-
postal federal employment. They were even more represented in postal jobs.49 A major 
case began in 1970, when Atlantic Telegraph and Telephone (AT&T) filed a request for a 
rate increase with the Federal Communications Commission, and EEOC petitioned to 
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intervene on the basis that the company had violated equal opportunity requirements of 
the Federal Communications Act and the Civil Rights Act. Five percent of EEOC's 
complaint backlog were AT&T grievances and EEOC launched the action in part to 
reduce this burden. The AT&T consent decree was filed in the US District Court for 
Eastern Pennsylvania in January 1973. The decree contained an affIrmative action plan 
with $15 million in back pay to 13,000 women and 2,000 minority men and $23 million 
to be paid annually to 36,000 minority and female workers. A second consent decree was 
filed in May 1974 that covered $30 million in back pay for 25,000 management 
employees. 50 The case had a huge impact upon the industrial relations policies of 
virtually all large companies in the US. Affirmative action programs thus also expanded 
(as EEOC and others no doubt anticipated) when fIrms not directly in the firing line of 
the agencies and the courts, fearing lawsuits, increasingly consulted EEOC or the courts 
regarding decisions that they would have decided independently. For example, in 
September 1973, Jersey Central Power and Light decided to lay off200 workers. It asked 
a Federal Court to decide which of two contracts - one with the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and one with EEOC - it should honour when deciding 
who to layoff. The judge ruled that both had to be honoured. The company asked the 
court to review its list. Other companies and agencies hired specialist lawyers and 
personnel managers to evaluate and negotiate personnel decisions with reference to 
affirmative action stipulations. Despite the profusion of activity, though, the conception 
of affIrmative action was not clear. As Marilyn Bender, writing in the New York Times, 
noted in 1974: "Confusion and uncertainty inevitably follow major changes in the law or 
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social policy but the job discrimination picture seems unusually chaotic to those who 
must grapple with it." 51 
Another factor influencing the growth of affirmative action as policies and 
as an issue was the decline throughout the 1970s of alternative civil rights strategies. As 
Graham was able to note in a book detailing policy during the Carter years, "[b]y 1980, 
two of the nation's great post-war crusades in civil rights policy, the racial integration of 
America's schools and housing, had largely failed.,,52 
By the summer of 1973 the administration felt conscious enough of the 
association between quotas and affrrmative action that it avoided speaking at all of 
affrrmative action. White House aide Ken Cole instructed staff preparing a press release 
regarding opportunities for "Spanish Speaking Americans" to "( 0 )mit the word 
"affrrmative" in the fIrst paragraph. Many 'affirmative action' programs have turned into 
quota systems - to which we are philosophically opposed. At this point, it is much better 
to talk of action programs than to have the President endorse all affrrmative action 
programs. ,,53 However, Watergate had begun to dominate the thoughts of the 
administration and the pundits, leaving little space for affIrmative action. No record of 
any discussion involving the President on affrrmative action in 1973 or 1974 has yet been 
uncovered. During the Ford Administration, however, the issue made more headlines. At 
a Cabinet Meeting held on June 25 1975, the subject of affIrmative action dominated the 
agenda. The President, Secretaries Henry Kissinger, Caspar Weinberger, John Dunlop, 
William Coleman and Attorney General Edward Levi discussed "how can we get out of 
the absurdity of regulations without it being perceived as a public retreat from the 
commitment to equal employment opportunity?,,54 
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In 1974, as the number of programs, regulations and legal decisions using 
affirmative action as a basis for personnel and other decisions increased some of the , 
murkiness surrounding the issue disappeared. The Supreme Court ruled against a plaintiff 
who complained that his rights had been denied when he missed out on a college place 
despite being qualified because of an affirmative action plan. By this time many more 
interests were becoming involved. In the case DeFunis v. Odegaard, the AFL-CIO, B'nai 
B'rith filed amicus curiae in support of DeFunis' claims, whereas the American Hebrew 
Women's Council, the Union of Auto Workers (UA W), and the Union of Mine Workers 
Association (UMWA) filed amicus curiae against DeFunis. 55 In 1975 Nathan Glazer 
published the fIrst book-length critique of affIrmative action, Affirmative Discrimination. 
Glazer's book, an intelligent and reasoned analysis lacking much of the histrionic nature 
of some later critiques, was significant in that it was the fIrst to treat the various disparate 
policies thematically. It \\'1$ in 1978, however, that most Americans first heard of 
affIrmative action. Then, the Supreme Court handed down a decision in favour of the 
plaintiff in the much-discussed Bakke v. California Board of Regents case. By the late 
1970s, the issue had grown from a small dispute over whether or not some relatively 
insignificant policies had been overzealously applied into the largest discussion in the 
United States touching upon matters of race. 
Lateral expansion of affirmative action 
Besides the programmatic expansion in affrrmative action policies and 
affIrmative action-based decisions, strategies and regulations, affirmative action grew 
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laterally. The so-called "affected classes" within affirmative action grew to include more 
and more groups within US society. The Philadelphia plan, though it specified 
"minorities," really only dealt with the dearth of blacks in construction employment. As 
was indicated previously in this dissertation, the justification for the Philadelphia plan 
was in its specific application to African-Americans within the construction industry. In 
fact, the term minorities had, in regard to contract compliance policies, really referred to 
African-Americans.56 Even with the inclusion of the category of sexual discrimination in 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the categories of other minorities and women were usually 
added for consistency's sake in the late 1960s. EO 11246 in 1965, for instance, was issued 
without reference to sexual discrimination. It was only changed two years later when EO 
11375 supplanted it. However, in 1971, Revised Order No.4 included women as an 
affected class. In January 1973 the US Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance, issued new guidelines to cover discrimination against persons because of 
religion or ethnic origin. These guidelines stated: 
Members of various religious and ethnic groups, primarily but not exclusively of 
Eastern, Middle, and South European ancestry, such as Jews, Catholics, Italians, 
Greeks, and Slavic groups continue to be excluded from executive middle 
management, and other job levels because of discrimination based on their 
religion and/or national origin. These guidelines are intended to remedy such 
unfair treatment. (60-50.1 of Chapter 60, Title 41, Code of Federal Regulations) 
In the end, it was decided that affirmative action would deal only with 
''unchanging physical characteristics. ,,57 Also in 1973 , however, affirmative action was 
extended to the physically and mentally handicapped. In 1974, non-native speakers of 
English were included. Within SBA's 8(a) program, the original defmition for the 
purposes of classification had been ''Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Indians, Eskimos and 
Aleuts" but, at least potentially, members of all races could benefit provided they were 
301 
"deprived.,,58 In 1979, the program was expanded to include "Asian Pacific A m e r i c a n s . ~ · ·
In the 1980s the SBA accepted petitions from representatives of the following groups for 
inclusion within the 8(a) program: (East) Indians, Sri Lankans, Tonganese, Indonesians, 
Nepalese, and natives of Bhutan. It rejected petitions from Hassidic Jews, women, 
disabled veterans, Iranians and Afghans. 59 
The inclusion of others besides African-Americans within the remit of 
affirmative action programs led to problems of justification for affIrmative action. In the 
Congressional debates over the Philadelphia plan, it was clear that it was intended as part 
of a package of civil rights programs designed to accommodate African-Americans 
within the mainstream. References to the threat of riots were used as justifications in the 
1969 debate. In the debate surrounding the Hawkins bill (HR1746) in 1971, reference 
was made only to affirmative action programs' effects on black employment. With the 
new affected classes added, affirmative action moved out of the package of measures 
designed to resolve a racial crisis. The logic that had justified programs like these in the 
fIrst place could not justify the growing number and scope of these policies. 
AffIrmative action fIrst existed within what Gareth Davies has called 
"liberal individualism. ,,60 It existed to compensate for flaws and omissions that did not 
permit African Americans to participate within the mainstream of the United States 
economy. As such, early affIrmative action was "Keynesian" in that it was a government 
policy that attempted to oil the wheels of the system, rather than replace it. As Johnson 
insisted in 1966, " ... we know that no national government action, however enlightened, 
can by itself change the conditions of Negro life in America." He instead considered his 
policy initiatives as "rededications to age-old American values." 61 The American Creed 
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still existed within the hearts and minds of many Americans; affirmative action's purpose 
was, originally, to make this creed a reality within the African-American community. 
However, if, as Davies characterised it, Johnson's fmal three years of office saw "an 
increasingly desperate salvage operation aimed at keeping afloat a liberal creed 
transformed by the politics of race," this creed sank beneath the surface when Nixon took 
office.62 
Affirmative action, though originally designed to augment and strengthen 
the liberal creed, played a role in undermining it. The rapid expansion of affirmative 
action programs might stand as an empirical demonstration of the legitimation crisis 
pointed out by Habermas. With the imposition of an affIrmative action program in the 
federal civil service, the practices and rules that the civil service had followed for nearly 
one hundred years were replaced. Efficiency and Weberian rationality were the 
watchwords of the servants of the public. Hiring was to be done on merit (as required by 
the Civil Service Act of 1883) and what has been called the "doctrine of privilege" 
governed, meaning that it was a privilege to work in public service and, generally, 
employment rights should not apply. With the affirmative action imperative, the tradition 
of hiring by merit was thrown into question, as managers had to balance new priorities 
with 01d.63 AffIrmative action also imperilled the traditional management prerogative to 
make decisions over whom to hire and fIre. Even American law came into question, both 
because of affIrmative action's fairly blatant circumvention of the strictures against 
quotas in the 1964 Civil Rights Act but, more broadly, because legislative remedies had 
failed to guarantee equal opportunities for African-Americans. Both sides of the debate 
today appeal to "higher law" as well as to the statute books. 
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With the expansion of affIrmative action programs to include women and 
other categories of minorities, it became separated from its original justification of 
fulfilling the democratic promise for African-Americans. As such, it had undermined its 
own raison d' etre. The programs existed with no real philosophical basis, hiding within 
the shadow cast by now extinct Great society programs. Some new justification for the 
policies - a new philosophy that could replace or reinforce many of the democratic 
features of liberal individualism - was needed. 
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Chapter 11 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRIBUTION TO AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION: RAWLS AND ZERO-GROWTH 
A Theory of Justice 
In 1971, John Rawls' published A Theory of Justice. An enormously 
influential book, it attracted a flood of criticisms, comments and praise after its 
publication. When first published, the book received favourable reviews in the New York 
Review of Books, the New York Times Book Review, the Economist, the Spectator, 
Nation, Washington Post, The Times Literary Supplement and others. Disputes about the 
various building blocs that Rawls erected rumbled on in the pages of various 
philosophical and journals. The American Political Science Review printed seven lengthy 
reviews alone. Yet even those reviewers that were critical of Rawls agreed upon its 
monumental importance. James Fishkin and Peter Laslett noted that Isaiah Berlin's 
assertion in 1962 that no commanding work of political theory has appeared in the 20th 
century was no longer true in 1971. 1 
Rawls' theory's central importance to the emergence of affirmative action 
lies in its explication of a new framework of values that replaced traditional values and 
mores that, at the end of the 1960s, had lost their salience. Many facets of the American 
Creed, or liberal individualism, were simply no longer operable as legitimating devices. 
Rawls' project, as he characteristically admitted/ was to recreate a basis upon which 
liberalism might provide a stable order. Within the book, the most important discussion 
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in relation to legitimating affIrmative action is undoubtedly his treatment of the problem 
of equality of opportunity. Having said that, it is necessary to understand Rawls' book 
within the historical period in which it appeared. Had it remained an obscure academic 
work, there would be little reason to study it; the question of why this work became so 
popular and widely discussed is more important for the purposes of this study than any 
that Rawls discusses. For, although Rawls advances an interesting, well-argued and 
sophisticated philosophical theory, its popularity is less a renewed interest in obscure 
philosophical discussions than a manifestation of the need for a new philosophical 
framework for liberalism. 
An historical appreciation of the arguments is appropriate because the 
book is a complex synthesis of twenty years of philosophical development. Rawls deals 
with many topics and leaves many questions - purposefully, it sometimes appears - open 
ended in a way that has created vast amounts of material dedicated simply to clarifying 
the meaning of many aspects of the theory. As Robert Wolff observed, the "labyrinthine 
complexities" of Rawls' book reflect his initial idea for a simple, coherent, and relatively 
straightforward answer to a basic question, and developed around responses to his initial 
answer since the 1950s.3 Large sections of the book concentrate on very specific 
difficulties; as such, the structure of the book is quite difficult to follow. Rawls 
incorporates discussions of many different intellectual traditions, including economic 
"games theory," ideal utilitarianism, contractarianism, and intuitionism into the book. 
Key aspects of the theory evolved at different times, though. 
The philosophical problem with which Rawls engages in lay in an impasse 
between two schools of philosophical thought, which also appear to have influenced by 
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historical problems, even if those who put them forward fail to acknowledge any sort of 
historical influence. Utilitarianism - the greatest good for the greatest number - ran into 
the difficulty that, according to the theory, it was right to sacrifice the good of one often 
for the good of many. Such a theory sat uncomfortably in a liberal individualist polity, 
especially at a time when communism might legitimately claim to be the heir of 
utilitarian thinking. Furthermore, by reducing individuals to simple receptacles of 
happiness, utilitarianism denied that any moral purpose might unite a society or that 
individual morality had any real role to play. Intuitionism asserts that each person has a 
power of moral intuition that is essentially rational. It holds that the right is independent 
of the good, and makes rightness a fundamental, irreducibly moral conception. 
Intuitionism, however, is in many ways a mere expression of conviction; if two people 
have different moral intuitions, intuitionism has no answer. It can be observed that 
intuitionism might have looked problematic when the moral rightness of capitalism (and, 
in particular, anticommunism) came into question in the McCarthyite era of American 
history. 4 
That Rawls attempted to resolve these problems sets him apart from other 
philosophers in the twentieth century, who as Kukathas and Pettit note, were "loath to 
present themselves as defenders of any particular values.,,5 It also moved in the direction 
of resolving a similar question expressed in political theory, the divide between existing 
conceptions of that is politically feasible, on the one hand, with what is politically 
desirable, on the other. Such a bridge might have helped bring together academic 
disciplines that had long developed progressive demarcations between their respective 
professional spheres such as economics, political science and philosophy. Gene Blocker 
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and Elizabeth Smith observe that "Rawls' work can be seen as a way of relieving a major 
political schism of our time, one which separates the libertarian right from the egalitarian 
left." They note that, in law, Rawls' theory helped resolve a dispute between legal 
positivism and those arguing for a natural rights/natural law conception. "Like Kant, 
Rawls stands as the man in the middle, a mediator of many longstanding disputes.,,6 The 
immodesty of Rawls' theoretical project (though Rawls himself made less grand claims 
for his theories than have other writers), with its attempt to resolve so many problematic 
divisions as well as provide a basis for political action, is perhaps its greatest strength. 7 
Rawls' solution to the problem became the heart of his book, a brilliantly 
simple, elegant, formal manoeuvre, "one of the loveliest ideas in the history of social and 
political theory," as Wolff, a trenchant critic, puts it.8 Rawls constructs a formal model of 
a society populated with rational, self-interested persons that would choose the way in 
which their society would organise. Called the "original position" (and self-consciously 
referring to Rousseau's "initial situation"), Rawls posited that these individuals would, if 
they were rationally self-interested, unanimously choose a set of principles from which 
institutions and practices within which the players interact might be evaluated. Once they 
agreed those principles, Rawls added to the rules of the game, they will have to abide by 
those principles. His concern is to derive principles of justice from this formal model that 
might stand as the basis to ajust society.9 
"J. F . ,,10 In its original appearance, in Rawls' 1958 essay, ushce as arrness, 
Rawls derived two principles of justice from this model. The first was that "each person 
participating in a practice, of affected by it, has an equal right to the most extensive 
liberty compatible with a like liberty for all." The second, which would be changed in 
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later versions, was that "inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that 
they will work out for everyone's advantage, and provided the positions and office to 
which they attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all."ll The principles 
are "lexically" ordered; the fIrst was prior to the second. Rawls used the expectations of 
the "representative man" to judge whether an inequality was legitimate; the 
representative man must believe that an unequal distribution works to his advantages. In 
other words, if there were a dispute over the rules within, say, a game of baseball, 
representatives might be made up of pitcher, infielder, outfielder, and catcher, who 
represented the various different positions within the game. In order to decide the 
efficacy of the rules, these four players could fairly represent the views of most players. 
For Rawls, in this version of his theory, inequalities in the benefits accruing to different 
position must be in the interest of every party participating. 12 Rawls claimed that the 
principles were at the same time an accurate reconstruction of our settled moral 
convictions and the solution to the bargaining game. It is interesting to note that this 
version strongly supports the principle of equal opportunity that existed at the time of 
publication. 13 
The next version of the theory appeared 1967, a date of crucial importance 
in understanding the influences upon Rawls, as "Distributive Justice.,,14 He made two 
revisions to his theory. First, Rawls dealt with a difficulty that arose from the first version 
of his theory. The players of the game within the original position, if they knew too much 
about their own situations, may not have agreed with Rawls' outcome, particularly if they 
counted themselves as amongst the top of the social strata. Rawls created the "veil of 
ignorance," whereby "no one knows his position in society, nor even his place in the 
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distribution of natural talents and abilities," in order to rid his theory of justice of 
"bargaining problems which arise in everyday life from the possession of this 
knowledge" that might affect the choice of the players. The second revision - extremely 
important for a justification of affirmative action - was a change in the second principle 
of justice. Instead of justifying inequalities by their acceptability to everyone playing the 
game - or of representative man, inequalities had now to be justified by their 
acceptability to the "representative man of those who are least favored by the system of 
institutional inequalities.,,15 This new conception has been referred to at various times 
and by various people the "difference principle" and the "maximin" conception of justice. 
Additionally, however, some less obvious changes occurred between the versions. 
Whereas Rawls appeared to be dealing with small-scale institutions - implied in the 
baseball metaphor - in the new article Rawls asks the question of "whether it is possible 
to arrange the institutions of a constitutional democracy so that the two principles of 
justice are satisfied, at least approximately.,,16 
As Ian Shapiro has noted, Rawls downplayed the difference between his 
original model and this new conception of his theory of justice. 17 In Rawls' terms, 
pointing out the problems with the "Pareto-optimal" justification for inequalities in his 
fIrst version of events would "only show what we knew all along," namely that the 
efficiency of a system and a high degree of equality of opportunity did not guarantee 
justice. 18 Yet the implication of the changes are large. John Schaar observed in 1975 that 
"Rawls proposed a basic shift in our operative definition of equality.,,19 Equality of 
opportunity, in the past, made real the primary liberal tenet that the individual is the basic 
unit of society. It justified inequality within capitalism by holding aloft the possibility 
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that all individuals have equal chances to hold offices and positions within society. 
Schaar pointed out that: 
Up until a few years ago, this understanding of equality as equality of opportunity 
reigned virtually unchallenged. It is still by far and away the dominant conception 
of equality in the public mind and the dominant conception employed in the 
making of public policy. Today, however, in some quarters the principle has come 
under attack. Far from being a remedy for inequality, and thus a move toward 
justice, the principle is held to be the fountain of new kinds of inequality, and thus 
a move toward injustice. Some writers are arguing that equality of opportunity 
should be replaced by equality of expectations, or even equality of results. John 
Rawls agrees with much of this criticism, and proposes that the liberal principle of 
equal opportunity must, as a requirement of justice, be replaced by a new 
understanding of "fair equality of opportunity.,,2o 
The importance of this shift should not be glossed over. Affirmative action 
was justified within the original conception of equality of opportunity only as a 
contingent, temporary measure. Rawls incorporated the old within a new system that 
would, he hoped, please all "by combining the principle of fair equality of opportunity 
with the difference principle.,,21 The fIrst definition of equality of opportunity could be 
preserved (instead of entirely annihilated, as more radical commentators might have 
wished) to provide a continuity but superseded by the difference principle in order to 
fulfil its own mission in forwarding what Myrdal referred to as ''the general process 
toward economic democratization in our society.,,22 
The third form of Rawls' model appeared with the publication of his 
theory in the book, A Theory of Justice, in 1971. One striking difference between the 
1967 version of the theory and the book version is the new conception of "primary 
goods," which Rawls defines as "rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income 
and wealth.,,23 In the 1967 article, Rawls had dealt with the problem of distribution 
314 
entirely within economic terms. Now, however, Rawls stated that "perhaps the most 
important primary good is that of self-respect," because: 
Without it nothing may seem worth doing or if some things have value for us. we 
lack the ~ i l l l to strive for them. All desire and activity becomes empty and vain, 
and we sink into apathy and cynicism. Therefore, the parties [Rawls had by then 
also dropped reference to "players"] in the original position would wish to avoid 
at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect.24 
Rawls also adds stipulations to the "veil of ignorance." All parties in the 
original position know much more about the general situation than they did in previous 
versions. In particular, they must assume that their society needs a system of justice -
"moderate scarcity" is assumed so that the players cannot imagine that, with endless 
abundance, no system of justice would be necessary. Rawls also has them "understand 
political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know the basis of social 
organization and the laws of human psychology.,,25 The parties in the original position 
would choose the maximin rule frrst, there are only a few alternatives, as Rawls omits, for 
example, any form of libertarianism,26 principles requiring distribution according to need, 
and desert-based conceptions of justice; second, Rawls stipulates that "the person cares 
very little if anything, for what he might gain above the minimum stipend that he can, in 
fact, be sure of by following the maximin rule. It is not worthwhile for him to take a 
chance for the sake of further advantage, especially when it may turn out that he loses 
much that is important to him... The situation involves grave risks.,,27 This much-
modified process, whereby the parties of the original position pick the difference 
principle, is perhaps the most criticised of Rawls' formulations. 28 However, Rawls made 
no claim to have derived the choice made by original position parties from their 
characteristics. Instead, he has, as he admits, made the stipulations conform as closely as 
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possible with the desired result of the maximin principle: "We want to define the original 
position so that we get the desired solution ... ,,29 
The result - if we accept Rawls' qualifications - is that the reader chooses 
the two principles of justice Rawls proposes. A fmished version of them is contained 
near ly halfway through A Theory of Justice: 
First Principle 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
Second Principle 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, ... and 
b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity. 30 
They are, as in the fITst model, lexically ordered so that the first precedes the 
second and (b) precedes (a) within the second. Any social institution or practice can be 
fairly easily evaluated by asking whether it fit these criteria, eliminating lengthy 
contestations about the fairest forms of institutions. Because of the way the principles of 
justice are chosen, they are not up for debate; any rational, self-interested person would 
choose these principles, as Rawls asserted. 
Responses to Rawls 
Scholarship has tended to concentrate on criticising Rawls from either a 
left or right perspective (along with those from the less easily-categorised communitarian 
tradition) but many criticisms are common to both, particularly those that deal with the 
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structure of the theory. One of the key problems, it has been pointed out, is that Rawls 
ignores any questions of production.31 Myriad problems with the original position have 
been pointed out, especially the difficulty that the parties of the original position know 
little about themselves yet have "life plans" (presumably they don't know what they want 
but they know how to get it!) and very sophisticated knowledge about human 
psychology, economic theory and a developed sense of justice. The "veil of ignorance" is 
uneven, to say the least.32 Rawls, as others pointed out, constructed his theory so it would 
fit intuitively with the existing liberal democratic conceptions, from the result to the 
method, as he admitted. 33 
However, much of the criticism directed from political perspectives misses 
the point. From the left, the complaint is that Rawls is simply bolstering the liberal status 
quO.34 This is true, to an extent, but misses the important point that his model of justice 
changes fundamentally the existing legitimation for the liberal status quo, providing 
something qualitatively new. Conservatives picked up on this point and accused Rawls of 
undermining traditional conceptions of rights, notions of equality of opportunity and 
merit.35 However, these conservatives only pointed instead to principles from the past 
that had failed. The equality of opportunity they championed did not incorporate African-
Americans. Any restatement of these principles would have to address this fundamental 
flaw and propose some answer to this basic difficulty. In any case, libertarian thinking, 
by the time that Rawls fmished his book, had become counterintuitive in the eyes of most 
Americans. 36 Like a philosophical version of Franklin Roosevelt (though, of course, in a 
very different way) Rawls can be seen as doing conservatives a favour despite their 
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antagonism to him. Rawls attempted to save the existing system by propping up badly 
discredited ideological premises. 
It makes most sense to see Rawls within the historical context within 
which his theory was developed and made a huge impact on the way a large section of 
the intelligentsia understood social and political issue. In terms of its development, Rawls 
no doubt saw the changes he made to his theory of justice as simply refmement of his 
original argument. Yet the historical events of the period between 1958, when the first 
article appeared, and 1967, when the difference principle made its entrance, cast a large 
shadow over his theory. The essential historical background (though one that Rawls fails 
to mention)37 was the apparent contradiction between the individualist conception of the 
principle of equality of opportunity and the need for American society to extend special 
measures that treated African-Americans as a group (even if only to achieve the original 
conception of equality of opportunity for all). Logically, if these special measures were 
temporary measures designed to incorporate blacks within the mainstream, giving them 
real equality of opportunity as individuals, the attempts made by the Johnson 
administration should have tapered off. Instead, as we have seen, these special measures 
increased and expanded to meet the demands of other groups in American society. The 
difference principle justified this differential treatment by insisting that, in a just society, 
the least advantaged members of society should receive, as it were, unequal treatment in 
order to further the equality of society in general. 
Besides reflecting and effectively explicating the problems, Rawls created 
the basis for the legitimation of an entire swathe of government intervention and 
expansion by removing questions of its existence from the political sphere. It is a moot 
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point whether Rawls' theory specifically supports specifically affirmative action. Many 
critics from the right assert that the difference principle effectively legitimates quotas. 
Bell cites Rawls' principle of "redress" as legitimating quotas: "The idea is to redress the 
idea of bias of contingencies in the direction of equality. In pursuit of this principle 
greater resources might be spent on the education of the less intelligent, at least over a 
certain time of life, say the earlier years of school.,,38 Schaeffer feels that Rawls, by using 
this idea of "redemptive equality," contributes to quotas: "One can fmd many examples 
of redemptive egalitarianism in contemporary American political thought and practice 
... in so-called affirmative action programs that require persons to be educated and hired 
according to racial and sexual quotas ... ,,39 Some from the left - criticising Rawls -
indicated that privileging liberty in the order of the two principles of justice precluded 
any affIrmative action programs.40 From a pro-affIrmative action stance, Hardy Jones 
replied that affIrmative action represented an inequality that could be justified by the 
principles of justice. 41 Alan H. Goldman and Robert K. Fullinwider both published books 
on the legitimacy of affIrmative action using a Rawlsian contractarian approach to ethics. 
Both accept that group discrimination, under Rawls' terms, is impermissible, but 
Fullinwider accepts the validity of affrrmative action programs whereas Goldman, while 
accepting affIrmative action to assist individuals, rejects it on all other countS.42 
Of course, Rawls fails to give any specific guidance as to whether his 
theory supports affrrmative action programs. Discussants might argue and, like a 
seminary, cite scripture and verse to support one particular interpretation or another. The 
most important aspect of Rawls, however, is not is rigidly ordered system that privileges 
rights ahead of redressing inequalities. If looked at as a particular response to historically 
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specific problems, the frrst principle merely signals that there is to be continuity with the 
traditions, both formal and informal, of the past. The important new aspect is the 
difference principle, which attempts to marry traditional conceptions of equality of 
opportunity with radical critiques of the liberal individualist conception. In this sense, it 
has an important legitimating function in its incorporation of the radical critique within 
the existing conceptions of justice and equality. By providing a model of equal 
opportunity that legitimates a societal ordering around the needs of the least well-off, it 
broadly supports the idea behind affrrmative action and allows it to move away from the 
original justification as a temporary aberration from the liberal individualist aims of civil 
rights measures. Rawls, in theory, at least, resolved the schism between the rapid growth 
of programs and aims of affrrmative action programs and their conceptual attachment to 
the black civil rights imperative of integration. 43 
Another historical difficulty to which Rawls suggests an answer was the 
apparent stasis within the political sphere in dealing with the problem of civil rights. 
Johnson had wrestled with the fact that from 1966 onwards the American electorate was 
hopelessly divided on the need for new policies. A vociferous minority demanded more 
effective civil rights programs whereas much of the white majority refused to back 
further civil rights measures. Rawls moved the problem from the problematic political 
sphere into the realm of the purely administrative. The contradiction lies between 
commitment to majoritarian democracy on the one hand and the need for measures to 
create a just (and thus stable) democracy on the other. The difference principle simply 
takes the question of distributive justice out of the hands of the majority. Rawls notes a 
problem in utilitarianism whereby a large part of society has an irrational abhorrence of 
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certain harmless religious or sexual practices, for which we might substitute the irrational 
racial prejudices of large percentages of white Americans towards African-Americans. 
Rawls notes that, with a utilitarian perspective, there is nothing to be done about 
prejudice: "Even when these attitudes are unsupportable on moral grounds, there seems 
to be no sure way to exclude them as irrational. Seeking the greatest satisfaction of desire 
may, then, justify harsh repressive measures against actions that cause no social injury." 
In justice as fairness, however, "this problem never arises. The intense convictions of the 
majority, if they are indeed mere preferences without any foundation in the principles of 
justice antecedently established, have no weight to begin with .... To have a complaint 
against the conduct and belief of others we must show that their actions injure us, or that 
the institutions that authorize what they do treat us unfairly.,,44 Rawls thus proposes a 
compromise between the American democratic heritage and the civil rights imperative. 
The democratic heritage and the rights of citizens are preserved under the first principle 
but, under the difference principle, programs that redistribute "goods" can be protected 
against the will of the majority, if necessary. 
Rawls and public policy 
A Theory of Justice, of course, only suggested an alternative philosophical 
basis upon which choices between institutional arrangements might be made. Evidenced 
by the reams of material arguing over many of the points the book made, as many 
questions as answers are provided by the book. Yet, almost immediately after its 
publication, Rawls' theory was used to justify and make sense of real issues happening 
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within American government. Many public administrators, for example, had grave doubts 
about the operating principles they had followed for some time and some fairly leapt 
upon Rawls' theory. H. George Fredrickson noted that, in the existing crisis, public 
administrators had to take on a more activist role in redistributing resources in order to 
preserve the status quo: 
Pluralistic government systematically discriminates in favor of established stable 
bureaucracies and their specialized minority clientele ... and against those 
minorities ... who lack political and economic resources. The continuation of 
widespread poverty, disease, ignorance, and hopelessness in an era of 
unprecedented economic growth is the result. This condition is morally 
reprehensible and if left unchanged constitutes a fundamental, if long-range, 
threat to the viability of this or any other political system. Continued deprivation 
amid plenty breed widespread militancy, and so forth. A Public Administration 
which fails to work for changes which try to redress the deprivation of minorities 
will likely be eventually used to repress those minorities. 45 
Not happy with the prospect of repressing potentially militant minorities, 
public administrators grasped Rawls' A Theory of Justice when it appeared.46 Rawls' 
paradigm allowed them to create and administrative framework without waiting for a 
mandate from the electorate. The permanent feature that would give them decision-
making apparatus was the difference principle, beyond the reach of the potentially 
irrational American people. In a symposium arranged by the Public Administration 
Review in 1974, the difference principle was translated into "social equity." An article by 
David K. Hart, a public administration academic from George Washington University, is 
worth citing at length, though not because his tone is that of the breathless excitement of 
a child arriving at the feet of his parents with some information he knows will interest 
them. Rather, it is remarkable how completely Hart transcribed Rawls' philosophical 
treatise into policy ethics. Hart begins: 
It may well be, given the unpleasant probabilities of our future [this is, 
322 
unfortunately, not explained], that social equity is an idea "whose time is come." 
T h ~ t t p o s i t ~ o n n is ~ c c e p t e d d herein and the main points to be discussed are: (1) that 
social equity, while most appealing, needs a fuller substantive ethical content; (2) 
that, ~ c . a u s e e of this, its advocates have based their justifications and their 
prescnptIons upon the extant American ethical paradigm; (3) that the extant 
p a r a ? i ~ m m (a) d ~ n i e s s legitimacy to social equity but (b) is itself suffering from 
declmmg pubhc confidence; ( 4) that a most promising alternative ethical 
paradigm has been developed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice; and (5) that 
his theory of justice can provide a powerful ethical foundation for (a) a 
substantive theory of social equity and (b) for a professional code for equitable 
public administrators.47 
Hart does not particularly care whether the theory stands up to rigorous 
philosophical scrutiny or not, for "( t)o drift is to court disaster and unless we address 
ourselves to conscious and pervasive value change, that drift will make disaster 
inevitable." The theory is simply the best tool lying within reach: "It is in this spirit that I 
argue for the theory of justice developed by John Rawls, which is the most significant 
alternative ethical theory available to US.,,48 
This reinterpretation of the at least part of the purpose of public 
administration that had previously been seen as only to implement the decisions made by 
elected government49 would prove vital for the transformation of affirmative action from 
an exemplary policy that hoped to bully American business and private enterprise into 
hiring representative percentages of minorities, that had, as we have seen, very little 
intention of rigorously enforcing its strictures, to a full-blown method of implementing 
"social equity" that extended from personnel management to contract allocations and 
beyond. First, administrators incorporated social equity into assessments of public 
administrative bodies. H. George Fredrickson noted that "Social equity, then, would be a 
criterion for effectiveness in public administration in the same way that efficiency, 
economy, productivity, and other criteria are now used." Personnel systems would add 
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different criteria to their assessments of individual workers that went far beyond 
questions of merit: "In essence, the social equity doctrine requires a pluralistic basis for 
judging people rather than a monolithic one.,,50 
Merit, while still existing as an employment criterion, became less 
important in the overall scheme personnel management than social equity. Another 
symposium held by the Public Administration Review in 1974 raised the issue of merit, 
deciding that it had been contradicted and must necessarily be shunted aside in favor of 
social equity. The convenor of a symposium entitled "The Merit Principle Today" 
observed: "As you read the articles, you may be struck, as I was, by how (and for how 
many reasons) we have lost sight of the ideal: the best possible candidate in every job in 
the public service. The reasons may be good ones.,,51 
Perhaps the best illustration of the interpretation of Rawls into affirmative 
action was the "mini-symposium" on affirmative action and public employment in the 
same journal two months after the social equity symposium. Significantly, affrrmative 
action was recognised by this symposium as a management technique, a method of 
measuring the performance of delivery of services and of individual managers in an 
increasingly service-oriented economy. As Catherine Lovell, taking up objections to 
affirmative action, observed: 
Setting operational goals, and developing criteria for measurement of progress 
toward these goals, is much talked about these days in management theory .... Yet 
goal setting, action programs, and evaluation are the modus operandi of 
affirmative action. Affirmative action demands more from organizational leaders 
than lack of prejudice and belief in equal opportunity; operationalizing affirmative 
action requires leaders to take action stances in which priorities are reordered and 
time and energy is allocated to affirmative action above other goals. 52 
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Although this symposium dealt only with public employment, it is possible 
to see from this tract how affirmative action policies gained reasons for being far beyond 
their original remit of forcing contractors to hire more representative workforces. Rawls 
(who is also mentioned within the affirmative action symposium) helped to legitimate 
affIrmative action by transforming it from the realm of civil rights enforcement to that of 
management science. From humble beginnings as a policy, affIrmative action became the 
main operational tool for this new theory. It began to supplant the hallmarks of previous 
management science - efficiency and merit - and was soon ubiquitous not only in public 
but in private industry as a mark of effective personnel management, rivalling, perhaps, 
the scientific management techniques originated by Frederick Taylor at the tum of the 
century. 53 
Consciousness of limits 
One more intellectual trend deserves our attention for its contribution both 
to justifications of affirmative action and to making affirmative action a potent political 
issue in American society. Previously, civil rights efforts had been based on an idea of 
generally increasing material prosperity, on those standing on the lower rungs of the 
ladder of opportunity being able to move upwards. Importantly, though objections to 
black civil rights demands were heard from Southerners and from Northern ethnics, these 
objections seldom concerned employment and were more often directed at the political 
power that blacks appeared to wield. By the end of the 1960s, however, the assurance of 
continual material progress appeared not only unrealistic but, to many, even undesirable. 
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"The age of abundance has ended," wrote historian David Donald, summing up the 
perspective of the 1970s in the New York Times. He saw his duty as a historian to 
"disenthrall" students "from the spell of history, to help them see the irrelevance of the 
past, ... [to ] remind them to what a limited extent humans control their own destiny.,,54 
Perhaps the most famous expression of these new perceptions was The 
Limits to Growth but many other "no-growth society" discussions, either inspired by or 
responding to this book came forth around the same time, questioning the viability or 
even the desirability of continuous economic growth. 55 A group of some thirty 
individuals - scientists, educators, industrialists, civil servants - from ten countries met 
for the fIrst time in April 1968. In early 1972 The Club of Rome, as they became known, 
published a report by the MIT project team. The Limits To Growth presented a glum 
picture forecasting population growth, resource depletion, food supply, capital investment 
and pollution in the future. They forecasted that "(t)he most probable result [of present 
trends] will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and 
industrial capacity" unless the world sought equilibrium and a "stationary state" where 
economic growth was curtailed. 56 The report reverberated in the newspapers and 
magazines when it was published, causing a plethora of alarming articles. Most leading 
journals were critical of the report. The New York Times called it "an empty, misleading 
work." The Times of London called it "pseudo-science at its worst. ,,57 Yet, after 
criticising the specifics of the book, the general point that there were limits to growth 
found agreement in nearly all reviews. As Rufus E. Miles, Jr., wrote, "The book's 
sensational doomsday warning seemed to strike a responsive chord - almost untouched 
by any previous work - in the strong intuitive feelings of many thoughtful citizens that 
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the end of the era of dependable economic growth and high-energy affluence might be 
nearer than supposed by economic analysts and forecasters. ,,58 S. Fred Singer. an 
economist writing in Nation, was amongst the most critical but agreed that "a kind of 
self-regulation that uses the laws of economics" was necessary. "I don't feel as optimistic 
about population growth."s9 Another more substantial review, published the next year, 
attacked the book savagely yet agreed that its impact was positive: "As a result of reading 
The Limits To Growth many people are now thinking anew about long-term problems and 
discussing them much more seriously. In particular, they are discussing once again 
whether or not the world is likely to run up against physical limits. This is a very 
important achievement. ,,60 
As the critics pointed out, this perception of the limits to growth rested on 
three assumptions, all of them superficially correct. First, the spectacular growth in the 
Gross National Product occurring after WWII did not correlate to quality of life; second, 
the resources of the earth, upon which all prosperity is based, are [mite; and third, 
environmental pollution was getting worse. These observations, however, might have 
been made at nearly any time. Nor did absence of economic growth guarantee, for 
instance, that resources would not be used up. Economic growth also can be used to 
positive effect to clear up pollution, a fact that has been demonstrated by the relative 
success of Western countries in the battle against pollution.61 Whatever the criticisms, 
though, the ideas rapidly became an underlying assumption with which economists had 
either to agree or explain their disagreements. 
Like Rawls' book, these ideas tended to cut through the existing bipolar 
political structure. As Mancur Olson, wrote, "they owe nothing to the long-standing and 
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often tiresome controversies between left and right.,,62 Like Rawls, h o w e v e r ~ ~ they tended 
to incorporate radical critiques of American society into their essential theory, making 
them effectively mainstream. 
The readers to which Rawls addressed his book, he assumed, would wish 
to avoid "grave risk." The entire premise of the original position - at least, after the 
difference principle was introduced - was that rational self-interested parties, knowing 
nothing about themselves, would seek the strategy that involved the least-worst scenario. 
However, as numerous critics have pointed out, this is clearly a pessimistic strategy. The 
whole way in which the term "risk" was used in Rawls would not have been recognised 
during John F. Kennedy's tenure. Risk, then, was to be calculated rather than 
scrupulously avoided. It is just as well that Rawls no longer used small examples of 
situations such as baseball games. As Kukathas and Petitt point out, the maximin 
principle appears absurd if applied to everyday life where risks, such as driving a car, 
would be eliminated.63 Rawls' pessimistic perspective, then, clearly found a kindred spirit 
in the limits to growth theory. 
Perhaps the most important assumption shared by Rawls and the limits to 
growth theories is that the sphere of distribution deserves more attention than the sphere 
of production. Again, this contrasts with past ideas about social problems that analysed 
distribution issues as closely related to the particular existing mode of production. As 
Shapiro noted, there is no reason to think that the denizens of the original position would 
not wish to ensure that the arrangements at which they arrived secured an appropriate 
mode of production even before they worried about distribution. Surely the parties would 
choose a mode of production that increased the wealth of all, even if the distribution 
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system did not follow the difference principle, rather than an inferior productive system 
that guaranteed that the least advantaged would be treated fairly?64 Even the assumption 
of "moderate scarcity" or of a relatively unchanging social milieu would have been a 
strange - if not un-American - idea to Americans at the end of World War II or even ten 
years before Rawls' book was published. The confident belief in unending economic and 
social progress as a natural condition of free men was almost a secular religion in the 
United States. 
Concentration on the sphere of distribution rather than that of production 
plainly favours an affrrmative action strategy that aims to allocate existing jobs 
proportionally rather than one with the broader goal of integrating black Americans 
within the American economic mainstream. Previously, civil rights strategies rested on 
the premise that, as John F. Kennedy's famous dictum would have it, "a rising tide lifts 
all boats." The "ladder of opportunity" upon which African-Americans were, according 
to analysts like Glazer and Moynihan in their famous book, Beyond the Melting Pot, to 
begin climbing like other ethnic groups, no longer provided opportunity for betterment.65 
Instead of production and the creation of more jobs and resources, the focus of new 
economic thought was on the way that the resources of society would be distributed in a 
no-growth society. These new ideas contributed to the pattern of development of 
affirmative action both because it became a useful method of fitting minorities and 
women into a non-expanding economy and, as they became popularised, because white 
males felt threatened by any program that might lessen their chances in the job-market. 
Programs that attempted to regulate existing resources, rather than those aimed at 
expansion of the total sum of resources, became more relevant. The difference between 
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early and later affIrmative action programs can be seen in this change m the very 
different assumptions behind them. 
Economist Dr. Herman Daly expressed the task for a new government in 
1969 as he saw it: 
For several reasons the important issue of the stationary state will be distribution, 
not production. The problem of relative shares can no longer be avoided by 
appeals to growth. The argument that everyone should be happy as long as his 
absolute share of wealth increases, regardless of his relative share, will no longer 
be available... The stationary state would make fewer demands on our 
environmental resources, but much greater demands on our moral resources.66 
Daly hit upon a problem that was also highlighted by other economists. 
The concentration on the realm of distribution rather than production gives a clue as to 
why affrrmative action became an issue in the way that it did.67 In a no-growth society, 
affirmative action becomes a zero-sum game. "If there were no growth of income and a 
constant population [to say nothing of an increasing population], there would be no 
possibility of someone having less.,,68 In such a climate, jobs cease to have the simple 
function of producing goods and become social goods themselves.69 If black Americans 
gain jobs, someone else loses jobs. Here, I will suggest, is the key to understanding why 
affIrmative action became a pervasive political issue despite all the best attempts of 
Rawls to ensure programs like affIrmative action remain administrative imperatives 
rather than po litical issues. 
Why affirmative action became an issue 
In its conception, there is nothing inherently objectionable about 
affirmative action. In the context of a constantly expanding job or college places market, 
330 
or at least the perception of such, it would be unlikely that affirmative action would 
provoke any real interest. The idea that someone else is getting preferential treatment can 
only bother someone when they fail to get a job or college place. At worst, preferential 
treatment for someone else might be a minor setback. In an expanding job market, most 
people will be confident that they will get a job. When college places are plentiful and, 
more importantly, the number of jobs they lead to is expanding, it will matter less if only 
a second preference of college is given. To use Johnson's metaphor, someone who is 
confident of winning or at least doing well in a race will not object if others less able are 
given a head start. He or she can afford magnanimity. The victory will be, if anything, 
more deserved if all are equal at the starting line. However, those that feel less confident 
about achieving success in the race will feel the advantages given to some others an 
onerous burden. 
Much as principled objections exist, the real fount of attacks on 
affirmative action lie in the contention that white males are victimised by the policy. The 
legalist Edmund Cahn, in his study of the sense of injustice, made the point that people 
do not become outraged when a decision violates some dialectical pattern or an analytic 
conception of justice. They become outraged when they feel themselves - or someone 
they can identify with - being treated unfairly. The sense of injustice, Cahn explains, 
" ... denotes that sympathetic reaction of outrage, horror, shock, resentment, and anger. .. 
Nature has thus equipped all men to regard injustice to another as personal aggression." 
"Justice thus acquires its public meaning, as those in a given ethos perceive the same 
threat and experience the same organic reactions." 70 
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Marco Defunis, whose civil suit against the University of Washington 
reached the Supreme Court in 1974, launched perhaps the fIrst big battle over affIrmative 
action. DeFunis (and later Alan Bakke, in a suit against the University of California 
Board of Regents) argued that the affrrmative action programs were in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a provision of the California 
Constitution, and section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides 
that no person shall on the ground of race or colour be excluded from participating in any 
program receiving federal fmancial assistance. The law school at the University of 
Washington had set aside 16 percent of the places in its entering classes exclusively for 
members of racial or ethnic minorities: Philippines-Americans, Chicano-Americans, 
black Americans, and American Indians. All applicants were screened and categorised by 
race. Minority applicants were then admitted to the law school using standards much 
lower than the admission standards applied to whites. While this affrrmative action 
program was in force, Defunis, a white applicant with an adequate record, was rejected 
by the law school in two successive years. Convinced that he (or some other white 
applicants in very similar circumstances) would surely have been admitted had his skin 
been of a different colour, he sued the university for admission, claiming that he had been 
deprived of his constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws. The university lost 
the case in the lower court and duly admitted DeFunis. By the time the case reached the 
Supreme Court DeFunis was nearing the end of his third year and would be allowed to 
graduate whatever the ruling. The Supreme Court held the case moot.71 
It is notable that both DeFunis' and Bakke's defences hinged upon the 
legal objection that affirmative action violated the rights of individual members of groups 
332 
not favoured by affirmative action. In other words, they claimed that they were 
victimised by affIrmative action. The response to the Bakke case highlighted the fact that 
many Americans identified with the plaintiffs.72 AffIrmative action had become to them a 
new unfair system. Looked at with Habermas's model in mind, the legitimation crisis 
incorporated - ironically - a suspicion of institutions, of which affIrmative action was 
now numbered. However, it is unlikely that, in the absence of a sense of insecurity and 
that affIrmative action was a zero-sum game, the amount of outrage at affIrmative action 
programs should become so prevalent. 
Historically, also, it may be demonstrated that affrrmative action became 
generalised as an issue only as insecurity about future prospects affected individuals. 
Reasons for objecting to affirmative action, just like justifications for it, vary throughout 
the period when the possibility of affIrmative action was fIrst raised and today. One 
source of resentment no longer heard focused upon the abrogation of union rights that 
affirmative action might entail. George Wallace, as previously noted, raised this objection 
in 1964. This was also an objection raised by Sam Ervin during the debate in Congress 
about the Philadelphia plan.73 Vieira raised another objection that the authority of the 
government's educative role - its role in educating American citizens away from racism 
- would be abrogated by its participation in positive discrimination.74 Another complaint, 
voiced by Myrdal but still heard today, is that affirmative action undermines the 
protection of individual rights contained in the Constitution.75 This is no doubt a salient 
criticism but it was as true when the Philadelphia plan fIrst emerged as it is today yet, 
though it is possible to find record of the objection, it was hardly the basis of a mass 
campaign against affirmative action. Instead, as we have noted in chapter 1, the criticisms 
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of affIrmative action policies then invoked the American Creed and "American 
principles" in an effort to show that the policy was "undemocratic.,,76 No one now argues 
that affIrmative action is undemocratic without meeting the contention that, had 
democracy worked for women and minorities in the fIrst place, affirmative action would 
hardly be needed. 
As indicated above, a sense of victimisation fIrst occurred at institutions of 
higher education. Why? Education became what Lester Thurow called a "defensive 
necessity" with the changed economic climate. 
As the supply of educated labor increases, individuals fmd that they must improve 
their educational level simply to defend their current income positions . 
... Education becomes a good investment not because it would raise people's 
incomes above what they would have been if no one had increased his education, 
but rather because it raises their income above what it will be if others acquire it 
and they do not. In effect, education becomes a defensive expenditure necessary to 
protect one's "market share." The larger the class of educated labor and the more 
rapidly it grows, the more such defensive expenditures become imperative. 
Thurow felt that the problem emerging from this would be a "demand on 
the part of disadvantaged groups for 'open admissions' to universities.,,77 But the real 
problem was that whites imagined that affIrmative action in admission policies might hurt 
their chances of receiving the new imperative of education. When the conception is of a 
world in which horizons are not continually expanding, preparation that would enable 
one to gain initially a high place becomes more important. In other words, the streaming 
of society appears to happen at the level of education rather than within the organisation 
joined after graduating. In this limited, defensive market is the origin of the moral 
indignation at affirmative action, the only real objection to affirmative action that can 
compete with the moral basis for its existence. As affIrmative action programs impacted 
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in colleges where, as Paul Seabury commented, "the pie is shrinking," outrage began to 
build. 
Whereas other civil rights policies had threatened whites only when 
affecting them personally, as in busing and residential desegregation, job quotas became 
a constant issue with the onset of pervasive economic insecurity in the 1970s, 
transforming affirmative action from a minor, perhaps-objectionable policy to a threat. 
However, the perception of a no-growth society and limits to the total number of 
resources available has long outlasted the recessions of 1974 and 1982. It is this changing 
perception of the economic context that ensured affirmative action would be an issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study has been to explore the origins of affIrmative 
action in order to shed new light on it, the Nixon presidency and recent intellectual 
history. In resolving the specific historical mystery set at the beginning - why did a 
conservative president first implement affirmative action and oversee a huge 
expansion of affirmative action programs? - this dissertation has re-examined the 
nature of the Nixon presidency and suggested that affIrmative action was less the 
progenitor of policy changes than the result of a change in liberalism itself. It has been 
demonstrated on the preceding pages that the ideological differences between friends 
and foes of affirmative action are less significant than the acceptance by both sides of 
what is termed here a culture of limits. Finally, the research indicates that the nature 
of affIrmative action has less to do with racial or ethnic divisions and more to do with 
a pervasive critique of the equity and justice of concepts such as "merit" and 
"efficiency. " 
The dissertation builds upon but also argues against much of the 
existing scholarship. Hugh Davis Graham, who has written the seminal text on the 
history of affIrmative action policy, maintains that the logic of the policy itself - the 
fact that affIrmative action included enforceable targets and goals - encouraged civil 
rights activists to push for it in the mid 1960s.1 That the exhaustion of enforcement 
mechanisms of policies put in place in the early 1960s logically led to affIrmative 
action has not been disputed here. A parallel process occurred in school desegregation 
efforts. Instead, I maintain that affirmative action policies would have been 
insignificant without a fundamental shift in liberal values that brought them to 
prominence. 
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The importance of understanding the role of the preVIOUS policy 
paradigm in preventing affirmative action policies is emphasised in Part I, building 
upon the work of John Skrentny.2 What was it that prevented what seems to be an 
obvious idea from being implemented?3 This dissertation has emphasised the 
importance of Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma, both in its expression of a 
deep-seated belief in the "American Creed" and its influence in shaping attitudes 
towards issues of race. Within the Myrdalian paradigm, justification for or arguments 
against any affIrmative action programs related primarily to the goal of reforming 
white America away from racial divisions. The barriers to full integration of African-
Americans into the mainstream of American society were perceived to be a (white) 
"hearts and minds" problem. This approach to race relations meant that affIrmative 
action was perceived as useful only in its ability to kick-start a process that would 
take place organically within white America, destroying the basis of the racial divide. 
An employment quota might alienate white labor - one of Myrdal's favoured 
institutions for extirpating racism - from civil rights efforts. Enforced quotas on any 
large scale, moreover, denied that the process would take place organically. Not 
surprisingly, given the "contact theory" made popular by Gordon Allport and the 
sanguine contemporary view of the possibilities of racial reform, race relations efforts 
of the 1950s and 1960s focused upon education rather than employment. That this 
concentration on education continued throughout Nixon's fIrst term indicates the 
powerful legacy of the Myrdalian paradigm. 
Again building on Skrentny, this dissertation discusses the nature of the 
crisis that destroyed the liberal consensus, clearing the way for affIrmative action.4 
Skrentny mainly focuses on the riots occurring in the late 1960s. This thesis proposes 
a broader conception of the crisis and the implications for the elite of the destruction 
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of the Myrdalian paradigm. The shift that took place beginning in the 1960s (perhaps 
even continuing today) was the movement away from the belief that the capitalist 
market is the basis of an equitable, just, and rational society. Milton Friedman' s 
assertion that racial divisions were irrational and thus antipathetic to the capitalist 
market appeared naive even at the time of its publication.5 By the end of the 1960s it 
appeared ridiculous. The basic institutions and precepts of post-war American society, 
from the trade union movement to political parties to the concept of merit, came under 
serious question. Even the neo-conservative revival of free market policies and the 
triumph of capitalism over communism after the fall of the Berlin Wall have not 
managed to stem this critique of the fairness of capitalism. 
The implementation of affIrmative action policies in the late 1960s and 
1970s is best explained in terms of Jiirgen Habermas's Legitimation Crisis.6 Here it is 
possible to see that, whatever the ideological colour of an administration, 
policymakers felt they had to replace these previously informally administered 
institutions with direct government control. Thus, the informal system whereby 
management and trade unions worked out at a local level who would be 
hired/fIred/promoted was, in some ways, supplanted by direct government 
involvement in these decisions. As Habermas observed, this process led to more 
government (and quasi-government) intervention as the fIrst round of intervention 
tended to undermine yet more institutions, necessitating further intervention. The fIrst 
affirmative action policies undermined traditional criteria for awarding government 
contracts. However, they soon impinged upon decisions made at local levels. An 
example of the end product of this process, where Jersey Central Power and Light 
asked the court to review the list of personnel it intended to layoff in order to ensure 
it complied with affirmative action and union contracts, is given above. A decision 
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that in the past would have been made by local management and perhaps contested by 
a union was now subject to court intervention. 
Nixon played a crucial but misunderstood role in the genesis of 
affirmative action. Existing scholarship has overestimated the contribution of the 
Philadelphia Plan - the fIrst enforced affIrmative action program - to the creation of 
modern affIrmative action programs.7 It neither ''worked'' in the sense that it fulfilled 
its goals nor provided a blueprint for later affIrmative action. Its importance lies in the 
congressional battle over its continued existence in December 1969. Besides a rump 
of Southern resistance that sawall civil rights measures as parts of a plot against the 
South, those resisting the Philadelphia Plan were generally connected with organised 
labor. The debate over the Philadelphia Plan's future in Congress reflected the 
destruction of labor as a force for progress in American society; very few complaints 
against affirmative action on the basis that it curbs union rights can be heard today. 
Both in its operation and in the arguments against it, the Philadelphia Plan, and its 
close relatives, the hometown plans and Order No.4, belong more to Johnson's Great 
Society than a later affIrmative action paradigm. The focus of all three, at that stage, 
was on reforming urban ghettos. The Philadelphia Plan was part of Nixon's "holding 
pattern" in 1969, when he simply continued with many of the Johnson priorities. 
Shortly after defending it in congress, Nixon dropped it and barely mentioned it again. 
If the Philadelphia Plan was a dead end in the evolutionary process of 
affIrmative action, other initiatives in Nixon's first term were not. These were 
designed to use the Federal Government's fmancial muscle to insist on black 
representation (and, perhaps less consciously, to use the moral imperative of black 
representation to justify the Federal government's increased intervention into hitherto 
privately negotiated spheres). Instead of being policed inadequately by Federal 
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authorities, like the Philadelphia Plan, these programs succeeded largely by self-
policing. A reinterpretation of Johnson's Executive Order 11246 taking place in 1969 
included universities and colleges as well as state and local government within its 
remit. The "set aside" strategy of the OMBE, though it initially foundered when 
centred on ghetto industries, has become one of the most important affirmative action 
programs in existence. EOl1478 ensured that affirmative action took place in Federal 
government employment. Revenue sharing reorganised the complex system of 
Federal grants. When the Revenue Sharing Act of 1972 passed, it added another string 
to be attached to Federal loans and grants, vastly extending federal control over the 
minutiae of local administration. Surely these programs were more effective in 
"rule making to bind recipients to federal dollars," as Graham put it. 
Whereas much of the existing scholarship sees the Philadelphia Plan as 
the culmination of the development of affIrmative action, this study emphasises the 
rapid growth ofaffrrmative action after 1970. On this level, Nixon's input was crucial. 
In 1970 he made a conscious decision to give up attempts to reform the ghettos and 
instead to concentrate civil rights efforts on creating a stable black middle-class. 
Though some of the scholarship recognises that some sort of shift took place at this 
time, it sees the shift in purely negative terms (see Chapter 8). No one has yet pointed 
out the fact that Nixon simply rationalised civil rights policy at this stage. Besides 
calling for increased "cultural legitimacy" for black Americans and $100m to fund 
black colleges, Nixon instructed staff not to aim efforts at "street-comer society." 
While the Philadelphia Plan and hometown plans languished, the OMBE broadened 
its efforts, moving away from failing ghetto industries and attempts at building 
public/private "partnerships" and towards contracting to black or minority-owned 
fIrm. Nixon also broadened the intended beneficiaries of affIrmative action by 
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concentrating the admm' l' stratI' 0 , tt t' N' . .. n s a en Ion on attve Amencans and Hlsparucs, as 
well. 
Nixon's curious espousal of early affirmative action is not necessarily 
so curious if we view affirmative action within the very different context of the times. 
Existing scholarship tends to emphasise his "aprincipled" (or ' ' u n p r i n c i p l e d , ' ~ ~
depending on the degree of sympathy for Nixon held by the author) character in order 
to explain his combination of liberal and right-wing policy decisions (see Chapter 9). 
However, one principle that Nixon could claim as his explains both his stout defence 
of the Philadelphia Plan and his condemnation of quotas in the run-up to the 1972 
election. As Gary Wills observed, Nixon truly believed in the "right to earn," a 
version of the Protestant work ethic identified by Weber. At that time almost self-
evident, this right to earn is today difficult to understand now that work is seen by 
many as a limitation of the development of the self rather than its realisation.8 Nixon's 
generation, however, believed that work was a moral duty, a social obligation and the 
route to personal success. Nixon wished to include blacks within this work-based 
society; he wished to extend to them the right to earn. Thus, he supported affirmative 
action efforts; yet, he could simultaneously attack quotas as they might limit the right 
to earn for whites. 
The question of whether or not Nixon was an unlikely hero depends 
upon one's perspective. Despite his hatred for the elite (which was certainly 
reciprocated), he helped to transform the difficult question of civil rights, which had 
provoked widespread questioning of the legitimacy of the entire "system," into a 
question of allocation of resources. In some ways, by rationalising government, he 
created a temporary resolution to the legitimation deficit. Blacks and whites critical of 
the system and liable to reject the authority of the elite now appealed to it to reallocate 
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resources more equitably. The State, once regarded as an armed body prepared to 
defend capitalism, was now regarded as a referee or appeals board. Voices were 
lowered, peace restored, and restless citizens became passive consumers. The services 
Richard Nixon performed to the status quo may have to be reviewed anew by future 
historians. To those who object to the increasing intervention of the American State 
into the lives of its citizens, Nixon is anything but a hero. He may well be vilified, 
ironically, as the facilitator of a vast increase in the growth of the US State as well as 
because of Watergate. It is worth recalling Graham's observation that the Federal 
Register quintupled during Nixon's frrst term. 
Other important developments, beyond the scope of presidential 
involvement aligned with both the legitimation crisis and Nixon's rationalisation 
attempts, prepared the ground for affirmative action. Changes in the economy that 
progressively tied private enterprise to government made enforcement of affrrmative 
action possible. In the 1950s, in a period of rapid military expansion, contractors 
could negotiate from a position of strength. In the 1970s, a cut-back in defense and 
other expenditures created competition for contracts. In this climate, a progressive 
affirmative action policy might tip the balance for a contractor. 
This thesis puts new emphasis on the distinction between affrrmative 
action's growth as evolving set of policies and affrrmative action as an issue. As 
pointed out in Section III, the issue of affirmative action - the widespread public 
argument about whether affrrmative action creates useful and just policies - had yet to 
develop during Nixon's first term. Here is another reason why Nixon saw no 
contradiction in his support of affirmative action and his dislike of quotas that limited 
opportunities - he referred to the operation of certain policies rather than relating to a 
pervasive public debate. There was little continuum between the objections to quotas 
347 
heard in 1964 and those heard in the mid-1970s. In particular, the most important 
objection to affirmative action heard today - that it is inherently unfair to those 
excluded from its categories - did not really arise until the DeFunis and Bakke 
Supreme Court cases. Thus the emphasis of this thesis has been on determining what 
has changed in the intellectual climate that both lent itself to the proliferation of 
affirmative action policies and ensured that they would become a near-permanent 
issue in the American polity. 
Hugh Graham has mentioned John Rawls as a "theoretician" of 
affirmative action, amongst others. Yet the process of the development of affirmative 
action is better explained by William Safrre's observation that sometimes fitting a 
philosophy to the set of deeds is what must be done.9 This thesis examines Rawls' A 
Theory of Justice not as the theoretical basis of affrrmative action but as an 
explication of the need, in the light of the legitimation crisis, for a new ethical 
framework for liberalism. Thus, it places Rawls' strangely ahistorical tract within its 
historical context. A Theory of Justice does not deal directly with affirmative action 
but his "difference principle," whereby any decision must benefit the least well-off, at 
least points in the direction of a new way to allocate resources. AffIrmative action 
policies fit the bill. 
This dissertation places new emphasis on the implications of what is 
termed the "culture of limits" emerging in the early 1970s for affIrmative action. 
Perhaps most famously rehearsed in the Club of Rome's 1973 publication, The Limits 
to Growth, the perspective that resources are fmite, that constantly increasing 
production is both unrealistic and undesirable, changed the political and cultural 
landscape in the 1970s and 1980s dramatically. In relation to affirmative action, the 
culture of limits both creates the need for affrrmative action policies and makes 
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affirmative action a continuous focus of resentment. When focus is no longer placed 
on increased production, attention to how resources are divided becomes paramount. 
In a stationary state, the problem of relative shares can no longer be overcome by 
appeals to growth. Kennedy's dictum, "a rising tide lifts all boats," was no longer 
deemed valid. Instead, as with Rawls, focus increasingly turned to the search for an 
equitable method of dividing resources. Affrrmative action becomes a key 
replacement for the relatively automatic distribution of resources within the 
continuously expanding capitalist market. 
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Reflections on the Current Debate 
AffIrmative action is perhaps best understood as the relatively constant 
form in which a set of complex, evolving, and often-contradictory tendencies have 
found expression. Nearly every aspect of the term - save the name - has changed 
profoundly in the past thirty years. Thus the story of how American politics and 
culture have changed a set of deeds into a philosophy has been the remit of this thesis. 
The argument put forward on the preceding pages is that the most important 
developments in the genesis of affIrmative action occurred after the implementation 
of the Philadelphia Plan and Order No.4; some occurred very recently - such as the 
heightening of the importance of diversity as a justification. Moreover, they occurred 
outside of the development of the policies. The suggestion here is that the tendencies 
underneath this form hold the key to a real understanding of the phenomenon. 
A number of fairly large implications emerge from this study. The 
most important is that the affIrmative action problematic exists relatively 
independently of the issues of race and gender. Affirmative action is less the heir of 
the 1960s civil rights struggles than it appears to be. The essential condition for what 
Nathan Glazer termed the "institutionalisation" of affIrmative action - and, we might 
add, the institutionalisation of arguments surrounding it - is suspicion of the category 
of efficiency and, thus, merit. Underlying is a tension between the cultural and 
economic spheres of American life. This is not to question the motives of those who 
put affIrmative action policies in place or even to comment on whether the policies 
are effective or not. Instead, I am saying fIrst that even if the need to include blacks 
within American society did not exist, some sort of system that justified personnel, 
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management and selection procedures in both private companIes and government 
would have to be invented. Second, whatever method this system employed to 
distribute jobs, college places, contracts, whatever categories of "affected classes" 
existed, controversy would ensue. 
In the past, as the passage by Friedman implies, people were hired on 
merit in relation to their role in production. In a climate with no culture of limits, 
where more was considered better, the need for constant increases in productivity 
overrode all other considerations. The most efficient worker or contractor was hired 
for the job, the highest scoring student accepted. But if the goal of maximising 
production is downgraded, so is the importance of hiring the most efficient worker for 
the job. Of course, capitalist production continues and the relation of categories of 
efficiency, performance and, thus, merit can not be entirely jettisoned. Yet there 
appears to be a permanent questioning of the relevance of these categories. The 
testing of prospective college students is under constant discussion. Are School 
Admissions Tests useful? Is the testing procedure itself a reliable predictor of success 
both during and after college? Goals other than efficiency - such as the efforts by 
contractors to hire and promote minorities and women - become equal in importance 
to efficiency. Some system employing factors different to maximising production 
must be found. Hence the widespread adoption of affIrmative action policies. 
Yet affirmative action criteria remain extraneous to the production 
process and in their often-random categories (the distinction in the 8a program 
between those of Nepalese extraction, who are included as affected classes, and those 
of Afghan extraction, who are not, springs to mind 10) are themselves subject to 
constant questioning. Some opponents of affirmative action accept that merit can not 
be the sole reason for accepting college students, awarding contracts or hiring and 
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promoting. William Julius Wilson, followed by Dinesh D'Souza and o t h e r s ~ ~ argue not 
against preferences in principle but against the present racial defmitions of the 
beneficiaries of affirmative action. 11 But it has been suggested by the analysis on the 
preceding pages that whatever criteria are used to decide how the resources of society 
are divided will lack the organic and automatic system of allocation of the market 
economy. Not only will they seem random and face contestation by those outside their 
boundaries (necessitating further government intervention), they will constantly bump 
up against the economic need for efficiency. 
The suggestion of this research IS that the right/left discussion 
surrounding affirmative action can not be resolved, as it expresses a tension between 
the need for efficiency and maximum productivity of the economy on the one hand 
and the pervasive cultural critique of the justice and equity of the market on the other. 
In sum, There was no "wrong turn" away from the colorblind civil rights perspectives 
in the 1960s made by liberalism, nor is affirmative action simply the culmination of 
the civil rights efforts of the post-war period. 
I Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy 1960-1972 
(Oxford University Press: New York, 1990). 
2 John David Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, Culture, and, Justice in America 
(London: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Part One of Skrentny's book is entitled "Understanding 
Resistance to Affirmative Action." 
3 The concept of quotas for addressing black inequality was first voiced in 1871 by Major Martin 
Delany, a black unionist soldier who later joined the Democrats. Cited in Seymour Martin Lipset, 
American Exceptionalism: A Double Edged Sword (London: W. W. Norton and Co., 1996), 312n. 
4 See "Crisis Management through Affirmative Action" in Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action, 
67-110 (Chapter 4). 
5 See Chapter 2, 65-66. . 
6 Jiirgen Habennas, translated by Thomas McCarthy, Legitimation Crisis (London: Hem em ann 
Educational, 1976). Skrentny uses this book to define what a crisis is but explores it no further. See The 
Ironies of Affirmative Action, 257n. 
7 The most influential book to emphasise the importance of the Philadelphia Plan is Hugh Davis 
Graham, The Civil Rights Era. See also J. Larry Hood, "The Nixon Administration and the R ~ v . i s e d d
Philadelphia Plan for Affirmative Action: A Study in Expanding Presidential Power and DIVided 
Government" Presidential Studies Quarterly 23 (1993): 145-67, Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare 
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(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), Stephen Steinberg, Turning Back: The Retreat from 
~ a c i a l l Ju:tice i ~ ~ Ame.rican .Thought and S o c ~ a l l P o ~ i C Y Y (Bost?n, MA: Beacon Press, 1995). 
For an mterestmg dIscussIOn of new ways m whIch work IS understood, see Andre Gorz, Reclaiming 
Work: Beyond the Wage-Based Society (translated by Chris Turner. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
1999). 
9 See Chapter 1,27. 
10 See Introduction, 7. 
II Though first suggested in William Julius Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and 
Changing American Institutions (London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), this perspective is more 
fully explicated in The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) and When Work Disappears: New Implications for Race 
and Urban Poverty in the Global Economy (London: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, 1998). 
Dinesh D'Souza, who opposes affirmative action, stated that Universities should "retain their policies 
of preferential treatment, but alter their criteria of application from race to socioeconomic 
disadvantage." (cited in Francis J. Beckwith and Todd E. Jones, "Introduction to Part 1" (21-33) of 
Affirmative Action: Social Justice or Reverse Discrimination? (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 
1997), 29. Like Bill Clinton, who said "mend it - don't end it," Seymour Martin Lipset warns that 
"affirmative action should be refocused, not discarded." (American Exceptionalism, 149.) Perhaps the 
best explication of this view is in Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Remedy: Class, Race, and Affirmative 
Action (New York: Basic Books: 1996). He declares that ''the thesis of this book is that affirmative 
action, a well-intentioned but flawed instrument of public policy, should not be discarded but should be 
revamped so that preferences in education, in employment, and in government contracting are provided 
on the basis of class, not race or gender." (ix). Other opponents of affirmative action argue, often 
crudely, that those excluded from the affected classes (white males) are themselves victims of 
affirmative action. See, for instance, Fred Lynch, Invisible Victims: White Males and the Crisis of 
Affirmative Action (London: Greenwood, 1989). This is also not an argument against preferential 
treatment but a plea that white males be included. 
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Appendix I 
Titles VI and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
Title VI NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED 
PROGRAMS 
SEC. 604. Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to authorize 
action under this title by any department or agency with respect to any employment 
practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except where a 
primary objective of the Federal fmancial assistance is to provide employment. 
Title VII EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
Section 703(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall 
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of 
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a 
bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or 
quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such 
differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test 
provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, 
intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It 
shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this title for any employer to 
differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or 
compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is 
authorized by the provisions of section 6( d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as 
amended (29 U.S.C. 206(d)). 
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Section 703(j) Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require 
any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management 
committee subject to this title to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any 
group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or 
group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or 
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any 
employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor 
organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted 
to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the 
total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any 
community, State, section, or other area. 
Section 706 (g) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally 
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in 
the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful 
employment practice, and order such affIrmative action as may be appropriate, which 
may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by 
the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible 
for the unlawful employment practice). Interim earnings or amounts earnable with 
reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to 
reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. No order of the court shall require the 
admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union or the hiring, 
reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of 
any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled or was 
refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason 
other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin or in 
violation of section 704(a). 
Source: http://www.dot.gov/ost/docr/CIVILR64.HTM#7 
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Appendix II 
Executive Order 11246 
Subpart B - Contractors' Agreements 
SEC. 202. Except in contracts exempted in accordance with Section 204 of 
this Order, all Government contracting agencies shall include in every Government 
contract hereafter entered into the following provisions: 
"During the performance of this contract, the contractor agrees as follows: 
"(1) The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or 
applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The contractor 
will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees 
are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national 
origin. Such action shall include, but not be limited to the following: employment, 
upgrading, demotion, or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or 
termination; rates of payor other forms of compensation; and selection for training, 
including apprenticeship. The contractor agrees to post in conspicuous places, available 
to employees and applicants for employment, notices to be provided by the contracting 
officer setting forth the provisions of this nondiscrimination clause. 
SEC. 203. (a) Each contractor having a contract containing the provisions 
prescribed in Section 202 shall file, and shall cause each of his subcontractors to file, 
Compliance Reports with the contracting agency or the Secretary of Labor as may be 
directed. Compliance Reports shall be filed within such times and shall contain such 
information as to the practices, policies, programs, and employment policies, programs, 
and employment statistics of the contractor and each subcontractor, and shall be in such 
form, as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe. 
356 
(b) Bidders or prospective contractors or subcontractors may be required 
to state whether they have participated in any previous contract subject to the provisions 
of this Order, or any preceding similar Executive order, and in that event to submit, on 
behalf of themselves and their proposed subcontractors, Compliance Reports prior to or 
as an initial part of their bid or negotiation of a contract. 
See for Section 8(a) of the 
Small Business Act of 1953 
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Appendix III 
Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act 
Sec. 8. (a) It shall be the duty of the Administration and it is hereby 
empowered, whenever it determines such action is necessary -
"(1) to enter into contracts with the United States Government and any 
department, agency, or officer thereof having procurement powers obligating the 
Administration to furnish articles, equipment, supplies or material to the Government. In 
any case in which the Administration certifies to any officer of the Government having 
procurement powers that the Administration is competent to perform any specific 
Government procurement contract to be let by any such officer, such officer shall be 
authorized in his discretion to let such procurement contract to the Administration upon 
such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between the Administration and the 
procurement officer; and 
"(2) to arrange for the performance of such contracts by negotiating or 
otherwise letting subcontracts to small-business concerns or others for the manufacture, 
supply, or assembly of such articles, equipment, supplies, or materials, or parts thereof, or 
servicing or processing in connection therewith, or such management services as may be 
necessary to enable the Administration to perform such contracts. 
It(b) It shall also be the duty of the Administration and it IS hereby 
empowered, whenever it determines such action is necessary-
"(1) to provide technical and managerial aids to small-business concerns, 
by advising and counseling on mattters in connection with Government procurement and 
property disposal and on policies, principles, and practices of good management, 
including but not limited to cost accounting, methods of financing, business insurance, 
accident control, wage incentives, and methods engineering, by cooperating and advising 
with voluntary business, professional, educational, and other nonprofit organizations, 
associations, and institutions and with other Federal and State agencies by maintaining a 
clearinghouse for information concerning the managing, fmancing, and operation of 
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small-business enterprises, by disseminating such information, and by such other 
activities as are deemed appropriate by the Administration; 
"(2) to make a complete inventory of all productive facilities of small-
business concerns or to arrange for such inventory to be made by any other governmental 
agency which his the facilities. In making any such inventory, the appropriate agencies 
in the several States may be requested to furnish an inventory of the productive facilities 
of small-business concerns in each respective State if such an inventory is available or in 
prospect; 
"(3) to coordinate and to ascertain the means by which the productive 
capacity of small-business concerns can be most effectively utilized; 
"(4) to consult and cooperate with officers of the Government having 
procurement or property disposal powers, in order to utilize the potential productive 
capacity of plants operated by small-business concerns; 
"(5) to obtain information as to methods and practices which Government 
prime contractors utilize in letting subcontracts and to take action to encourage the letting 
of subcontracts by prime contractors to small-business concerns at prices and on 
conditions and terms which are fair and equitable; 
"(6) to determine within any industry the concerns, fIrms, persons, 
corporations, partnerships, cooperatives, or other business enterprises which are to be 
designated 'small-business concerns' for the purpose of effectuating the provisions of this 
Act. To carry out this purpose the Administrator, when requested to do so, shall issue in 
response to each such request an appropriate certifIcate certifying an individual concern 
as a 'small-business concern' in accordance with the criteria expressed in this Act. Any 
such certificate shall be subject to revocation when the concern covered thereby ceases to 
be a 'small-business concern'. Offices of the Government having procurement or lending 
powers, or engaging in the disposal of Federal property or allocating materials or 
supplies, or promulgating regulations affecting the distribution of materials or supplies, 
shall accept as conclusive the Administration's determination as to which enterprises are 
to be designated 'small-business concerns', as authorized and directed under this 
paragraph; 
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"(7) to certify to Government procurement officers, and officers engaged 
in the sale and disposal of Federal property, with respect to the c o m p e t e n c y ~ ~ as to 
capacity and credit, of any small-business concern or group of such concerns to perform a 
specific Government contract. In any case in which a small business concern or group of 
such concerns has been certified by or under the authority of the Administration to be a 
competent Government contractor with respect to capacity and credit is to a specific 
Government contract, the officers of the Government having procurement or property 
disposal powers are directed to accept such certification as conclusive, and are authorized 
to let such Government contract to such concern or group of concerns without requiring it 
to meet any other requirement with respect to capacity and credit; 
"(8) to obtain from any Federal department, establishment, or agency 
engaged in procurement or in the fmancing of procurement or production such reports 
concerning the letting of contracts and subcontracts and the making of loans to business 
concerns as it may deem pertinent in carrying out its functions under this Act; 
"(9) to obtain from any Federal department, establishment. or agency 
engaged in the disposal of Federal property such reports concerning the solicitation of 
bids, time of sale, or otherwise as it may deem pertinent in carrying out its functions 
under this Act; 
"(10) to obtain from suppliers of materials information pertaining to the 
method of filling orders and the bases for allocating their supply, whenever it appears 
than any small business is unable to obtain materials from its normal sources: 
"(11) to make studies and recommendations to the appropriate Federal 
agencies to insure that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts for property 
and services for the Government be placed with small-business enterprises, to insure that 
a fair proportion of Government contracts for research and development be placed with 
small-business concerns, to insure that a fair proportion of the total sales of Government 
property be made to small-business concerns, and to insure a fair and equitable share of 
materials, supplies, and equipment to small-business concerns; 
"(12) to consult and cooperate with all Government agencies for the 
purpose of insuring that small-business concerns shall receive fair and reasonable 
treatment from such agencies; and 
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"(13) to establish such small business advisory boards and committees truly 
representative of small business as may be necessary to achieve the purposes of this Act. 
"(c) The Administration shall from time to time make studies of matters 
materially affecting the competitive strength of small business, and of the effect on small 
business of Federal laws, programs, and regulations, and shall make recommendations to the 
appropriate Federal agency or agencies for the adjustment of such programs and regulations 
to the needs of small business. 
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Appendix IV 
Vote recorded December 18 1969 in the Senate on the question of whether 
Section 904 ofHR15202 (Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 1970) was germane to the bill. 
Yeas - 52 
Aitken Ervin Murphy 
Allen Fannin Pearson 
Allot Fulbright Proutty 
Baker Goldwater Proxmire 
Bennet Gore Randolph 
Bible Gurney Saxbe 
Burdick Hansen Smith, Maine 
Byrd, Va. Holland Sparkman 
Byrd, W. Va. Hruska Spong 
Cannon Jordan, NC Stennis 
Cook Jordan, Idaho Stevens 
Cotton Long Talmadge 
Curtis Magnusson Thurmond 
Dodd Mansfield Williams, Del. 
Dole McClellan Yarborough 
Dominick Metcalf Young, NO 
Eastland Miller Young, Ohio 
Ellender 
N 37 ays -
Baye Hart Montoya 
Bellmon Hatfield Moss 
Boggs Hughes Muskie 
Brooke Jackson Nelson 
Case Javits Packwood 
Church Kennedy Pastore 
Cranston Mathias Pell 
Eagleton McCarthy Schweiker 
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Fong McGee Scott 
Goodell McGovern Smith, Ill. 
Gravel Macintyre Tydings 
Griffin Mondale Williams 
Harris 
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Vote Recorded December 22 1969 in the House of Congress on the motion put forward by Mr. 
Mahon from Texas that the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 33 
(HR15209). From CR 40921, 40922. 
Y'EAS-156 
Abernethy Fuqua O'Konskt 
Addabbo Galiflanakis Olsen 
Alexander Gaydos Passman 
Anderson, Gettys Patman 
Tenn. GIaimo Pepper 
Ashbrook Gray Perkins 
Baring Griflln Philbin 
Bennett Gross Pickle 
Blaggi Grover Preyer, N.C. 
Blackburn Hagan Pryor, Ark. 
Bray Haley Pucinsky 
Brinkley Hansen, Wash. Purcell 
Brooks Harsha Quillen 
Brown, Calif. Hays Randall 
Broyhill, N.C. Henderson Rarick 
Broyhill, Va. Hicks Rivers 
Burke, Mass. Holifield Roberts 
Burleson, Tex. Hungate Roe 
Burlison, Me. Ichord Rogers. PIa. 
CabeI Jarman Rooney,Pa. 
Casey Johnson, Calif Roudebush 
Chappell Jonas Ruth 
Clancy Jones, Ala. St. Germain 
Clark Jones, N.C. St. Onge 
Clawson, Del J ones, Tenn. Satterfield 
Collins Karth Scherle 
Corbett Kazen Scott 
Cramer Kee Shipley 
Crane King Slack 
Daniel, Va. Kluezynski Smith, Iowa 
Daniels, N.J. Kyros Snyder 
Davis, Ga. Lennon Steed 
de la Garza Long, La. Steiger, Artz. 
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Denney Long, Md. Stubblefield 
Derwinski MeDonald, Stuckey 
Devine Mich. Symington 
Dingell McFall Taylor 
Donohue MeMillan Thompson, Ga. 
Dom Macdonald, Tieman 
Dowdy Mass. Ullman 
Downing Mahon Vigorito 
Duncan Mann Waggonner 
Edmondson Marsh Wampler 
Eilberg Melcher Watson 
Fisher Minshall Watts 
Flood Mizell Whitehurst 
Flowers Mollohan Whitten 
Flynt Monagan Wiggins 
Ford, Morgan Williams 
WilliamD. Murphy, Ill. Yatron 
Foreman Myers Young 
Fountain Natcher Zablocki 
Frey Nedzi 
Fulton, Pa. O'Hara 
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NAYS-208 
Adams Button Esch 
Albert Byrne,Pa. Eshleman 
Anderson, Byrnes, Wis. Evans, Colo. 
Calif Camp Feighan 
Anderson, Ill. Carter Fish 
Annunzio Cederberg Foley 
Arends Chamberlain Ford, Gerald R. 
Ashley Chisholm Fraser 
Ayres Clausen, Prelinghuysen 
Barrett DonH. Friedel 
Beall, Md. Clay Gallagher 
Belcher Cleveland Garrnatz 
Bell,Calif Cohelan Gibbons 
Betts Conable Gilbert 
Biester Conte Gonzalez 
Bingham Corman Goodling 
Blatnik Coughlin Green, Pa. 
Boggs Cowger Gubser 
Boland Culver Gude 
Bow Cunningham Halpern 
Brademas Daddario Hamilton 
Brasco Davis, Wis. Hanley 
Broomfield Dellenback Hanna 
Brotzman Dennis Hansen, Idaho 
Brown, Mich. Dickinson Harrington 
Brown, Ohio Diggs Hastings 
Buchanan Dulski Hathaway 
Burke, PIa. Eckhardt Hawkins 
Burton,Callf Edwards, Ala. Hechler, W. Va. 
Bush Erlenbom Heckler, Mass. 
Helstoski Minish Sebelius 
Hogan Mink Shriver 
Horton Mize Smith, N.Y. 
Hosmer Moorhead Springer 
Howard Morton Stafford 
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Hunt Mosher Staggers 
Hutchinson Murphy, N.Y. Stanton 
Jacobs Nelsen Steiger, Wis. 
Kastenmeler Nix Stokes 
Keith Obey Stratton 
Kleppe O'Neill, Mass. Taft 
Koeh Ottinger Talcott 
Kuykendall Patten Teague, Calit. 
Kyl Pelly Thompson, N. 
Landgrebe Pettis Thomson, Wis 
Langen Pike Tunney 
Latta Pirnle Udall 
Leggett Podell Utt 
Lloyd Price, Ill. Van Deerlin 
Lowenstein Price, Tex. Vander Jagt 
Lujan Quie Vanik 
Lukens Railsback Waldie 
McCarthy Reid, Ill. Weicker 
MeCloskey ReId, N.Y. Whalen 
McClure Rhodes Whalley 
McCulloch Riegle White 
MeDade Robison Widnall 
MeEwen Rodino Wilson, Bob 
McKneally Rogers, Colo. Wilson, 
MaeGregor Rooney,N.Y. Charles H. 
Madden Rosenthal Winn 
Mailliard Poth Wold 
Mathias Roybal Wyatt 
Matsunaga Ruppe Wydler 
May Ryan Wylie 
Mayne Sandman Wyman 
Meeds Saylor Yates 
Meskill Schadeberg Zion 
Michel Scheuer Zwach 
Mikva Schneebell 
Miller, Ohio Schwengel 
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ANSWERED "PRESENT"-l 
Pollock 
NOT VOTING-68 
Abbitt Edwards, La. Montgomery 
Adair Evins, Tenn. Morse 
Andrews, Ala. Fallon Moss 
Andrews, Farbstein Nichols 
N.Dak. Fassell O'Neal, Ga. 
Aspinall Findley Poage 
Berry Fulton, Tenn. Poff 
Bevill Goldwater Powell 
Blanton Green, Oreg. Rees 
Boiling Griffiths ReIfel 
Brock Hall Reuss 
Burton, Ut Hammer- Rostenkowsk 
Caffery Schmidt Sikes 
Cahill Harvey Sisk 
Carey Hebert Skubitz 
Celler Hull Smith, Calif 
Collier Johnson, Pa. Stephens 
Co liner Kirwan Sullivan 
Conyers Landrum Teague,Tex. 
Dawson Lipscomb Watkins 
Delaney McClory Wolff 
Dent Martin Wright 
Dwyer Miller, Calif 
Edwards, Ca Mills 
Source: Congressional Record, 91 st Congress, Volume 115,40921,40922. 
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